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According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), there are
852 million undernourished people in the world, of whom approximately 815
million reside in developing countries. 1 Progress in hunger reduction has
slowed in recent years, and the number of undernourished people is growing
in most of the developing world. 2 Rampant hunger and malnutrition impair
3
the economic performance of individuals, households, and entire nations,
and can lead to political instability and civil strife.4 Environmental
*Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to thank the
following individuals for their helpful comments and suggestions: Jan Ainsworth, Ari Afilalo,
Charles Pouncy, David Skover, Phil Harvey, Jose Alvarez, Rand Rosenblatt, Ann Freedman,
Kellye Testy, Jorge Esquirol, Kristen Sheeran, Fran Ansley, Tim Canova, Linda Bosniak, Claire
Moore Dickerson, and Sylvia Lazos.

I U.N.

FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2004 6 (July 2004),
available at http://www.fao.org (last visited Dec. 29, 2004) [hereinafter FAO, STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY 2004].
2 U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2003 4 (July 2003),

available at http://www.fao.org/documents/showcdr.asp?url-file=/DOCREP/006/jO083eOO.htm
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2003].
3 See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2002,
Undernourishment Around the World 8 (July 2002), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/
005/y7352e/y7352e0O.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter FAO, STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY 2002]. For example, anemia, stunted growth, iodine deficiency, and iron deficiency
have reduced GDP by several percentage points in countries as diverse as Bolivia, Nicaragua,
India, Pakistan, and South Africa. Id. at 8-9.
4 See id., Toward the Summit Commitments, at 4. Food insecurity and conflict often coincide.
According to some analysts, poverty and underdevelopment, which are closely linked to food
insecurity, make countries more prone to conflict. Indeed, food insecurity and conflict often share
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degradation has depressed agricultural productivity, 5 and is increasingly
recognized as a major factor contributing to both food insecurity and conflict.6
Natural resource degradation through unsustainable farming methods can
exacerbate poverty, produce large-scale migrations, sharpen social cleavages,
weaken institutions, and result in outbreaks of violent conflict.7 For example,
one of the underlying causes of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan was
the drought and desertification that prompted Arab herders to encroach upon
African tribal lands.8 It is important to recognize that food security and
ecological sustainability are closely intertwined and that both are critical to
sustainable rural development.
This article examines the impact of the neoliberal policy prescriptions of
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) on hunger and natural resource degradation in the
developing world. The neoliberal economic model generally consists of trade
liberalization, slashing of social spending, privatization of industry and
public services, deregulation, and unrestricted movement of capital. 9 While
mindful of the various elements that comprise the neoliberal model, this
article focuses specifically on the food security and environmental
consequences of trade liberalization in the agricultural sector.
The article's conclusions are two-fold. First, "free trade" is a misnomer.
The neoliberal trade regime institutionalizes a double standard that permits
protectionism in developed countries while requiring developing countries to
open their markets to highly subsidized foreign competition. This double
standard reinforces pre-existing patterns of trade and production that
undermine the livelihoods of rural smallholders, degrade the natural resource
base necessary for food production, and impede the economic diversification
necessary for food security at the national level. Second, as explained in Part
V of the article, even if the neoliberal model were applied in an even-handed
a common set of risk factors, including degradation and unequal access to natural resources,
repressive political systems, and socially and culturally polarized societies. Id. at 4-6.
5 See Per Pinstrup-Anderson & Rajul Pandya-Lorch, Food Security and Sustainable Use of
Natural Resources: A 2020 Vision, 26 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1, 5-6 (1998).
6 See id. at 6; see also THOMAS F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY AND VIOLENCE 73-106

(1999) (describing the relationship between environmental scarcity and violent conflict); LEIF
OHLSSON, SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, LIVELIHOOD CONFLICTS: LINKING
POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENT AS CAUSES OF CONFLICT (2002), available at http://www.gm-

nccd.org[FIELD/Bilaterals/Swedenlsweden7.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) (describing how
environmental degradation fuels conflict by undermining the livelihoods of the poor).
See FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2002, supra note 3, Toward the Summit Commitments, at
6.
8 Emily Wax, DarfuriansCould Lose the Land They Fled, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004, at A16.
9 The adoption of the neoliberal economic model in much of the developing world has resulted in
a significant slowdown in economic growth, greater poverty and inequality, and growing social
and political unrest. See William Finnegan, The Economics of Empire: Notes on the Washington
Consensus, HARPER'S, May 1, 2003, at 42, 45-50 (describing the elements of the neoliberal
model).
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manner to both developed and developing countries, it would nevertheless
have a negative impact on food security and ecological sustainability.
In order to assess the impact of trade liberalization in the agricultural
sector, it is important to grasp four counter-intuitive points developed in
Parts I and II of the article. First, hunger is a function of poverty rather than
food scarcity. Food production has kept far ahead of population growth for
nearly half a century. People go hungry because they lack the resources with
which to purchase or grow food. Consequently, measures that increase
poverty will have a negative impact on food security. Second, nearly eighty
percent of the world's undernourished people reside in rural areas in the
developing world. Most of these malnourished people are small farmers
whose livelihoods depend on selling their agricultural output. Policies that
(such as food aid or production-enhancing
depress agricultural prices
programs like the Green Revolution) exacerbate hunger by rendering small
farmers destitute, thereby depriving them of the income with which to
purchase agricultural inputs, pay taxes, and purchase consumer goods and
food not produced on the farm. Third, economic diversification is necessary to
achieve food security at the national level. A food secure country is one that
can grow or import the food necessary to feed its population. The most food
insecure countries are those that rely on one or two agricultural commodities
to finance the importation of food products.1 0 These countries are vulnerable
to world market price fluctuations and to the declining terms of trade for
agricultural commodities relative to manufactured goods. Economic policies
that directly require or indirectly reinforce specialization in a handful of
primary agricultural commodities exacerbate food insecurity by hindering
economic diversification.
Fourth, biological diversity is necessary for
ecosystem health and for the integrity of the food supply. Consequently,
monocultural production techniques that maximize the production of a few
crops degrade the natural resource base necessary for food production by
eroding biological diversity, promoting pest and disease infestation, depleting
soil fertility, and requiring massive application of harmful agrochemicals.
Taken together, these insights highlight the misguided nature of
international efforts to solve the problem of hunger by providing free or
subsidized food, by promoting monocultural production based on the theory of
comparative advantage, and by maximizing the supply of food without regard
to the impact on poverty and inequality. The significance of these
observations is often obscured by the fact that the relevant research has been
undertaken in different disciplines. For example, the ecological literature on
sustainable agriculture and the economic literature on food security make
analogous critiques of the theory of comparative advantage as applied to the
agricultural sector. Contrary to the theory of comparative advantage,
economic specialization in the cultivation of monocultures is inimical to the
biological diversity essential to ecosystem health. This economic
10 See, e.g., U.N. ECON. COMM'N ON LATIN AM. AND THE CARIBBEAN (ECLAC), THE SOCIAL
PANORAMA OF LATIN AMERICA 12-13 (2003) [hereinafter ECLAC].
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specialization is also an obstacle to the economic diversification necessary to
promote food security. One of the contributions of this article is to bring
together insights from a variety of disciplines in order to explain the links
among hunger, rural poverty, and environmental degradation and to explore
the roots of these problems in historical and contemporary international
trade and agricultural policy.
It is important to emphasize that trade liberalization did not create the
patterns of trade and production that produce food insecurity and
environmental degradation in the developing world. Rather, these patterns
have their genesis in colonialism, in the post-colonial integration of many
developing countries into the global trading system, and in the unintended
consequences of post-World War II development assistance programs (such as
the Green Revolution). Trade liberalization under structural adjustment and
under the WTO trade regime aggravates hunger and natural resource
degradation precisely because it reinforces these underlying trade and
production patterns.
As explained in Part II, the underlying inequities in the global trading
system have their origin in the colonial division of labor that relegated the
colonized "periphery" to the production of primary agricultural products for
the benefit of the colonizing "core." As a consequence of this economic
specialization, many developing countries currently rely on export-oriented
crop production as a means of generating the foreign exchange earnings with
which to purchase manufactured goods and food products. Specialization in
the cultivation of cash crops contributes to food insecurity in two distinct
ways. First, it diverts prime agricultural lands from food production to cash
crop production. Second, it subjects developing country export revenues to
fluctuating world market prices for agricultural commodities and to the
declining terms of trade for agricultural products. Developing countries
thereby produce less food and lack the steady and reliable export earnings
necessary to finance the importation of food products. This economic
specialization also degrades the environment by replacing biodiverse
agroecosystems with monocultures that require application of large amounts
of chemical fertilizers and synthetic pesticides.
After World War II, international development assistance programs
inadvertently exacerbated food insecurity and environmental degradation by
aggravating rural poverty and promoting monocultural production
techniques. For example, both the Green Revolution and the provision of
surplus U.S. grain as aid undermined the livelihoods of poor farmers in the
developing world by depressing agricultural prices. The Green Revolution
also extended to food crops the monocultural production techniques used for
cash crops. As a consequence of the Green Revolution, the world's food supply
came to rely on a smaller number of crops and on an increasingly narrow
genetic base. Farmers throughout the developing world abandoned
traditional biodiverse cultivation techniques in favor of uniform seeds,
chemical fertilizers, and synthetic pesticides manufactured by transnational

HeinOnline -- 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 423 2004-2005

TRANSNA TIONAL LA W & CONTEMPORAR Y PROBLEMS

[Vol. 14:419

corporations headquartered in the industrialized world. The rapidly
expanding commercial cultivation of genetically modified crops threatens to
reinforce monocultural production techniques and to increase the dependence
of farmers in the developing world on inputs and innovations produced in the
industrialized world.
As detailed in Part III, the structural adjustment programs mandated by
the IMF and World Bank exacerbated the problem of economic specialization
and ecologically harmful monocultures by requiring developing countries to
increase agricultural exports in order to boost the foreign exchange earnings
available to service the foreign debt. In addition, developing countries were
required to eliminate agricultural subsidies and to lower tariffs and eliminate
non-tariff barriers. Because these policy prescriptions did not apply to
industrialized countries, structural adjustment promoted a double standard
that plagues the agricultural sector to this day: protectionism in wealthy
countries; liberalized trade in poor countries. While developing countries
opened their markets to foreign competition, the United States and the
European Union (EU) increased agricultural subsidies and utilized both tariff
and non-tariff barriers to keep out developing country exports.
Structural adjustment had a devastating impact on food security and the
environment in the developing world. The reduction or elimination of (tariff
and non-tariff) import barriers resulted in an influx of cheap, subsidized food
from the United States and the European Union. Small farmers were
rendered destitute, and hunger increased at the household level. By
depressing food prices, the cheap imports also discouraged domestic food
production. At the same time, the protectionist import barriers and tradedistorting subsidies maintained by the United States and the European
Union reduced developing country export revenues. Food security declined at
the national level as developing countries produced less food and had less
foreign exchange with which to purchase imports. Finally, the exportoriented policies favored by the World Bank and the IMF degraded the
environment by promoting the expansion of chemical-intensive, monocultural
production techniques (industrial agriculture). The widespread adoption of
industrial agriculture has contributed to a wide range of ecological problems,
including soil degradation, loss of agricultural productivity, depletion of
freshwater resources, contamination of water supplies by pesticides and
fertilizers, loss of biological diversity, and loss of ecosystem resilience."

11 See Brian Halweil, Farming in the Public interest, in THE WORLDWATCH INST., STATE OF THE
WORLD 2002, 51, 53-56 (2002); Jules N. Pretty et al., Policy Challenges and Priorities for
Internalizing the Externalities of Modern Agriculture, 44(2) J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 263, 264
(2001) [hereinafter Pretty, Policy Challenges and Priorities];LORI ANN THRUPP, WORLD RES.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
INST., LINKING BIODIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURE:
SUSTAINABLE FOOD SECURITY 4-10 (1997) [hereinafter THRUPP, LINKING BIODIvERSITY AND
AGRICULTURE]; see also David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for
Agriculture: Towards a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 4 (2002).

HeinOnline -- 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 424 2004-2005

Fall 2004]

NEOLIBERAL THREAT TO SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT

425

The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947 GATT) failed to
curb agricultural subsidies and import barriers due to weaknesses in the
agreement that facilitated these protectionist practices. However, the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture was explicitly intended to correct market
distortions in the agricultural sector. Regrettably, the Agreement on
Agriculture was riddled with ambiguities and exceptions that enabled the
United States and the EU to maintain protectionist import barriers and
trade-distorting subsidies. Indeed, subsidy levels in industrialized countries
increased after the Agreement on Agriculture came into effect-from $308
billion in 1986-1988 to $318 billion in 2002. By contrast, developing countries
were required by World Bank- and IMF-mandated structural adjustment
programs to maintain relatively open markets. In effect, the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture institutionalized the double standard in the agricultural
sector: protectionism in wealthy countries; liberalized trade in poor countries.
Many proponents of trade liberalization would agree with the above
analysis and would argue that the solution is simple: level the playing field
by requiring the United States and the EU to eliminate agricultural subsidies
and reduce tariffs. As explained in Part V, dismantling the protectionist
barriers of the United States and the EU would certainly reduce the
inequities in the global trading system, but trade liberalization is not
sufficient to promote food security and ecological sustainability in the long
term.
First, trade liberalization in the industrialized world is not sufficient to
address the distortions and inequities caused by the monopolization of
agricultural markets by a handful of transnational corporations. For
example, five agrochemical companies currently control over sixty-five
percent of the global pesticide market. Many of these companies have merged
with companies that produce seeds and fertilizers. These companies can
extract monopolistic prices for key agricultural inputs. A similar
concentration of market power exists among the transnational corporations
that process and market agricultural output. These companies utilize their
market power to dictate agricultural commodity prices. Farmers are
increasingly squeezed between the handful of transnational corporations that
supply inputs and the handful of transnational corporations that purchase
their agricultural output. The monopolization of agricultural trade by
transnational agribusiness places developing country farmers at an enormous
competitive disadvantage and threatens to perpetuate poverty and hunger.
Second, trade liberalization impedes the economic diversification
necessary to promote food security at the national level. Contrary to the free
market prescriptions of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, virtually all
industrialized countries (including the United States, France, Germany,
Japan, and the United Kingdom) relied on tariffs, subsidies, and other
interventionist measures to industrialize. Most recently, the newly
industrializing countries of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore successfully
industrialized their economies using a combination of tariffs, subsidies, and

HeinOnline -- 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 425 2004-2005

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 14:419

regulation of foreign investment. Trade liberalization deprives developing
countries of the very tools used by industrialized countries to diversify and
industrialize their economies.
Finally, trade liberalization poses a threat to the biological diversity
necessary to maintain healthy agroecosystems. The elimination of U.S. and
EU subsidies and import barriers is anticipated to increase crop
specialization in the developing world in accordance with the dictates of
global markets. This development would continue the erosion of crop
diversity and the displacement of sustainable agricultural production
techniques by chemical-intensive monocultures.
There is only one country in the western hemisphere that has
emphatically rejected the neoliberal economic model and has promoted a
nation-wide experiment in ecologically sustainable alternatives to exportoriented industrial agriculture. That country is Cuba. 12 From the colonial
period until the early 1990s, Cuba, like many developing countries, was
highly food insecure as a consequence of its dependence on one agricultural
commodity (sugar) to generate the bulk of foreign exchange earnings and its
reliance on imports to satisfy domestic food needs. 13 During the first three
decades of the revolution (1959-1989), the Cuban government embarked on
an investment strategy designed to produce large-scale, chemical-dependent,
capital-intensive farms specializing in sugar cane and livestock. 14 Cuba's
adoption of industrial agriculture resulted in serious ecological harm and
little improvement in food security.15 When the collapse of the socialist
trading bloc in 1990 plunged the Cuban economy into a state of crisis known
as the Special Period in Peacetime, Cuba experienced severe shortages of
food, fuel, and agricultural inputs 16 The Cuban government responded to the
crisis by implementing a series of reforms (including diversification of the
agricultural sector, production for the domestic market, and active promotion
of organic and semi-organic techniques) that enhanced food security and
promoted ecological sustainability.17 These reforms have been hailed by some

12 See generally SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND RESISTANCE (Fernando Funes et al. eds., 2002)
(describing the transformation of Cuban agriculture after the demise of the socialist trading
bloc).
13See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security in
Cuba, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 685, 689-95, 703-07 (2003); see also Laura J. Enriquez, Cuba's New
Agricultural Revolution: The Transformation of Food Crop Production in Contemporary Cuba, 14
FOOD FIRST DEV. REP. (May 2000), available at http://www.foodfirst.org/pubs/devreps/drl4html
(last visited Nov. 9, 2004) (explaining that export-oriented agricultural production and
dependence on food imports are common in the Caribbean and much of the developing world).

14Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 707-08.
16Id. at 706-08.
16 Id.

at 686.

at 712-28. These reforms included decentralization and diversification of agricultural
production, renewed emphasis on production for the domestic market, promotion of organic and
semi-organic farming techniques, and opening farmers' markets (at prices determined by supply
17 Id.
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commentators as "unprecedented, with potentially enormous implications for
other countries suffering from the declining sustainability of conventional
agricultural production." 18
Cuba's post-1990 economic experiment raises many questions of interest
to developing countries caught in the vise of neoliberal economic policies. The
transformation of Cuban agriculture was made possible by Cuba's relative
economic isolation, including its exclusion from major international trade and
financial institutions as a consequence of the U.S. economic embargo. 19 When
the U.S. embargo is lifted, Cuba will be faced with the difficult task of
maintaining an autonomous development path in the face of intense pressure
to adopt neoliberal reforms and to revert to the export-oriented industrial
agricultural model. Cuba is therefore a superb vehicle for examining the
ways in which global trade and financial institutions constrain the
development options of small, trade-dependent developing countries and
threaten food security and the environment.
An analysis of the historic roots and current status of export-oriented
industrial agriculture in the developing world through the lens of food
security and ecological sustainability necessarily requires a definition of key
terms. Part I introduces the concept of food security and explains the key
elements of ecological sustainability. Part II traces the evolution of industrial
agriculture in developing countries from the colonial period through the
Green Revolution and discusses some of the risks and benefits of
biotechnology. Part III examines the ways in which the neoliberal economic
model imposed through trade agreements and structural adjustment
programs reinforces export-oriented industrial agriculture and compromises
food security and ecological sustainability. Part IV shifts the focus to Cuba,
describing the evolution of industrial agriculture in Cuba and highlighting
the innovative policies and practices adopted by the Cuban government in the
aftermath of the collapse of the socialist trading bloc. Part IV concludes with
an assessment of the potential impact of neoliberalism on the Cuban reforms.
Finally, Part V argues that the neoliberal economic model is inherently
incompatible with food security and ecological sustainability.

and demand) in order to boost food production and improve food distribution. Cuba shifted from
a large-scale, export-oriented, chemical-intensive agricultural development strategy to one that
favored smaller-scale production, ecologically sustainable farming techniques, and production for
the domestic market. Id.
18 See THE GREENING OF THE REVOLUTION: CUBA'S EXPERIMENT WITH ORGANIC AGRICULTURE 8

(Peter Rosset & Medea Benjamin eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE GREENING OF THE REVOLUTION].
19 See MINOR SINCLAIR & MARTHA THOMPSON,

OXFAM, CUBA: GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN:

AGRICULTURAL CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION 43 (2001), available at http://www.oxfamerica/
newsandpublications/publications/ research reports/art1 164.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
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SECURITY AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This Part supplies the theoretical framework for the remainder of the
article by defining food security and ecological sustainability.

A. Food Security: An EntitlementsApproach
Food security is "physical and economic access by all people at all times to
20
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life."
Contrary to popular misconception, food insecurity is not caused by food
scarcity. 21 Indeed, global food production since 1950 has kept far ahead of
population growth, and many of the countries experiencing rampant hunger
routinely export more agricultural products than they import. 22 Food
insecurity is therefore not due to lack of food or even lack of productive
capacity. 23 Rather, people go hungry because of economic inequalities that
prevent them from obtaining food.24
The notion of food insecurity as a consequence of food distribution, rather
than food scarcity, is a product of the pioneering work of Amartya Sen,
winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in economics. 25 In Sen's view, food security is
a matter of entitlements, which he defines as the ability to command food
using the legal means available in society. 26 Sen's analysis of the role of
entitlements transformed the debate on food security from a scarcity-based

20 This

definition is based on the food security definition adopted at the 1996 World Food Summit
and on the definition utilized by the World Bank in its influential 1986 report on world hunger.
Like the World Food Summit and the World Bank report, this article recognizes that eradication
of poverty and inequality is critical to promoting food security. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.
(FAO), ROME DECLARATION ON WORLD FOOD SECURITY, WORLD FOOD SUMMIT 13-17 (Nov. 1996),
available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/w3613e/w36163EOO.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2004) (vowing to "implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality and improving
physical and economic access by all, at all times, to sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe
food and its effective utilization"); WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER: ISSUES AND OPTIONS
FOR FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (1986) (defining food security as "access by all
people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life," and recognizing that food insecurity
is caused mainly by a lack of purchasing power) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND
HUNGER].
21

See E.M. YOUNG, WORLD HUNGER 3 (1997); STEPHEN DEVEREUX, THEORIES OF FAMINE 57-82

(1993); WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER, supra note 20, at 1.
22

See FRANCES MOORE LAPPE ET AL., WORLD HUNGER: TWELVE MYTHS 8-14 (1998).

23 See id.; JOHN MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL: THE NEED FOR A NEW AGRICULTURE 34 (2002)
[hereinafter MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL].
24

See MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL, supra note 23, at 32-34; WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER,

supra note 20, at 1.
25 See JENNY EDKINS, WHOSE HUNGER? CONCEPTS OF FAMINE, PRACTICES OF AID 43-49 (2000)

(describing Sen's challenge to the assumption that famine is caused by food shortages).
26

AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION 1-2

(1981) [hereinafter SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES].
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approach to one that emphasizes the political, economic,
27
institutions that determine how available food is distributed.

and

legal

Sen identifies food security at the household level as a function of the
household's package of entitlements. 28 This package may consist of all or
some of the following: (i) production-based entitlements (the right to consume
the food produced); 29 (ii) labor-based entitlements (the right to the income
obtained through the sale of labor); 30 (iii) trade-based entitlements (the right
to purchase food in the market);31 and (iv) transfer-based entitlements (the
right to food donated by others, such as family, friends, and government aid
programs). 32 Utilizing this framework, food security in rural households in
developing countries will turn on access to land, the availability of
employment, income earned from employment or from the sale of agricultural
output, food available for purchase in the market, and assistance from family

27EDKINS, supra note 25, at 45; YOUNG, supra note 21, at 4. As a consequence of Sen's work, it is
now widely accepted that promotion of food security requires a reduction of poverty and
inequality. See, e.g., JOHAN POTTIER, ANTHROPOLOGY OF FOOD: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF FOOD
SECURITY 142-43 (1999); GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY GREEN REVOLUTION: FOOD FOR ALL IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 4-5, 286-87 (1997); YOUNG, supra note 21, at 2-7; DEVEREUX, supra note 21,
at 57-82; FRANK ELLIS, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 302-11, 316 (1992);
WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER, supra note 20, at 1; U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG, STATE OF
FOOD INSECURITY 2000, at What Have We Learned? and The Socio-Economic Impact of
Agricultural Modernization (2000) (concluding that hunger is not the result of insufficient food
supplies, but lack of access to food supplies, and stating that world food security is a matter of
insufficient purchasing power of the poor) [hereinafter FAO STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2000].
While Sen's approach has generally been well received, Sen's work has been criticized for being
overly technocratic and insufficiently attentive to economic and political context. See generally
EDKINS, supra note 25, at 49-66 (discussing this and other criticisms of Sen's work).
28 SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES, supra note 26, at 1-2; YOUNG, supranote 21, at 6.
29 SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES, supra note 26, at 1-2. The key determinant of production-based
entitlements is access to land and livestock on the basis of ownership or other rights, such as
tenancy, sharecropping, or usufruct rights. See CHRISTOPHER STEVENS ET AL., THE WTO
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY 5 (2000). Governments can boost productionbased entitlements by offering farmers credit, input subsidies (such as free or subsidized seeds
and fertilizer), research and extension services, and irrigation projects or by distributing land
pursuant to land reform legislation. Id. at 19-22.
30 SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES, supra note 26, at 2. Labor-based entitlements will be determined
by the availability of employment in both urban and rural areas. Governments can promote
labor-based entitlements by creating incentives for the generation of employment in agricultural
production, manufacturing, or other industries. See STEVENS ET AL., supranote 29, at 7, 34-35.
31SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES, supra note 26, at 2. The price of food relative to household income
is the key factor affecting trade-based entitlements. Food prices will turn on local or regional food
production, the degree of market integration, transportation costs, food subsidies, and, if food is
imported, world market agricultural prices. See STEVENS ET AL., supranote 29, at 6.
32 SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES, supra note 26, at 2. Governments can promote transfer-based
entitlements by providing non-targeted assistance programs (such as food subsidies available to
all regardless of income), targeted assistance programs (such as food stamps or food-for-work
programs available only to the most vulnerable group), or social safety nets designed to assist
those experiencing deterioration in any of their entitlements. See STEVENS ET AL., supra note 29,
at 8.
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members or the state. 33 For urban dwellers, food security will depend on
employment earnings, the consumption and sale of crops grown in backyards
or common lands, food available for purchase on the market, publicly34
subsidized food programs, and assistance from family members.
Food security at the national level parallels food security at the
household level. 35 Like household food security, the food security of a state is
a function of (i) production-based entitlements (domestic food production
capacity), 36 (ii) trade-based entitlements (ability to earn foreign exchange in
order to import food),37 and (iii) transfer-based entitlements (ability to obtain
food as aid). 38 Thus, a food-secure state is one that can produce, purchase, or
obtain as aid the food necessary to satisfy the needs of its population.
Contrary to the specialization promoted by the theory of comparative
advantage, 39 diversifying exports is the key to maintaining food security. 40
The least food-secure states are those that combine inadequate domestic food
production with heavy reliance upon one or two agricultural export
commodities for a significant portion of foreign exchange earnings. 41 Poor
harvests or sudden declines in world market prices for exports can deprive
these countries of the foreign exchange earnings necessary to purchase
essential foodstuffs. 42 Likewise, increases in the world market price of
imports can make it difficult to obtain the food necessary to satisfy domestic
nutritional needs. 43 Beginning in the 1880s, developing countries that
specialize in agricultural exports have been battered by the declining terms
33 YOUNG, supra note 21, at 6.
3

4Id.

35 See STEVENS ET AL., supra note 29, at 18.
36 See id. at 18.

37 See id.
38 See id.

39 Modern trade theory is based in large part on David Ricardo's theory of comparative
advantage. According to this theory, human happiness will be increased if each country produces
those commodities best suited to it by virtue of natural or historical circumstances. Overall
production will increase, and countries can simply trade with one another for the commodities
they do not produce. See PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 630 (11th ed. 1980) (describing
comparative advantage as the "unshakeable basis for international trade").
40 See JEAN DREZE & AMARTYA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION, reprinted in THE AMARTYA
SEN AND JEAN DRtZE OMNIBUS 76-77, 168-70 (1999).

41See STEVENS ET AL., supra note 29, at 14; ECLAC, supra note 10, at 12-13 (2003). For example,
of the forty-seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa, thirty-nine are dependent on two primary
commodities for over fifty percent of export earnings. Declines in the prices of these commodities
can have severe economic consequences. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG, TRADE REFORMS AND
FOOD

SECURITY:

CONCEPTUALIZING

THE

LINKAGES,

ch.

4.1

(2003),

available

at

http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/Y4671E/y4671EOO.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter
FAO, TRADE REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY].
42

YOUNG, supra note 21, at 41.

43 Id.
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of trade for agricultural products relative to manufactured goods. 44 These
countries have found themselves on an economic treadmill whereby they
must significantly expand export production in order to keep pace with
increasingly expensive manufactured imports. 45 Consequently, diversification
of exports is necessary to promote food security and to secure the steady and
46
reliable revenue stream necessary for economic development.
B. Ecological Sustainability:Protectingthe NaturalResource Base Necessary
for Production
Ecological sustainability is the productive use of nature's goods and
services without damaging the environment. 47 Sustainability is a goal rather
than a predetermined set of practices. The actual practices adopted on any
given farm will be specific to the farm's unique biophysical and socioeconomic
48
characteristics.
Drawing upon the work of biologist Jules Pretty, it is possible to identify
certain characteristics of sustainable agricultural production. First,
sustainable agriculture strives to integrate a wide range of natural pest,
nutrient, soil, and water management technologies into the production
process, while minimizing the use of non-renewable inputs, such as synthetic
fertilizers and pesticides, which may harm human health or the
environment. 49 Second, sustainable agriculture utilizes the knowledge and
skills of farmers as well as the latest scientific innovations in order to
50
promote self-reliance and reduce dependence on costly external inputs.

44 JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 86 (1997).

45 Id.
46 See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (FAO), MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE:

A RESOURCE MANUAL, Vol. I, at 36-37 (2000), available at http://www.fao.org/documents/
show.cdr.asp?urlfile=/DOCREP/003/x7351EOO.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004) [hereinafter FAO
RESOURCE MANUAL, Vol. I].
47 See JULES N. PRETTY, AGRI-CULTURE: RECONNECTING PEOPLE, LAND AND NATURE 56 (2002)

[hereinafter PRETTY, AGRI-CULTURE]. The definition of sustainability used in this article is
derived in part from the concept of sustainable development. Sustainable development is
generally defined as meeting "the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs." WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON
FUTURE 43 (1987). In the agricultural context, this would entail preserving the productive
capacity of the ecosystem and minimizing the use of non-renewable resources. See PETER
EINARSSON, FORUM SYD, AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY AS IF FOOD SECURITY AND ECOLOGICAL

SUSTAINABILITY
MATTERED
4
(2000),
available
library.cfm?refID=29994 (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).

at

http://www.agobservatory.org/

48 See generally JULES N. PRETTY, REGENERATING AGRICULTURE: POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR
SUSTAINABILITY AND SELF-RELIANCE 8-13 (1995) [hereinafter PRETTY, REGENERATING
AGRICULTURE].
49See PRETTY, AGRI-CULTURE, supra note 47, at 56.
50Jules N. Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty by Increasing Sustainability in Developing Countries,
95 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV'T 217, 218-19 (2003) [hereinafter Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty];
PRETTY, REGENERATING AGRICULTURE, supra note 48, at 12. For example, a farm might
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Third, sustainable agriculture recognizes the important contribution of
biodiversity to agricultural production and ecosystem health, and adopts
practices that enhance and conserve biodiversity in agroecosystems,
including plant genetic resources, livestock, insects, and soil organisms. 51
Biological diversity is essential to ecosystem health because it enhances the
ability to resist and recover from disturbances that disrupt important
ecosystem processes. 52 Biodiverse farming systems are more resistant to
pests and disease, conserve soil fertility, reduce dependency on harmful
agrochemicals, reduce risks of catastrophic crop failure, and improve human
nutrition by offering a wide variety of plants and animals for human
consumption. 53 Finally, sustainable agriculture is multifunctional. In
addition to producing food, it provides important public goods, such as clean
water, wildlife conservation, carbon sequestration in soils, flood protection,
54
and aesthetically pleasing landscapes.
The importance of biological diversity for the maintenance of ecosystem
health may create a conflict between sustainable agriculture and the
55
increasing economic specialization promoted by neoclassical trade theory.
From a trade theory perspective, countries with abundant natural resources
and little capital should capitalize on their comparative advantage by
specializing in the production of one or two primary commodities and
purchasing capital-intensive goods from industrialized countries. 56 This
theoretical approach underpins the policy prescription of the World Bank, the
57
IMF, and the WTO.
Regrettably, trade theory neglects to recognize that extension of the
principle of specialization from an industrial context to an agricultural
context erodes biodiversity and jeopardizes the ecosystem services necessary
to sustain agricultural production over the long-term. 58 Likewise, as
explained in the preceding section, reliance on a handful of primary
59
commodities for the bulk of export earnings compromises food security.
incorporate a diversity of inter-linked enterprises, such that byproducts or wastes from one
enterprise (for example, manure from livestock operations) become inputs to another. Id. at 10.
51See THRUPP, LINKING BIOD1VERSITY AND AGRICULTURE, supranote 11, at 1-4, 10-12.
Fred P. Gale, Economics Specialization Versus Ecological Diversification: The Trade Policy
Implications of Taking the Ecosystem Approach Seriously, 34 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 285, 287 (2000).
52

53 THRUPP, LINKING BIODIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURE, supra note 11, at 3.
5

See Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty, supra note 50, at 219.

51 See Gale, supra note 52, at 288-89.
56

Id. at 289-290; see also FAO, TRADE REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY, supra note 41, at ch. 1.3.

57

See FAO, TRADE REFORMS AND FOOD SECURITY, supra note 41, at ch. 1.3.

58 Gale, supra note 52, at 289-90; THRUPP, supra note 11, at 4-10 (discussing the causes and

consequences of loss of agrobiodiversity). See infra notes 135-69 and accompanying text for an
analysis of the ways in which agricultural specialization degrades the environment and
undermines food security.
59See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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Thus, economic specialization on the basis of the theory of comparative
advantage is inconsistent with the economic diversification required to
promote food security and with the biological diversity necessary to promote
ecological sustainability.
These preliminary insights can be illustrated by an account of the
historical evolution of industrial agriculture in the developing world from
colonialism through the Green Revolution and the food security and
ecological consequences of these developments.
II.

ORIGINS OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Three factors contributed to the adoption by developing countries of
monocultural, chemical-intensive, export-oriented model of agricultural
production: the colonial and post-colonial economic division of labor, the postWorld War II agrochemical production boom, and the Green Revolution. This
section argues that the economic specialization in agro-export production
introduced by colonialism (and favored by the theory of comparative
advantage) and the chemical-intensive monocultural farming practices
promoted by the Green Revolution established the patterns of trade and
production that create food insecurity and environmental degradation in the
developing world. Part A discusses the economic and political factors that
caused many developing countries to specialize in agro-export production and
to rely on food imports to satisfy domestic needs. Parts B and C examine the
technological innovations that transformed biodiverse self-sufficient
traditional farms into ecologically harmful monocultures. Part D draws upon
the lessons of the preceding sections to evaluate the potential risks and
benefits of the rapidly expanding commercial cultivation of genetically
modified crops.
A. Export Monocultures: The Colonialand Post-ColonialLegacy
The central role of export-oriented agricultural production in the
60
economies of many developing countries has its genesis in colonialism.
European colonization of Asia, Africa, and Latin America was accompanied
by the imposition of export-oriented crop production as a means of
61
transferring wealth from the colonized "periphery" to the colonizing "core."

60 See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 41-42.
61 See id. at 40-41; ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY 140-41, 310-15

(1997); MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL, supra note 23, at 13; TERENCE HOPKINS ET AL., THE AGE OF
TRANSITION 4 (1998); CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS AND THE Loss

OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 40-41, 179 (1996); Vandana Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind, in
MONOCULTURES OF THE MIND: PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 78-79
(1993) [hereinafter Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind]; see also BELINDA COOTE, THE TRADE TRAP

41-42 (1992) (describing the imposition of cotton cultivation in Chad by the French in the 1920s).
As John Stuart Mill openly acknowledged, "Our West India colonies, for example, cannot be
regarded as countries .... The West Indies ...are the place where England finds it convenient
to carry on the production of sugar, coffee, and a few other tropical commodities." JOHN STUART
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By the latter part of the nineteenth century, places as diverse as Malaysia
(rubber producer), India (cotton producer), Egypt (cotton producer),
Argentina (beef and wheat producer), Ghana (cocoa producer), and Cuba
(sugar producer) had become specialized in the production of one or more
export crops for European (and later U.S.) markets. 62 As they gained
independence, the former colonies were reintegrated into the world economy
as suppliers of raw materials and as consumers of imported manufactured
63
goods.
As a consequence of this history of economic specialization, many
developing countries currently maintain a dangerous reliance on the
production of a handful of primary commodities (such as sugar, coffee, cocoa,
or tea) for the bulk of export revenues. 64 Contrary to the theory of
comparative advantage, specialization has not brought prosperity. On the
contrary, developing countries that specialize in one or two agricultural
commodities to generate export earnings with which to purchase
manufactured goods are highly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of world market
prices for agricultural commodities and to increases in prices for imported
goods. 65 For example, between 1980 and 1998, the terms of trade between
agricultural commodities and manufactured goods fell by more than forty
percent, thereby causing agricultural export revenues to drop while the price
of imports increased. 66 Furthermore, agricultural commodity prices
MILL, Principlesof PoliticalEconomy, with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy, in 2
COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 693 (J.M. Robson ed., 1965).
62See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 41; WOLF, supra note 61, at 310-41 (providing a detailed
description of the worldwide specialization in export crops); Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 689-92
(discussing the factors that produced Cuba's specialization in sugar).
63YOUNG, supra note 21, at 41. In Latin America, for example, agro-export production introduced
by the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers expanded after political independence. Between 1820
and 1930, as the power of the mercantile colonial powers (Spain and Portugal) waned and Great
Britain assumed the role of dominant industrial and commercial power, the newly independent
states of Latin America re-entered the global economy as suppliers of agricultural commodities to
Europe and the United States and as purchasers of manufactured goods. ALAIN DE JANVRY, THE
AGRARIAN QUESTION AND REFORMISM IN LATIN AMERICA 62-65 (1981).
64 YOUNG, supra note 21, at 41; COOTE, supra note 61, at 3-11; Yon Fernandez de Larrinoa Arcal
& Materne Maetz, Trends in World Agriculture and Trade, in FAO RESOURCE MANUAL VOL. I,
supra note 46, at 12, available at http://www.fao.org/documents/ show cdr.asp?urljifle=docrep/
003/x7352E01.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization, as many as forty-three developing countries currently depend on a single
agricultural commodity to generate over twenty percent of total export revenues and derive over
half of total export revenues from agricultural exports. Most of these countries are located in subSaharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2003,
supranote 2, at 17.
65 See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 41, 66; COOTE, supra note 61, at 8; FAO, STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY 2003, supra note 2, at 17. In addition, because export agriculture relies on marketing
institutions controlled by transnational agribusiness, only a fraction of the revenues derived
from the sale of agricultural commodities accrues to the producing country. DE JANVRY, supra
note 63, at 161.
66See Fernandez de Larrinoa Arcal & Maetz, supra note 64, at 13; see also YOUNG, supranote 21,
at 41-42; COOTE, supra note 61, at 8-10.
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fluctuated significantly during this period, thus depriving developing
countries of the stable and steady revenue stream needed for productive
investment and for the purchase of goods not produced locally.6 7 In the
terminology of entitlements, the trade-based entitlements of many developing
countries are quite precarious. Slight fluctuations in global commodity prices
can interfere with their ability to purchase food and other essential items in
68
international markets.
Economic specialization also eroded the production-based entitlements of
developing countries by diverting prime crop land to export production and
encouraging dependence on food imports to satisfy domestic nutritional
needs. 69 This trend gained momentum in the post-World War II period when
the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 480, authorizing the sale of surplus
agricultural commodities to developing countries on highly favorable terms or
the distribution of these commodities free of charge to developing countries as
food aid. 70 Public Law 480 bound developing countries more closely to U.S.
67See Fernandez de Larrinoa Arcal & Maetz, supra note 64, at 12.
68 See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 42. One solution to this predicament is economic
diversification-the development of a manufacturing base in order to ensure robust trade-based
entitlements at the national level. See DRtZE & SEN, supra note 40, at 76-77, 168-70; COOTE,
supra note 61, at 10. Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, for example, diversified their tradebased entitlements by embarking on an ambitious state-led industrialization drive. These
countries identified industries with strong export potential and used a combination of tariffs and
subsidies to protect and promote the selected industries. See Ha-Joon Chang, The East Asian
Development Experience, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 107, 111-17 (Ha-Joon Chang
ed., 2003). However, many developing countries, especially those designated as Least Developed
Countries by the United Nations, derive no more than ten percent of gross domestic product from
manufacturing. These countries lack the capital to industrialize. Indeed, many of these countries
resorted to external borrowing when declining export earnings and unfavorable terms of trade
created serious balance of payments difficulties. The resulting debt service obligations depleted
the export earnings that would otherwise be available for investment. Moreover, the countries
that did develop a manufacturing base often found their exports excluded from industrialized
country markets by non-tariff barriers and by tariffs that escalated for processed commodities.
COOTE, supra note 61, at 10-11. Contrary to free market orthodoxy, virtually all developed
countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, and Japan, used
tariffs, subsidies, and other interventionist measures in order to promote industrialization. HaJoon Chang, The Market, the State and Institutions in Economic Development, in RETHINKING
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 41, 42-46. However, highly indebted developing countries are
currently precluded from using these measures because they are subject to the neoliberal policy
prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank pursuant to structural adjustment programs
designed to ensure loan repayment. See Finnegan, supra note 9, at 46. In Africa, for example,
efforts to diversify exports and to develop a manufacturing base have been thwarted by the
neoliberal reforms imposed by the IMF and the World Bank that emphasize comparative
advantage in raw material and primary product exports. Howard Stein, Rethinking African
Development, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 153, 156.

69 See JAMES WESSEL, TRADING THE FUTURE: FARM EXPORTS AND THE CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC POWER IN OUR FOOD SYSTEM 166-67 (1983).
7o See M.C. HALLBERG, POLICY FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: CHOICES AND CONSEQUENCES 15254 (1992); Edward Clay, Food Aid, Development and Food Security, in AGRICULTURE AND THE
STATE 202, 210-13 (C. Peter Timmer ed., 1991). As early as the 19th century, U.S. agriculture
had been plagued by overproduction and low agricultural prices. WESSEL, supra note 69, at 1623, 151-52. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 succeeded in stabilizing farm incomes and
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interests, thereby serving Cold War foreign policy objectives, and enabled
U.S. companies to establish a foothold in new foreign markets. Aid recipients
developed a taste for food crops (such as wheat) alien to the local
environment and eventually became major commercial purchasers of U.S.
grain. 7 1 By 1978, when commercial grain sales had virtually eclipsed food aid
shipments, a commission reviewing Public Law 480 described it as "an
integral part of U.S. efforts to promote exports and expand markets for its
agricultural products." 72 United States food aid, along with agricultural
subsidies that lowered the price of commercially purchased U.S. grain, eroded
the production-based entitlements of developing countries by depressing food
prices, undercutting local farmers, reducing domestic food production, and
creating long-term dependence on cheap imported food. 73 Reliance on imports
to satisfy domestic nutritional needs promotes food insecurity by subjecting
developing countries to the vicissitudes of world market prices for imported
food and for developing country exports and by making developing countries
vulnerable to economically devastating trade embargoes imposed by
exporting countries in order to further diplomatic goals, such as the U.S.
74
embargo on Cuba.
Finally, colonialism institutionalized inequitable patterns of land tenure
that deprived rural smallholders and landless laborers of the land and
income necessary to obtain sufficient food. 75 Plantation agriculture
concentrated landholding in the hands of national elites and required the
prices by creating a federal agency, the Commodity Credit Corporation, to purchase surplus
production, establish price supports, and enter into production control contracts with farmers.
However, stable prices, along with growing wartime food demand, encouraged rapid increases in
agricultural production. DE JANVRY, supra note 63, at 149. World War II, the Marshall Plan, and
the Korean War temporarily absorbed some of these agricultural surpluses, but grain exports
and farm income dropped sharply after the Korean War. By the 1950s, U.S. dumping of grain on
European markets was viewed as unwelcome competition rather than a form of aid. Public Law
480 enabled the United States to maintain amicable relations with Europe by disposing of its
surplus production in the developing world. WESSEL, supra note 69, at 151-53; DE JANVRY, supra
note 63, at 149.
71See WESSEL, supra note 69, at 153. As developing countries grew more prosperous, many
became major commercial buyers of U.S. agricultural products. Indeed, some of the Public Law
480 contracts explicitly required aid recipients to agree to subsequent commercial purchases as a
precondition for receipt of aid. Id. Food aid also facilitated the efforts of U.S. producers and
multinational grain traders to actively shape dietary preferences in the developing world so as to
create markets for U.S. agricultural products. For example, the Western Wheat Association, a
trade association of U.S. wheat producers, came to South Korea in 1967 to spearhead a
campaign, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, to promote wheat
consumption. The campaign included technical advice to new bakeries and attempts to make
wheat rolls a staple of school lunches. The strategy was wildly successful. By 1975, seven
thousand bakeries had been established in South Korea despite the fact that almost no wheat
was cultivated there. By 1978, South Korea was importing over $1 billion of U.S. farm products,
consisting largely of wheat. Id. at 155, 168-73.
72 Id. at 155.

73See Clay, supra note 70, at 213-23; HALLBERG, supra note 70, at 156-57.
74See DE JANVRY, supra note 63, at 160-61.
75 See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 66.
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enslavement of vast numbers of people to provide cheap labor. 76 When
slavery was abolished, the former slaves often had little recourse but to
accept wage labor on the plantations or to eke out a living on marginal
78
lands. 77 During the colonial period, land was often a symbol of social status.
79
After independence, agriculture became a profitable industry. Those with
capital, literacy, and access to political power expanded their landholdings at
the expense of tenants and small farmers and shifted some of the best land in
the developing world to the production of export crops (coffee, cotton, beef,
bananas, vegetables, and feed grains) rather than food for domestic
consumption.80 As farms expanded, dispossessed tenants and smallholders
swelled the ranks of landless laborers and depressed rural wages. 8 ' As a
consequence of this history, land ownership in the developing world continues
to be skewed in favor of traditional landholding elites and large-scale foreign
and domestic agro-export enterprises, many of which effectively obstruct or
dilute efforts at land reform.8 2 Moreover, the most malnourished people in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America are rural smallholders and landless laborers
whose production-based entitlements (ability to grow their own food) and
labor-based entitlements (ability to earn sufficient income to purchase food)
have been eroded by inequitable land ownership.8 3 According to the U.N.

76See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 95-96. Indeed, the need for labor was so great that
plantation owners often augmented the local labor force by importing indentured laborers from
India, China, and Europe. WOLF, supra note 61, at 368-74.
77See FOWLER & MOONEY, supranote 61, at 95-96.
78See WESSEL, supra note 69, at 166.
79 See id.

80Id. at 166-67. As a consequence of the land grab by large commercial farmers, small farmers
were often relegated to the least fertile and most ecologically fragile lands. DE JANVRY, supra
note 63, at 86.
81 See WESSEL, supra note 69, at 167.
82 See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 67; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 95. Over time, many of

the export-oriented plantations in the developing world came under the direct ownership and
control of corporations headquartered in developed countries (including United Fruit, the United
Africa Company, and Brooke Bond) as the rural elite found itself unable to compete with the
superior technology and capitalization of the foreign corporations. WOLF, supra note 61, at 317,
335-36. The domination of agricultural production and trade by transnational corporations has
become an important feature of the contemporary world economy. See Halweil, supra note 11, at
68 (Table 3-2); William D. Heffernan, Concentrationof Ownership and Control in Agriculture, in
HUNGRY FOR PROFIT: THE AGRIBUSINESS THREAT TO FARMERS, FOOD, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 6175 (Fred Magdoff et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter HUNGRY FOR PROFIT]; SOPHIA MURPHY, INST. FOR
AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND: MARKETS, FARMERS AND

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21-29 (2002), available at http://www.tradeobservatory.orgflibrary/
uploadedfiles/Managing the. InvisibleHand_- 2.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Vertically
integrated corporations currently control almost every aspect of the production and distribution
of agricultural commodities, from the sale of inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment)
to the processing, shipping, and marketing of agricultural output. MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL,
supra note 23, at 121-23.
83 See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 66. International lending agencies and developing countries'

governments exacerbated the problem of inequitable land tenure by funneling agricultural credit
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Food and Agricultural Organization, approximately eighty percent of the
84
world's malnourished people reside in rural areas in the developing world.
Half of these malnourished individuals are rural smallholders whose
livelihoods depend on selling their agricultural output, while twenty percent
85
are landless laborers.
From an environmental standpoint, the chief legacy of colonialism was
the displacement of local biodiversity by monocultures in order to provide raw
materials for distant, affluent markets.8 6 The resulting genetic uniformity
increased the vulnerability of entire crops to pests and disease, thereby
jeopardizing the livelihoods of millions of farmers throughout the developing
world.8 7 For example, in the 1870s, the coffee industry in Ceylon (now Sri
88
Lanka), India, East Asia, and parts of Africa was decimated by coffee rust.
In Costa Rica, banana plantations suffered severe economic losses as a
consequence of a series of diseases: Panama disease in the 1930s, Yellow
Sigatoka in the 1950s, and Black Sigatoka from the 1970s through the
1990s. 8 9 In India, an epidemic of brown spot disease in 1942 destroyed the
rice crop and precipitated the infamous Bengal famine. 90 In order to mitigate
the vulnerability of large-scale, genetically uniform crops, farmers
increasingly resorted to the use of agrochemicals that endanger human
health and the environment.9 1
B. The Post-World War II Boom in Agrochemical Production
The second factor that contributed to the adoption of industrial
agriculture in the developing world was the post-World War II agrochemical
production boom. At the end of the Second World War, most farms in the
United States relied on crop rotation and other biological means for pest
to wealthier farmers, who expanded their holdings at the expense of tenants and small farmers
and shifted production from food staples to more lucrative export crops. As a result, the
production of basic grains for domestic consumption declined. Many developing countries became
increasingly dependent on food aid and on commercial food imports. The influx of cheap food
dealt another blow to smallholders, tenant farmers, and sharecroppers by depressing the prices
they received for their crops. WESSEL, supra note 69, at 166-68.
84 FAO,

STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 1, at 25.

85 Id.
86 See
87

Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind, supra note 61, at 78-79.

See FOWLER & MOONEY, supranote 61, at 180-81.

88 Id. at 47.
89 LORI ANN THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY: AGROBIODIVERSITY AND FOOD SECURITY 28-29

(1998) [hereinafter THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY].
9 Id.
91 See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 180-81. Plantation agriculture also produced
massive deforestation throughout the developing world. In Cuba, for example, sugar plantations,
ranching, and ship-building resulted in the destruction of half of the country's forests by 1900.
Furthermore, inequitable land ownership created incentives for landless and jobless individuals
to invade tropical forests in order to obtain access to arable land. Id. at 93-95.
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control. 92 However, the U.S. chemical industry expanded rapidly after the
war, and developed a variety of cheap and effective synthetic pesticides. 93 In
the 1960s, chemical companies entered the seed production business, 94 and
late
soon came to market seeds and agrochemicals as a package. 95 From the
96
fifty-fold.
increased
States
United
the
in
use
pesticide
1990,
until
1940s
Over the last fifty years, the market for pesticides has undergone worldwide expansion. 97 Indeed, the amount of pesticides used in both developed
and developing countries "doubled every decade between 1945 and 1985,"98
and developing countries quickly became the fastest growing pesticide
market. 99 The United States is now one of the world's leading manufacturers
and exporters of pesticides, producing 1.6 billion pounds of pesticides per year
and exporting 700 million pounds of this amount. 00
The growing demand for pesticides in the developing world is a function
of several related factors. As a general matter, the cultivation of export
monocultures to earn foreign exchange necessitated high levels of pesticide
use.' 0 ' Furthermore, U.S. international aid programs actively promoted
pesticide use in developing countries by specifically earmarking loans and

92 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE 54 (1989).
93

JOHN HARTE ET AL., ToxIcs A TO Z: A GUIDE TO EVERYDAY POLLUTION HAZARDS 113 (1991).

94THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supranote 89, at 35.
95See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 128-37.
96HARTE ET AL., supra note 93, at 113. While farmers initially obtained a 400% rate of return on
every pesticide dollar, the gains were not sustained over the long run because pesticides induced
genetic resistance in target pests and destroyed beneficial insects that had previously kept pest
populations under control. Indeed, the United States lost the same percentage of crops to pests in
1987 as it did in 1900 despite the application in 1987 of approximately 430 million pounds of
pesticides. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 393-394 (1993).
97 James H. Colopy, Poisoning the Developing World: The Exportation of Unregistered and
Severely Restricted Pesticidesfrom the United States, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 7 167, 169
(1994/95); Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, DDT: An Issue of Property Rights, PERC
REPORTS, Sept. 2001, at 5, available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/sept0l.pdf (last visited Sept. 29
2004).
98 Colopy, supra note 97, at 169-70; Meiners & Morriss, supra note 97, at 5.
99David A. Andow & David P. Davis, Agricultural Chemicals: Food and Environment, in FOOD
AND NATURAL RESOURCES 194-95 (David Pimentel & Carl W. Hall eds., 1989).
10oDAVID DONALDSON ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDE INDUSTRY SALES AND
USAGE: 1998 AND 1999 MARKET ESTIMATES 9 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/
oppbead/pestsales/99pestsales/market estimatesl999.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
101 See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 180-81. Between fifty and seventy percent of the
pesticides used in the developing world were applied to exports crops such as coffee, cotton,
bananas, sugar, and tea. DAVID WEIR & MARK SCHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON: PESTICIDES AND
PEOPLE INA HUNGRY WORLD 32 (1981). In Central America, as much as eighty-five percent of all
pesticides used were applied to cotton, almost all of which was grown for export. DOUGLAS L.
MURRAY, CULTIVATING CRISIS: THE HUMAN COST OF PESTICIDES IN LATIN AMERICA 23 (1994).
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grants for the purchase of pesticides. 0 2 Finally, as discussed below, the
Green Revolution encouraged much of the developing world to adopt highyielding, genetically uniform seed varieties that were more susceptible to
pests and disease and required massive applications of both pesticides and
fertilizers.103
C. The Green Revolution: Supply-Side Approach to Food Security
The third factor that contributed to the adoption of industrial agriculture
in the developing world was the Green Revolution. The primary objective of
the Green Revolution was to reduce world hunger by applying modern science
and technology to the task of boosting crop yields. 0 4 The Green Revolution
had its genesis in the international crop-breeding institutions established in
Mexico and the Philippines between the 1940s and 1960s with the support of
the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations for the purpose of improving the yield
of basic food crops. 0 5 These institutions produced new varieties of rice,
wheat, and corn that were more responsive than traditional varieties to
synthetic fertilizers and controlled irrigation. 10 6 The new varieties were
102See MURRAY, supra note 101, at 21-23. "Between 1969 and 1974, USAID provided an annual
average of $17.5 million in grants and loans for the purchase of pesticides" in Central America
alone. Id. Furthermore, there is much evidence that agricultural assistance, including Alliance
for Progress aid intended for basic grain production, was in fact used for the purchase of
pesticides for the cotton industry. Id.

103See LAPPE ETAL., supra note 22, at 58-90.
104 See

KEITH GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 144 (2nd ed.
1990) [hereinafter GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES]; CONWAY, supra note 27, at 44.
1o5See CONWAY, supra note 27, at 47-52, 61; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 56. The first
research institution was established in 1943 as a joint venture between the Mexican Ministry of
Agriculture and the Rockefeller Foundation. It produced new high-yielding varieties of corn and
wheat that resulted in record harvests. Following the success of the new wheat and corn
varieties, a second research institution was established in the Philippines as a joint venture
between the Philippine government and the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. The second
research institution produced new rice varieties that dramatically increased rice yields in the
Philippines and throughout the developing world. CONWAY, supra note 27, at 47-57. Research
institutions were subsequently established in Colombia, Peru, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, Sri
Lanka, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Syria, Italy, the United States, and the Netherlands. The
work of these research centers is currently funded by an association of public and private sector
donors known as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). See
CGIAR ONLINE, at http://www.cgiar.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
106See CONWAY, supra note 27, at 47-52, 61. While these new varieties are frequently referred to

as '%igh-yielding varieties," this term is a misnomer. What distinguished the new seeds from
traditional varieties was their responsiveness to chemical fertilizers and irrigation. In the
absence of these inputs, the new seeds often performed worse than traditional varieties.
VANDANA SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION: THIRD WORLD AGRICULTURE,
ECOLOGY AND POLITICS 72 (1991) [hereinafter SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN
REVOLUTION]. Furthermore, comparisons of the yield of new and traditional seed varieties were
often biased in favor of the marketable component of the crop, and ignored the contribution of
traditional varieties to soil fertility, pest control, and fodder production. Traditional agricultural
systems are based on the mixed and rotational cropping of cereals, pulses, and oilseeds, whereas
the Green Revolution is based on the cultivation of genetically uniform varieties of a single crop.
Comparisons of yield typically single out a particular crop, such as wheat, and compare the
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quickly adopted in many parts of the developing world, and resulted in
dramatic increases in food production. 10 7 By the 1990s, about 70% of the
world's corn, over 50% of the wheat produced in Asia and Latin America, and
10 8
almost 75% of the rice cultivated in Asia consisted of the new varieties.
1. The Green Revolution's Socioeconomic Impact
From a technological perspective, the Green Revolution was immensely
successful. Total food production in developing countries more than doubled
between 1960 and 1985, and food production more than kept pace with
burgeoning population growth. 10 9 However, the Green Revolution was less
successful from a social and economic perspective because it was a supplyside technocratic solution to a distributional problem grounded in political
and economic inequality. 110 Indeed, as detailed below, the Green Revolution
exacerbated food insecurity by disproportionately benefiting large farmers
without countervailing social and economic reforms to improve the status of
the rural poor."'
The Green Revolution failed to solve the problem of world hunger because
it focused on improving the supply of food without addressing the issue of
inequitable distribution of food and food-producing resources. 11 2 Despite the

yields of traditional and new varieties while disregarding the yield of the other crops grown on
the same soil. "Even if the yields of all the crops were included, it is difficult to convert a measure
of pulse into an equivalent measure of wheat, for example, because in the diet and in the
ecosystem, they have distinctive functions." Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind, supra note 61, at 9,
40 (1993). Even though the protein supplied by pulses and the calories supplied by wheat are
both critical to a balanced diet, the nitrogen fixing capacity of pulses represents an important
contribution to soil fertility. Moreover, traditional agricultural practices, such as crop rotation,
intercropping (the simultaneous cultivation of two or more different kinds of crops), and planting
several varieties of a particular crop contribute to non-chemical pest control because certain
crops are resistant to particular types of pest infestation. These practices also ensure that some
crops will survive even if others succumb to new and existing pests and diseases. Finally,
traditional varieties produce not just food for humans but fodder for farm animals and organic
material for fertilization. By contrast, the Green Revolution's new varieties were specifically
designed to maximize the edible output while minimizing the output of non-edible biomass that
could be used for other purposes on the farm. Thus, yield comparisons are misleading to the
extent that they fail to take into account the multiple ways that traditional varieties are
integrated into the production system. Id. at 40-46, 56-57.
107 See CONWAY, supranote 27, at 44-45; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 60.
108 See LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22, at 59.

109 See CONWAY, supranote 27, at 44; GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 104, at 148.
110oSee LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22, at 59-60.

I" See id. at 60; CONWAY, supra note 27, at 69-72, 81; YOUNG, supra note 21, at 72.
112 See GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 104, at 160; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra
note 61, at 58-59; LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22, at 59-60; ANDREW PEARSE, SEEDS OF PLENTY,
SEEDS OF WANT 216-18 (1980).
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improvement in global food production, food insecurity persisted. 113 As the
World Bank acknowledged in an influential 1986 report on world hunger:
The growth of global food production has been faster than the
unprecedented population growth of the past forty years ....
Enough food is available so that countries that do not produce
all the food they want can import it if they can afford to. Yet
many poor countries and hundreds of millions of poor people
do not share in this abundance. They suffer from a lack of
4
food security, caused mainly by a lack of purchasing power."
The Green Revolution promoted food insecurity by favoring wealthy
farmers at the expense of poor farmers and landless laborers." 5 The Green
Revolution was inherently biased in favor of wealthy farmers because it
required significant capital investment." 6 The new seed varieties only
produced high yields in response to the application of key inputs, such as
fertilizers and irrigation." 7 These inputs tended to promote weed growth as
well as crop growth, thus necessitating the application of chemical
herbicides. 118 Furthermore, since the genetic uniformity of the new varieties
rendered them vulnerable to insects and disease, it was also necessary to
apply insecticides and fungicides." 9 Poor farmers generally lacked the
capital to invest in the requisite irrigation, fertilizers, and pesticides to

FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 58. Between 1970 and 1990, the two decades of
significant Green Revolution advances, the number of undernourished people in the world
dropped from 946 million to 786 million. However, the greatest progress in reducing hunger was
made in China. If China is excluded from this analysis, the number of hungry people in the world
actually increased by 66 million during this period. This increase in undernourishment is not a
function of population growth. Indeed, total food availability per person actually increased by
eleven percent between 1970 and 1990. Rather, the increase in world hunger is due to the failure
of the Green Revolution to address inequalities in access to food and food-producing resources.
See LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22, at 61; VANDANA SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND
DEVELOPMENT 129 (1989) [hereinafter SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE].
113 See

114WORLD

BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER, supra note 20, at 1.

1 See KEITH GRIFFIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE: AN ESSAY ON THE GREEN
REVOLUTION 51-52 (1974) [hereinafter GRIFFIN, POLITICAL ECONOMY]; YOUNG, supra note 21, at
72; see also LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22, at 60.

CONWAY, supra note 27, at 66; YOUNG, supra note 21, at 72; SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE
GREEN REVOLUTION, supra note 106, at 45; FRANCINE R. FRANKEL, INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION
193-94 (1971); PEARSE, supra note 112, at 161-63.
116See

117See GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 104, at 146; SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE
GREEN REVOLUTION, supra note 106, at 72; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 58; FRANKEL,
supranote 116, at 6; MICHAEL PERLEMAN, FARMING FOR PROFIT IN A HUNGRY WORLD 145 (1977);
Frederick H. Buttel & Laura T. Reynolds, Population Growth, Agrarian Structure, Food
Production and Distribution, in FOOD AND NATURAL RESOURCES 325, 344 (David Pimentel &
Carl W. Hall eds., 1989).
11s See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 58.

119See id.; GRIFFIN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 115, at 78, 205.
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successfully cultivate the new seed varieties. 120 Moreover, the government
institutions responsible for providing agricultural credit, technical assistance,
and marketing support were often biased against the poor. 121 Consequently,
122
the Green Revolution disproportionately benefited wealthy farmers.
Notwithstanding the Green Revolution's tendency to favor affluent
farmers, one might expect that the increase in food production would improve
food security overall by lowering food prices. This assumption is problematic
for two reasons. First, as explained in Part II.A, nearly eighty percent of
world's poor and hungry live in rural areas in the developing world. 123 Many
of the rural poor are smallholders, tenant farmers, and sharecroppers whose
livelihoods depend on selling their agricultural output. 124 When agricultural
prices decline, the income of these farmers is depressed. 125 While higher
yields may compensate wealthy farmers for the price drop, yields do not
26
increase for small farmers unable to take advantage of the new technology.
Consequently, declining agricultural prices reduce the cash income necessary
for small farmers to purchase agricultural inputs, to buy vital consumer
goods not produced on the farm, and to pay taxes. 127 Small farmers survive
by selling their assets (livestock and farm implements), by expanding cash
crop production at the expense of subsistence food crops (resulting in
undernourishment), by cultivating illegal crops (such as coca and poppy), or
by simply abandoning the land. 126 Indeed, one of the major unintended
consequences of the Green Revolution was the dispossession of many small
farmers in the developing world. 129 Second, the Green Revolution worsened
120 See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 58. Indeed, farmers who could not afford the
fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation necessary to successfully cultivate the new varieties found
that the production increases promised by the Green Revolution were illusory. THRUPP,
CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 23-24; PEARSE, supra note 112, at 166-67; Buttel &
Reynolds, supra note 117, at 344.
121See GRIFFIN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 115, at 52-58, 78; LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22,
at 63; FRANKEL, supra note 116, at 194-98; PEARSE, supra note 112, at 166-67.
122 See GRIFFIN, POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 115, at 128; CONWAY, supra note 27, at 66;
YOUNG, supra note 21, at 72; SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION, supra note 106,

at 45; FRANKEL, supranote 116, at 191-93.
123 See FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 1, at 25. Moreover, most of the foodinsecure urban dwellers are former farmers. MARCEL MAZOYER, PROTECTING SMALL FARMERS
AND

THE

RURAL

POOR

IN

THE

CONTEXT

OF

GLOBALIZATION

3

(2001),

available at

http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsummit/msd/Y1743e.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
124 See FRANCES MOORE LAPPE & JOSEPH COLLINS, FOOD FIRST: BEYOND THE MYTH OF SCARCITY

135 (1978).
125 See LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22, at 62.
126 See id.; LAPPE & COLLINS, supra note 124, at 135-36.
127 See MAZOYER, supranote 123, at 14.
128 Id. at 4-5, 14-15.
129 SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION, supra note 106, at 177. As the adoption of

Green Revolution technology by wealthier farmers increased land values, speculators purchased
farmland from destitute farmers, thus decreasing the number of self-provisioning farmers and
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the lot of landless laborers, the poorest segment of the rural population,
because the adoption of labor-saving technology by the large farmers
(herbicides and mechanization in lieu of hand weeding and labor-intensive
land preparation) tended to eliminate jobs and to depress rural wages. 130
A 1995 study reviewing over 300 published reports on the Green
Revolution produced over a thirty-year period found that eighty percent of
the reports concluded that the Green Revolution exacerbated rural poverty
and inequality. 131 In the language of entitlements, the Green Revolution
eroded the production-based entitlements (right to grow food), trade-based
entitlements (right to purchase food on the market based on farm earnings),
and labor-based entitlements (right to income obtained through the sale of
labor) of smallholders, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and landless laborers.
The Green Revolution's emphasis on boosting food production reduced
pressure for land reform and other redistributive measures in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.132 In so doing, the Green Revolution may have forestalled
the very reforms that have been found in hindsight to promote food security.
swelling the ranks of landless laborers. In other instances, large landowners evicted
sharecroppers and tenant farmers from the land in order to mechanize production and to avoid
potential claims under land-to-the-tiller reform movements. LAPPE & COLLINS, supra note 124,
at 135-48; GRIFFIN, ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 104, at 158; Buttel & Reynolds, supra
note 117, at 344.
130 See CONWAY, supra note 27, at 72-78; POTTIER, supra note 27, at 75-76; GRIFFIN,
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 104, at 136-37; PERLEMAN, supra note 117, at 149-50;
Buttel & Reynolds, supra note 117, at 344.

131 Donald K. Freebairn, Did the Green Revolution ConcentrateIncomes?: A Quantitative Study of
Research Reports, 23 WORLD DEV. 265, 265-79 (1995). See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 72;
CONWAY, supra note 27, at 69-72. As the Freebairn analysis acknowledges, a significant minority
of studies concluded that the Green Revolution's overall social impact was positive. See, e.g., RITA
SHARMA & THOMAS T. POLEMAN, THE NEW ECONOMICS OF INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION: INCOME
AND EMPLOYMENT DIFFUSION IN UTTAR PRADESH 16-18, 239-244 (1993); YUJIRO HAYAMI &
MASAO KIKUCHI, A RICE VILLAGE SAGA: THREE DECADES OF GREEN REVOLUTION IN THE
PHILIPPINES 121-24, 227-38 (2000); MURRAY J. LEAF, SONG OF HOPE: THE GREEN REVOLUTION IN
A PUNJAB VILLAGE 46-58, 64, 94-95, 104-05, 131-33, 140-41 (1984); PETER B. R. HAZELL & C.
RAMASAMY, THE GREEN REVOLUTION RECONSIDERED: THE IMPACT OF HIGH-YIELDING RICE
VARIETIES IN SOUTH INDIA 239-44 (1991); Robert W. Herdt, A Retrospective View of Technological
and Other Changes in Philippine Rice Farming 1965-1982, 35 ECON. DEv. & SOC. CHANGE 329,
347-448 (1989).
The Green Revolution coincided with the coming to power of the Chinese Communist Party
and with the growth of peasant movements in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam,
and India. It began just years after the first land reform program in Latin America under the
populist Cardenas regime in Mexico. See SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION,
supra note 106, at 50-57; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 56; TOM BARRY, ZAPATA'S
REVENGE: FREE TRADE AND THE FARM CRISIS IN MEXICO 22-25, 27-29 (1995). Critics of the Green
Revolution have emphasized that the very purpose of the Green Revolution was to reduce
pressure for radical political change in Asia and Latin America by promoting technological
innovation and market integration. See LAPPE ET AL., supra note 22, at 64-65. GRIFFIN,
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 104, at 147; FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 56-57;
SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION, supra note 106, at 47; ELLEN MESSER ET AL.,
INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST., FOOD FROM PEACE: BREAKING THE LINKS BETWEEN HUNGER
AND CONFLICT 12 (1998), availableat http://www.ifpri.org/2020/dp/dp24.pdf (last visited Sept. 29,
2004).
132
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As the FAO acknowledged in its 2002 report on the state of food insecurity in
the world, numerous studies have confirmed the importance of land reform in
benefiting both smallholders and landless laborers by reducing rural poverty,
stimulating growth in rural wages, and combating hunger.1 33 Indeed,
according to FAO data, countries where land was more equitably distributed
in 1980 made more rapid progress in reducing food insecurity over the last
two decades than countries where land ownership was more concentrated. 134
2. The Green Revolution's Environmental and Food Security Impact
From an environmental and food security perspective, the most
significant impact of the Green Revolution was the loss of crop genetic
diversity. 35 As a consequence of the Green Revolution, indigenous wheat
varieties had virtually disappeared by the 1970s in North Africa, the
Himalayas, Turkey, Spain, and Pakistan. 136 Staples such as "barley, rice,
137
millet, sorghum, [and] potatoes" also sustained erosion of genetic diversity.

133 See FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2002, supra note 3, at 26. Indeed, even World Bank
analysts acknowledge, based on studies from all over the world, that land reform reduces
poverty, increases efficiency, and lays the groundwork for sustained economic growth. KLAUS
DEININGER ET AL., How LAND REFORM CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY
REDUCTION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM INTERNATIONAL AND ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE (2002),
available at http://Inwebl8.worldbank.org/ESSD/ardext.nsf/24ByDocName/Howlandreformcan
contributetoeconomicgrowthandpovertyreductionEmpiricalevidencefrominternationalandZimbab
weanexperience/SFILE/Zimbabwe.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); see also INT'L FUND FOR
AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD), RURAL POVERTY REPORT 2001 at 76 (2001), available at http://www/ifad.org/
poverty/chapter 3.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) (concluding that land reform has demonstrably
increased both rural income and employment in a variety of countries); DANIEL MAXWELL &
KEITH WIEBE, LAND TENURE CTR., LAND TENURE AND FOOD SECURITY: A REVIEW OF CONCEPTS,
EVIDENCE AND METHODS 4-6 (1998), available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/
pdfLview.pl3paperid=1044&ftype=.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) (summarizing the studies
that find that land reform reduces poverty, increases employment, and enhances equity and
productivity); TIMOTHY BESLEY & ROBIN BURGESS, SUNTORY & TOYOTA INT'L CTRS. FOR ECON. &
RELATED DISCIPLINES, LAND REFORM, POVERTY REDUCTION, AND GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM
INDIA 20-21 (1998), available at http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/de/dedpsl3.pdf (last visited Sept. 29,
2004) (explaining that land reform in India reduced rural poverty and increased agricultural
wages);
PETER M. ROSSET, THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS AND BENEFITS OF SMALL FARM
AGRICULTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 11-14 (1999), available at
http://www.foodfirst.org/pubs/policybs/pb4.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) (discussing the studies
that conclude that land reform improves social welfare).
134FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2002, supra note 3, at 26-27.
135 See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 61-79.
136 Id.

at 68-69.

137Id. at 72. In Bangladesh, for example, the cultivation of new rice varieties resulted in the loss
of nearly 7000 traditional rice varieties. THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 23.
Other crops that experienced the extinction of traditional varieties include okra in Africa and
India; sugar beets, lentils, beans, peaches, pears, sweet cherries, and apricots in Turkey; and
broccoli, cauliflower, and brussel sprouts in Europe. The scientific literature also reports the
extinction of traditional varieties of "apple, lima bean, bitter gourd, Chinese cabbage, cotton,
cucumber, eggplant, flax, forage grasses, corn, oats, onion, peas, pumpkin, soybean, squash ...
sweet pepper, sweet potato, tomato, watermelon, yam," and various other crops. FOWLER &
MOONEY, supra note 61 at 74.
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Genetic erosion occurred even in export crops, such as coffee, bananas, cacao,
and cotton, as uniform varieties replaced traditional, diverse varieties.138
The loss of crop genetic diversity resulted in outbreaks of pests and
disease causing severe damage to food crops.139 The application of pesticides
often exacerbated the problem by destroying the pests' natural enemies and
by enabling pests and pathogens to develop pesticide resistance. 140 Finally,
genetic erosion resulted in the loss of the very genetic material that might
confer resistance in the event of catastrophic pest and disease infestations,
thus increasing the vulnerability of the world's food supply. 141
The Green Revolution contributed to micronutrient malnutrition in the
developing world by reducing the absorption of vital minerals into fruit,
vegetables, and grains. 142 The intensive monocropping of Green Revolution
varieties depleted the soil of important minerals such as "zinc, iron, copper,
manganese, magnesium, molybdenum, [and] boron,"'143 and the application of
synthetic pesticides and fertilizers (along with soil compaction) destroyed the
44
microorganisms needed to make these minerals available to food crops.
While organic fertilizers counteract this problem because the organic matter
contains and replenishes these micronutrients, synthetic fertilizers generally
contain few or none of these minerals. 145 A result of the Green Revolution is
46
that billions of people consume diets deficient in essential micronutrients.'

See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supranote 89, at 24.
131
See CONWAY, supra note 27, at 208-09; THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 28139
29 (box 5), 30 (thl. 2). For example, in 1972, following widespread adoption of new, high-yielding
varieties of wheat, half of the Brazilian wheat crop was lost to disease. Zambia's genetically
uniform corn crop was likewise devastated in 1974 as a result of mold infestation. Id. at 29 (box
5).
140See CONWAY, supra note 27, at 209-13. By the mid-1980s, approximately 450 pest species had
developed resistance to one or more insecticide, about 150 fungi had developed resistance to
fungicides, and nearly fifty weeds had developed resistance to herbicides. Id. at 209. Plant
breeders responded to this problem by building pest and disease resistance into the plant. This
resistance was usually overcome in a matter of years and often resulted in the emergence of new,
more virulent pest and disease strains. Id. at 213-14.
141See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 81-82; THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note
89, at 31.
142 See HELENA PAUL & RICARDA STEINBRECHER, HUNGRY CORPORATIONS: TRANSNATIONAL
BIOTECH COMPANIES COLONISE THE FOOD CHAIN 10-11 (2003).
143 SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE,

supra note 113, at 145-46.

144See PAUL & STEINBRECHER, supra note 142, at 10-11.
145 See SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE, supranote 113, at 145-46.
146 See PAUL & STEINBRECHER, supra note 142, at 10-11; GENETIC RES. ACTION INT'L (GRAIN),
ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS TO MALNUTRITION (March 2000), available at http://www.grain.org
seedling?id=106 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
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Micronutrient malnutrition can produce serious impacts on human health,
learning ability, and productivity. 147
The Green Revolution also displaced traditional food crops in the
developing world, thereby impoverishing the diets of many individuals and
communities. 148 As a result of the Green Revolution, monocultures of wheat
and corn replaced thousands of nutritious and robust traditional food crops,
such as the Senegalese cereal known as fonio and the Indian ragi and jowar
grains. 149 The immediate impact of this conversion from polycultural to
monocultural production was a decline in the variety of foods consumed,
increased reliance on frequently unaffordable and less nutritious purchased
150
foods, and the loss of foods essential to a balanced diet.
The adoption of new seed varieties, and the irrigation systems, pesticides,
and fertilizers needed for their cultivation, displaced ecologically sustainable
5
farming practices (such as intercropping, crop rotation, and agroforestry).' '
147 See PAUL & STEINBRECHER, supra note 142,

at 11; U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG (FAO),

PREVENTING MICRONUTRIENT MALNUTRITION: A GUIDE TO FOOD-BASED APPROACHES-A
MANUAL FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND PROGRAM PLANNERS (1997), available at http://www.fao.orgt

DOCREP/X5244EX5244e00.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
148 See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 23, 31.

149 See id. at 23-24, 31; see also Shiva, Monocultures of the Mind, supra note 61, at 24-26.
150THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 31; SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE, supra note
113, at 128-31. Zambia's experience with high-yielding corn varieties is a classic example of this
phenomenon. Following independence, Zambia promoted the cultivation of corn as a way of
ending economic dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia. The Zambian government used
revenues from the copper industry to provide generous subsidies to farmers, including fertilizer
subsidies, credit, farmer training, and an expanded network of input supply and crop collection
depots. In their zeal to "modernize" agriculture, policy-makers ignored the importance of
traditional agricultural practices (such as intercropping) and traditional food products to the
maintenance of balanced livelihoods and diets. The money earned by small farmers from corn
cultivation was not sufficient to offset the shortfall in other crops, such as cassava, groundnuts,
beans, sweet potato, pumpkin, and vegetables. The diet and health of Zambian children suffered
greatly. The crisis point was reached when the copper industry collapsed and the Zambian
government, under IMF pressure, phased out agricultural subsidies. Unable to earn sufficient
income from the sale of corn to meet their cash needs, farmers responded by selling to urban
consumers the foodstuffs that formerly circulated in local markets. In sum, Zambia's transition
to corn farming was accompanied by reduced crop diversification, an inability of local people to
procure sufficient and nutritious food, and a decline in local market activity. In the words of one
commentator, Zambia shifted "from subsistence to poverty, from complex and varied farming
systems to an impoverished pseudo-traditional diet that [failed] to meet consumption needs."
POTTIER, supra note 27, at 170-73.
151 Intercropping is the cultivation of two or more crops simultaneously in the same field. This is
useful because the crops utilize different resources or interact with one another in beneficial
ways. For example, one crop, such as legumes, may provide soil fertility. Crop interactions may
also help control pests since some crops will be more resistant to certain pests than others. Crop
rotation involves the growing of two or more crops sequentially on the same piece of land, with
benefits similar to those of intercropping. Agroforestry is a form of intercropping in which
herbaceous crops are interspersed with trees. Trees with deeper roots can exploit water sources
and nutrients unavailable to the crops and may provide shade or mulch. The crops, in turn,
provide ground cover that reduces weeds and controls soil erosion. CONWAY, supra note 27, at
170.
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Moreover, it often resulted in the loss of local knowledge about traditional
agroecological practices. 152 Pesticide use displaced traditional pest control
techniques (such as crop rotation and fallowing) that also contributed to soil
fertility. 153 Chemical fertilizers replaced the use of animal manure and crop
residues.15 4 The continuous planting of uniform crops in a given area replaced
crop rotation and intercropping. 155 Green Revolution varieties displaced
indigenous and traditional crops that required far less irrigation. 156 The
ecological consequences were often severe. The heavy use of agrochemicals
destroyed beneficial soil organisms and degraded soil quality. 157 The Green
Revolution monocultures removed vital micro-nutrients from the soil,
resulting in the long-term decline in agricultural yields. 158 Intensive
irrigation resulted in water-logging and salinization of soils. 159 In sum, soil
0
quality deteriorated, leading to a loss of agricultural productivity. 16
The use of pesticides to protect genetically uniform crops harmed the
environment and increased pesticide-related deaths and illnesses in
developing countries. 16 1 Pesticide and fertilizer runoff contaminated drinking
152 See id. at 32.

153 See PAUL R. EHRLICH ET AL., THE STORK AND THE PLOW: THE EQUITY ANSWER TO THE HUMAN

DILEMMA 185 (1995) (explaining how traditional pest control methods like fallowing and crop
rotation maintain soil fertility while chemical pesticides do not).
154

See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 23, 31.

155 See id. at 27.

156 See SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE, supra note 113, at 146-47 (explaining that Green Revolution crops

need much more water than indigenous and traditional crops).
157 See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 27.
158 See id.; SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE, supra note 113, at 145-46 (indicating that micro-nutrient

deficiency in the soil threatens agricultural production).
159 SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE, supra note 113, at 146-47; PERLEMAN, supra note 117, at 154. Green
Revolution seeds produced water-logging and salinization because they required more water
than traditional varieties. For example, the high-yielding varieties of wheat required three times
as much water as traditional varieties. Furthermore, since these new varieties were planted
continuously rather than for short durations, irrigation was required throughout the year.
Waterlogging occurs when the amount of water introduced into an ecosystem by irrigation
exceeds drainage capacity. Waterlogging reduces soil aeration, restricts the growth of roots and
can have a severe adverse impact on plant growth. Salinization occurs when irrigation is
introduced into areas of scarce rainfall. In these areas, the soil contains high levels of unleached
salts, which are brought to the surface by irrigation. As the irrigation water evaporates, a white
residue of salt is left behind, rendering the land less productive. SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE, supra

note 113, at 146-47.
160 See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 27; LAPPE ET AL., supranote 22, at 70-

71 (explaining that yields had declined or leveled off by the 1990s in a number of Green
Revolution areas as a consequence of soil degradation).
161See CONWAY, supra note 27, at 86-88. This was the result of the large quantity of pesticides
used and of pesticide misuse, including inadequate labeling, lack of protective equipment, and
the continued use of pesticides (such as DDT and chlordane) that were either banned or severely
restricted in developed countries. Id. at 87-90. Although developing countries account for
approximately 20% of global pesticide use, they experience 99% of pesticide deaths. Bartlett P.
Miller, The Effect of the GATT and the NAFTA on Pesticide Regulation: Hard Look at
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water supplies and resulted in the eutrophication of rivers, lakes, and coastal
waters. 162 Excessive pesticide use also killed cattle and livestock and
eradicated important sources of protein for poor farmers, such as fish,
shrimp, and crabs in rice paddies. 163 Nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic
fertilizers contributed to global warming and to the depletion of the ozone
layer. 164 In addition, fertilizer production, which increased tenfold between
1950 and 1990, required significant inputs of non-renewable petroleum, the
extraction and processing of which posed serious environmental risks.165
Indeed, industrial agriculture is so dependent on fossil fuels that 9.8
kilocalories (kcal) of fossil fuel energy are required to produce one kcal of food
energy.

66

and wetlands to
Finally, the conversion of forests, grasslands,
monocultural farming systems destroyed or fragmented the habitats of
16 7
The
various species of flora and fauna, producing a decline in biodiversity.

loss of biodiversity resulted in a loss of ecosystem services (such as water
purification, insect management, and climate regulation) as well as the loss
of wildlife habitat products useful for medicine, food, and fodder. 168 Because
Harmonization, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 201, 204 (1995). Farmers and agricultural
laborers in developing countries are often exposed to high levels of pesticides due to inadequate
domestic regulation, low literacy levels, lack of training in pesticide use, lack of proper safety
equipment, indiscriminate spraying, and improper storage or disposal of pesticides. Andrew M.
Cain, Opportunities to Improve Pesticide Policy in CentralAmerica, 11 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 151, 156 (2000); see also Margo Brett Baender, Pesticides and Precaution: The Bamako
Convention as a Model for an International Convention on Pesticides Regulation, 24 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 557, 559-60, 562-66 (1991) (describing the misuse of pesticides in developing
countries and the pressure to use excessive amounts in order to maximize cash crop production).
162 See EHRLICH ET AL., supra note 153, at 184. Fertilizer runoff produced nitrate contamination
in drinking water at levels likely to pose health hazards, including cancer and metahemoglobinema ("blue baby" syndrome). Fertilizer contamination also produced eutrophication of
surface waters. Nutrients in fertilizers (such as nitrates and phosphates) generated dense blooms
of algae and other surface plants. These blooms killed other aquatic plants by blocking access to
sunlight. When these other aquatic plants died and decomposed, they removed oxygen from the
water, causing the death of fish and other aquatic organisms. CONWAY, supra note 27, at 90-93.
163 See CONWAY, supra note 27, at 87; PERLEMAN, supra note 117, at 156-57.
164 EHRLICH ETAL., supra note 153, at 184; CONWAY, supra note 27, at 94-102.
165 EHRLICH ET AL., supra note 153, at 151, 184; SHIVA, STAYING ALIVE, supra note 113, at 143.
Moreover, when energy prices increased, synthetic fertilizers (along with fossil fuels to operate
irrigation pumps) became unaffordable in many developing countries, resulting in a decline in
agricultural production. In India, for example, fuel and fertilizer shortages caused by the energy
crisis of the 1970s produced a drastic decline in agricultural production. In 1974, wheat
production was twenty-five percent less than projected, and production continued to decline the
following year. EHRLICH ET AL., supra note 153, at 184-85.
166Laura L. Jackson, Agricultural Industrializationand the Loss of Biodiversity, in PROTECTION
OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: CONVERGING STRATEGIES 69 (Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jeffrey A.

McNeely eds., 1998).
167See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 27-29.
168

Id.

at 30.

AGRICULTURE
agriculture).

See

also MIGUEL ALTERI,

369-70

(1995)
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(describing the importance
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extinction is irreversible, such losses have both global and local implications,
169
and affect both present and future generations.
3. Summary and Conclusion: The Green Revolution and Industrial
Agriculture
In sum, the Green Revolution was a key step in the extension to food
crops of the monocultural, chemical-intensive production techniques used for
cash crops. 170 It represented a significant shift from a farming system
controlled by local peasants based on resources produced on the farm to one
dependent on seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery manufactured by
171
multinational corporations headquartered in the developed world.
While the Green Revolution increased agricultural production, it
neglected to address the fundamental causes of food insecurity: poverty and
inequality. Indeed, the Green Revolution exacerbated food insecurity by
increasing rural poverty and by defusing pressure for agrarian reform and
other redistributive measures. The Green Revolution also displaced
traditional ecologically sustainable farming practices in many parts of the
developing world and promoted reliance on genetically uniform seed
varieties, fertilizers, pesticides, and extensive irrigation. The environmental
and food security impacts of the Green Revolution included loss of crop
genetic diversity, increased vulnerability to pests and disease, loss of
traditional food crops, pesticide and fertilizer contamination of surface waters
and groundwater, increased pesticide-related death and illness, soil
degradation, and loss of ecosystem biodiversity.
D. Biotechnology: Will the Gene Revolution Reinforce the Harm of the Green
Revolution?
An analysis of industrial agriculture in the developing world would not be
complete without a discussion of the rapidly expanding commercial
cultivation of genetically modified crops. Although five countries (the United
States, Canada, Argentina, China, and South Africa) currently cultivate
ninety-nine percent of the world's genetically modified crops, 172 these crops
are increasingly tested in and marketed to developing countries.173

169See THRUPP, CULTIVATING DIVERSITY, supra note 89, at 30.
170See

FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 61, at 129-30.

171 See SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION, supra note 106, at 64. See also FOWLER

& MOONEY, supra note 61, at 130-31 (discussing how the Green Revolution created new markets
for giant agricultural corporations).
172 See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2003-2004 36 (2004),
available at http://www.fao.orgtdocuments/showcdr.asp?urlfile=/DOCREP/006/y5160e/y5160e
00.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
2003-2004]. The United States grows just under two-thirds of the world's genetically modified
crops. The most widely cultivated transgenic crops are soybeans, maize, cotton, and canola. Id.
173 See PAUL & STEINBRECHER, supra note 142, at 184-220.
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Notwithstanding the limitations of a technology-based supply-side approach
to the problem of world hunger, proponents of biotechnology claim that
genetically modified crops will enhance food security and protect the
environment by increasing food production, reducing the use of pesticides and
herbicides, and minimizing the need to cultivate new lands. 174 While a fullblown analysis of the risks and benefits of biotechnology is beyond the scope
of this article, this section will present a brief overview of the food security
and environmental implications of biotechnology in the developing world. The
section will focus on the two types of genetically modified crops that have
experienced the greatest commercial growth: herbicide-tolerant crops and
insect-resistant crops. 175 Because genetically modified crops are not currently
cultivated in substantial amounts in the developing world, the following
observations are necessarily preliminary and based on limited information.
From the standpoint of food security, the benefits of biotechnology are
highly uncertain. First, there is widespread consensus that genetically
modified crops, unlike their Green Revolution counterparts, have not
increased yields. 176 Second, biotechnology threatens to exacerbate food
insecurity by increasing rural inequality.1 77 Biotechnology is being promoted

174See Lakshman D. Guruswamy, SustainableAgriculture: Do GMOs Imperil Biosafety?, 9 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 461, 469 (2002) (summarizing the arguments of the proponents of
biotechnology); Norman E. Borlaug, Ending World Hunger: The Promise of Biotechnology and the
Threat of Antiscience Zealotry, 124 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 487-90 (2000), available at
http://www.plantphysiol.org/egi/content/full/124/2/487?maxtoshow=&HITS=108&hits=10&RESU
LTFORMAT=&authorl=Bourlag&searchid=1096503064213_9994&storedsearch=&FIRSTINDE
X=o&sortspec=relevance&journalcode=plantphysiol (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); Mark Strauss,
When Malthus Meets Mendel, 119 FOREIGN POL'Y, June 2000, at 105; see also William F. Kirk,
Address at the American Society of Agronomy and Social Science (June 19, 2000), available at
http://www.dupont.com/biotech/resources/speeches/speeches.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
175 Approximately ninety-nine percent of commercially grown genetically modified crops have
been bred for just two traits: herbicide tolerance and insect resistance. See Liz ORTON, GM
CROPS-GOING AGAINST THE GRAIN 9 (May 2003), available at http://www.actionaid.org (last
visited Sept. 29, 2004). Herbicide-tolerant crops allow the application of a broad-spectrum
herbicide (such as Monsanto's Roundup) to all standing crops, thereby killing weeds without
damaging the crop. Insect-resistant crops incorporate microbial pesticides (such as Bacillus
thuringiensis--commonly known as Bt) that kill susceptible herbivorous pests and thereby
reduce the need to apply conventional insecticides. See Jules Pretty, The Rapid Emergence of
Genetic Modification in World Agriculture: Contested Risks and Benefits, 28(3) ENVTL.
CONSERVATION 248, 249 (2001) [hereinafter Pretty, RapidEmergence].
176 Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note 175, at 255; MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE: HOW THE
POOR PAY FOR FREE TRADE 106 (2000) [hereinafter MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE]; MIGUEL
ALTIERI, GENETIC ENGINEERING IN AGRICULTURE: THE MYTHS, ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS, AND

ALTERNATIVES 7-10 (2001). Even where yields have increased, the costs of the new seeds have
often been greater than the gains obtained, thus producing a net loss for farmers. ORTON, supra
note 175, at 14.
177 ORTON, supra note 175, at 16; DEVLIN KUYEK, GENETIC RES. ACTION INT'L., GENETICALLY
MODIFIED

CROPS IN AFRICA:

IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL

FARMERS

4

(2002),

available at

http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=12 (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). In the 1990s, the pesticide
industry purchased biotechnology, plant breeding, and seed production enterprises in the
developed and developing world. As a consequence, six corporations headquartered in the United
States and Europe control 98% percent of the market for genetically modified crops and 70% of
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by the same transnational corporations that engaged in the massive export of
pesticides to developing countries. 178 These enterprises seek to maximize
profits by marketing their products to large-scale, commercial farmers in
affluent countries while neglecting the needs of small, resource-poor farmers
in the developing world. 179 By focusing on lucrative export crops and favoring
affluent farmers, biotechnology may force small-scale producers out of the
entitlements.180
market, thus depriving them of production-based
Furthermore, genetically modified crops may reduce the need for manual
labor (for example, weeding and pesticide application), thus eroding the
labor-based entitlements of poor rural dwellers.1 8' Third, the patenting of
genetically modified seeds by transnational corporations headquartered in
the industrialized world threatens to reinforce the economic dominance of
developed countries and to undermine the traditional agricultural practices of
farmers, such as saving, breeding, and sharing seeds. 8 2 Instead of saving
seeds from one season to the next and continually selecting and breeding
seeds in response to changing growing conditions, farmers who purchase
genetically modified seeds must purchase new seeds every season.' 8 3 Thus,
transnational corporations may increasingly affect which crop varieties will
84
be planted, and farmers may lose access to locally adapted seed varieties.
the world's pesticide market. The leading agrochemical and biotechnology companies are
Dupont, Monsanto, Dow, Syngenta, Bayer Aventa, and BASF (agrochemicals only). ORTON,
supra note 175, at 11.
178 Id. at 11.

179 Id. at 12, 16. Biotechnology companies invest in a relatively small number of internationally
traded commodities (maize, rice, wheat, cotton, soybeans, and canola) while ignoring crops grown
by poor farmers (such as millet, yam, cassava, quinoa, and indigenous roots and tubers). Id. at
19. Moreover, the highly uniform and standardized seeds produced by the biotechnology industry
are ill adapted to the range of stresses encountered by poor farmers (such as low soil fertility,
unique pests and diseases, and erratic rainfall) and to the resource constraints of poor farmers
(lack of credit and risk of falling into debt). Id. at 21-22. While some research is being performed
to develop crops with properties useful to poor farmers, genetically modified crops for the poor
are unlikely to be lucrative and are not a top commercial priority. Id. at 9-10. See also PER
PINSTRUP-ANDERSON & EBBE SCHIOLER, SEEDS OF CONTENTION: WORLD HUNGER AND THE

GLOBAL CONTROVERSY OVER GM CROPS 97 (2002) (discussing the different research priorities of
industrialized countries and developing countries with respect to genetically modified crops);
JANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELLON, THE ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS

19 (2000) (explaining that "virtually all transgenic crops... are aimed at the prosperous farmers
of the [industrialized world]").
180ORTON, supra note 175, at 16. Biotechnology's neglect of the needs of small farmers threatens
to reproduce the anti-poor bias of the Green Revolution and to exacerbate rural poverty and
inequality. For example, in Argentina, which has adopted genetically modified crops more
quickly and enthusiastically than any other developing country, cultivation of genetically
modified soybeans displaced the production of many staples (including milk, rice, maize,
potatoes, and lentils) and drove approximately 150,000 small farmers off the land. Sue Branford,
Argentina's Bitter Harvest, NEW SCIENTIST, Apr. 17, 2004, at 41, 43.
181 See ORTON, supranote 175, at 16.
182 Id. at 23.
183Id.
184 Id.

at 23-24.
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Furthermore, as farmers become increasingly reliant on external inputs
(seeds and agrochemicals), they will be highly vulnerable to catastrophic
supply disruptions or crippling debt in the event of input price increases or of
declining prices for their output.185 Finally, biotechnology may undermine the
livelihoods of developing country farmers by producing transgenic substitutes
86
for developing country exports, such as palm oil, coconut oil, and cocoa. 1
From an environmental and food security standpoint, one of the greatest
risks of industry-driven biotechnology is loss of agrobiodiversity-the
continuation of the trend begun by the Green Revolution toward the
cultivation of a limited number of high-input monocultures in lieu of diverse
local varieties' 8 7 As explained in the preceding section, the cultivation of
disease, and climatic stresses
monocultures increases vulnerability to pests,
88
and reduces the resilience of agroecosystems.
A second environmental risk is gene transfer from the genetically
modified crop to wild relatives through cross-pollination, a phenomenon
known as gene flow or genetic contamination. 189 For example, the transfer of
genes from herbicide tolerant crops to weeds might lead to the emergence of
herbicide-resistant "superweeds."'190 Because the risk of gene flow is greatest
when a particular crop has numerous wild relatives, the magnitude of the
risk will vary from crop to crop and region to region. 191 Gene flow may pose
particular threats to biodiversity in countries that are the centers of genetic
origin for certain crops. 192 Thus, Mexico, the place where maize originated,
faces far greater risk from genetically modified maize than countries with no
compatible wild maize relatives. 193 This threat was realized in 2001, when
DNA from genetically modified maize was discovered in local maize
varieties. 94 This gene flow occurred despite the fact that the Mexican

185Id. at 24.

86ORTON, supra note 175, at 18.
187Id. at 28.
188See supra notes 135-69 for a discussion of the importance of agrobiodiversity.

189Id.; Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note 175, at 250; FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE 2003-2004, supra note 172, at 66-67.
190 Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note 175, at 250; RISSLER & MELLON, supra note 179, at 5053.
191Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note 175, at 252.
192ORTON, supra note 175, at 29.

193Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note 175, at 252.
ORTON, supra note 175, at 30. In November 2001, the prestigious scientific journal Nature
published an article by a team of plant scientists from the University of California, Berkeley,
asserting that genetically modified corn had contaminated native varieties grown in remote
mountains in Oaxaca, Mexico. David Quist & Ignacio Chapela, Transgenic DNA Introgressed
Into TraditionalMaize Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 NATURE 541 (2001). Publication of the
article ignited a firestorm of controversy. In April, 2002, Nature retracted the article and
published two letters claiming that the research was fatally flawed. These letters raised
194
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government had banned the importation of genetically engineered, seeds in
1998 in order to protect the genetic diversity of Mexico's most important food
crop. 195 The alarming news from Mexico produced concern among some
scientists that genetic pollution might destroy the genetic diversity necessary
196
to preserve the integrity of the global food supply.
A third major concern is the risk that genetically modified crops will
accelerate resistance to insecticides and herbicides. 197 For example, the
cultivation of crops that contain the Bt toxin might accelerate the evolution of
insect resistance, thus diminishing the utility of Bt not only for farmers
growing Bt crops but also for resource-poor farmers who use Bt as a natural
insecticide on non-genetically modified crops.198 Organic farmers, who rely on
Bt-based microbial insecticides, are likely to be among those most affected. 199
Likewise, the planting of herbicide-resistant crops might accelerate herbicide
20 0
resistance in weeds, forcing farmers to resort to more powerful weedkillers.
Finally, genetically modified crops might themselves become weeds in the
context of crop rotation when seeds left in the fields from the previous
season's crop germinate in the current crop (for example, herbicide tolerant
cotton germinating in the current wheat crop). 201 The presence of these
20 2
unwanted "volunteers" may require the application of a different herbicide.
In general, genetically modified crops have resulted in an increase in
herbicide use, as farmers apply chemicals more frequently and in larger

questions about the article's claim that genes spliced into corn were unstable and scattered
around the genome in unpredictable ways, but did not dispute the article's central contention
that genetically modified corn was growing in Mexico. When Nature demanded that the authors
retract the whole article (and not just the part in dispute), the authors refused. Nature's
unprecedented decision to disavow the entire article in defiance of the authors and of the article's
peer reviewers prompted speculation that Nature may have been influenced by the powerful
biotechnology industry. See Fred Pearce, The Great Mexican Maize Scandal, 174 NEW SCIENTIST
14 (2002); Sarah Graham, Journal Retracts Support for Claims of Invasive GM Corn, SC. AM.,
Apr. 8, 2002, available at http://www.sciam.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). The genetic
contamination was subsequently corroborated in a study commissioned by Mexico's National
Institute of Ecology. See Mark Schapiro, Sowing Disaster? How Genetically Engineered American
Corn Has Altered the Global Landscape, NATION, Oct. 28, 2002, at 11.
191 Special Report: Genetic Contamination:Is it Worth Worrying About?, 174 NEW SCIENTIST 17

(2002).
196Id.; see also RISSLER & MELLON, supra note 179, at 16-17.
197 Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note

175, at 252; FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND

AGRICULTURE 2003-2004, supra note 172, at 71-72.

198 See id. at 252; ORTON, supra note 175, at 28; see also Miguel Altieri et al., Biological Control
and AgriculturalModernization: Towards Resolution of Some Contradictions,14 AGRIC. & HuM.
VALUES 303, 307 (1997); RISSLER & MELLON, supra note 179, at 16-17.
199See Miguel Altieri, The Ecological Impacts of Transgenic Crops on Agroecosystem Health, 6
ECOSYSTEM HEALTH 13, 14 (2000).
200 See Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note 175, at 252.
201See id.

202 See id.
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amounts. 20 3 While the cultivation of insect resistant crops (such as Bt cotton)
has resulted in a decline in insecticide use, these gains may be short-lived
once the insects develop resistance. 20 4 Thus, far from reducing herbicide and
insecticide use, the cultivation of genetically modified crops might actually
increase agrochemical use.
The fourth major environmental risk posed by biotechnology is harm to
non-target organisms through direct or indirect contact with the toxins
contained in insecticidal crops or through the overuse of herbicides. 205 For
example, Bt crops may kill the natural enemies of the target pest and other
beneficial insects, thus causing ecosystem disturbances. 20 6 Alternatively,
of broadfarmers growing herbicide-resistant crops might increase their 2use
07
spectrum herbicides that harm other plants, mammals, or birds.
In sum, industry-driven biotechnology may undermine food security and
pose serious environmental risks by reinforcing industrial agriculture in the
developing world rather than promoting alternative strategies that foster
biodiversity, utilize renewable and locally available inputs, build on farmer
20 8
knowledge, and give farmers greater control over the production process.
This is not to suggest that biotechnology is necessarily an evil to be avoided.
On the contrary, if biotechnology research were conducted by independent
bodies dedicated to the public interest, taking into account the socioeconomic
causes of food insecurity, carefully testing transgenic crops to address
potential environmental risks, and effectively involving poor farmers in the
setting of research priorities, then such research might produce seeds capable
of enhancing food security while minimizing environmental harm.
203 See FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2003-2004, supra note 172, at 69; ORTON,

supra note 175, at 14. In a highly publicized case in northern Argentina, soybean farmers
drenched the land with a mixture of powerful herbicides in order to combat herbicide-resistant
weeds. The careless spraying of herbicides resulted in harm to the health, crops, and livestock of
neighboring farmers. Although the farmers obtained a court order halting the spraying, the
spraying resumed as soon as new tenants took over the land. The incident highlighted emerging
problems with genetically modified crops, including herbicide-resistant weeds and the
destruction of the soil's natural microorganisms. Branford, supra note 180, at 41.
204ORTON, supra note 175, at 14; FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2003-2004, supra
note 172, at 45.
205 Pretty, Rapid Emergence, supra note 175, at 253; FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE 2003-2004, supra note 172, at 67-68.
206ORTON, supra note 175, at 29; RISSLER & MELLON, supra note 179, at 42.
207 ORTON, supra note 175, 29; FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2003-2004, supra

note 172, at 71.
208 Contrary to popular misconception, sustainable agriculture is neither low output nor
prohibitively expensive. On the contrary, studies have shown that sustainable agriculture has
improved food production in Africa, Asia, and Latin America using low cost, locally available,
and environmentally friendly practices and technologies. Pretty, Reducing food poverty, supra
note 50, at 217-234; Jules Pretty & Rachel Hine, The Promising Spread of Sustainable
Agriculture in Asia, 24 NAT. RESOURCEs F. 107-21 (2000); Jules Pretty, Can Sustainable
Agriculture Feed Africa? New Evidence on Progress, Processes and Impacts, 1 ENV'T, DEV. &
SUSTAINABILITY 253-74 (1999) [hereinafter Pretty, Can SustainableAgriculture FeedAfrica.
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Furthermore, in order to benefit resource-poor farmers, the resulting seeds
would have to be inexpensive and not subject to prohibitions on seed saving,
sharing, and breeding.
III. THE NEOLIBERAL MODEL: INSTITUTIONALIZING INEQUALITY
This section examines the ways in which the neoliberal policy
prescriptions of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO reinforce the
economic specialization in agro-export production and the monocultural,
chemical-intensive production techniques that produce hunger and
environmental degradation in the developing world. Part A discusses
agricultural policy in developed and developing countries in the period
immediately preceding the reforms. Part B describes and evaluates the
substance of the neoliberal reforms imposed through IMF- and World Banksponsored structural adjustment programs and through WTO-mandated
trade liberalization. Parts C and D explain the impact of the neoliberal
reforms on food security and on the environment. Part E summarizes the
conclusions of this section. Because a full-blown analysis of the various
elements of the neoliberal economic model is beyond the scope of this article,
this section will focus on the particular aspects of structural adjustment and
the particular WTO Agreements (primarily the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture) that have had the most direct impact on agricultural production
and agricultural trade.
A. Background to the Neoliberal Reforms
Beginning in the 1950s, most industrialized countries provided
significant subsidies to agriculture while using a variety of tariff and nontariff barriers to protect domestic farmers from foreign competition-a
practice that persisted despite the 1947 GATT due to gaps and weaknesses in
that agreement. 20 9 By contrast, developing countries generally lacked the
resources to subsidize agriculture and tended to tax agricultural producers in
order to maintain affordable food prices for urban dwellers and to finance
industrialization. 210 Because many developing countries rely on agriculture
THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 125, 155-56 (Terence
P. Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND]. The 1947 GATT contained a
variety of exceptions and omissions that severely compromised its ability to curb industrialized
country agricultural subsidies and import restrictions. See Carmen G. Gonzalez,
InstitutionalizingInequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing
Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433, 440-46 (describing the variety of tools used by
industrialized countries to subsidize and protect domestic agricultural production and explaining
why these measures were permitted under the pre-Uruguay Round GATT); Jonathan Carlson,
Hunger, Agricultural Trade Liberalization, and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal
Dimensions of a Political Problem, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1187, 1222-57 (1985) (explaining why the
pre-Uruguay Round GATT was unable to curb agricultural subsidies and import barriers).
209 See

See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 209, at 154-57. Unlike wealthy industrialized
countries, most developing countries could not afford to subsidize agriculture. An important
exception was Brazil, which provided significant subsidies to the sugar cane, wheat, and ethanol
industries. Id. at 158.
210
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as a major source of export earnings, they were harmed by the tariff and nontariff barriers that impeded access to developed country markets and by the
subsidies that made developing country products less competitive in world
agricultural markets. 211 Furthermore, the importation of cheap, subsidized
food from developed countries undermined the livelihoods of developing
country farmers, increased poverty and inequality, and depressed domestic
food production.2 12 Thus, the neoliberal reforms discussed below must be
evaluated in light of these pre-existing inequities in global agricultural trade.

B. The Neoliberal Reforms
The neoliberal economic model was imposed on the developing world in
two distinct phases. The first phase began in response to the debt crisis of the
1980s. 213 Many developing countries adopted neoliberal economic reforms
pursuant to structural adjustment policies mandated by the World Bank and
the IMF in order to restructure existing debt or to obtain new loans.2 14 The

211

See Gonzalez, supra note 209, at 447-48.

212 See

YOUNG, supranote 21, at 46-47.

WALDEN BELLO ET AL., DARK VICTORY: THE UNITED STATES AND GLOBAL POVERTY 28 (3rd
ed. 1999).
213 See

See id. at 28-31; RICHARD PEET ET AL., UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO
77-78, 121-25 (2003); WALDEN BELLO ET AL., THE FUTURE IN THE BALANCE: ESSAYS ON
GLOBALIZATION AND RESISTANCE 10-12 (Anuradha Mittal ed., 2001) [hereinafter BELLO ET AL.,
THE FUTURE IN THE BALANCE]; MICHALE CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY:
IMPACTS OF IMF AND WORLD BANK REFORMS 45-69 (1997); MICHAEL E. CONROY ET AL., A
CAUTIONARY TALE: FAILED U.S. DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 12-15 (1996);
SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT: THE WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE POOR 49,
142-44 (1990). While a full discussion of the underlying reasons for the debt crisis is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief chronology is in order. When the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of petroleum in 1973, non-oil producing
developing countries that depended on petroleum-based agricultural inputs and on the
importation of petroleum to spur industrialization had little recourse but to borrow money from
the commercial banks in order to finance imports. PEET ET AL., supra, at 71; GEORGE, supra, at
28-29. The scale of lending increased dramatically as the commercial banks, eager to earn
interest on the oil revenues deposited in their coffers (known as "petrodollars"), actively
encouraged borrowing by middle-income industrializing countries viewed as particularly creditworthy, including Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and South Korea. See PEET ET AL., supra, at 71;
COOTE, supra note 61, at 33-34. Low-income developing countries, regarded as more risky,
tended to borrow from multilateral lenders, such as the World Bank and the IMF. See DAVID M.
ROODMAN, STILL WAITING FOR THE JUBILEE: PRAGMATIC SOLUTIONS FOR THE THIRD WORLD DEBT
CRISIS, 155 WORLD WATCH PAPER 8 (2001). Unfortunately, much of that debt was contracted at
variable or "market" rates (meaning that the rate could change over time), and the loan proceeds
were squandered on ill-cunceived iidustrialization projects, weapons purchases, corruption, and
214

capital flight. GEORGE, supra, at 14-24, 27-28; ROODMAN, supra, at 8. In 1979-1980, the second
OPEC oil price increase was accompanied by rising real interest rates and by a sharp decline in
the world market price for agricultural commodities. GEORGE, supra, at 28; PEET ET AL., supra,
at 74; COOTE, supra note 61, at 33-34. As interest payments and petroleum expenditures soared
and foreign exchange earnings dropped, developing countries sought to borrow additional funds.
GEORGE, supra, at 28-29. Over time, it became clear that many developing countries were
borrowing money simply to repay interest on old loans and could not repay their debts. The debt
crisis came to a head in 1982, when Mexico and Brazil announced that they could no longer make
debt payments on time. By the mid-1980s, three quarters of Latin American countries and two-
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second phase began in the mid-1990s pursuant to the Uruguay Round trade
5
agreements overseen by the WTO.21
The structural adjustment programs required by the IMF and the World
Bank typically obligate developing countries to slash government spending
and to increase exports in order to maximize the revenues available to service
the foreign debt. 2 16 Developing countries are required to devalue their
currencies, to privatize government enterprises, to drastically reduce social
spending, to eliminate subsidies and price controls (including agricultural
input subsidies), and to liberalize trade by eliminating import quotas and
reducing tariffs.217
By requiring developing countries to open their markets to foreign
competition without any diminution in developed countries' subsidies and
import barriers, structural adjustment policies reinforced the economic
dominance of developed country producers in world agricultural markets. 218
Indeed, a study published while the WTO Agreement on Agriculture was
under negotiation concluded that developing countries lost about $35 billion a
year due to declining market share for agricultural products as a consequence
219
of the subsidies and import barriers of the industrialized world.

thirds of African countries were operating under structural adjustment programs overseen by
the World Bank and the IMF in order to ensure loan repayment. See PEET ET AL., supra, at 72,
74-75.
215 See MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note 176, at 60. The objective of the Uruguay Round
negotiations was to amend the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT or 1947
GATT). The negotiations were launched in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay, and culminated
with the 1994 signature by trade ministers from more than 100 countries of "The Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations." See Over 100
Nations Sign GATT Accord to Cut Barriersto World Trade, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), at 61
(Apr. 20, 1994). The Final Act established a World Trade Organization to oversee the new
multilateral trading system and included agreements pertaining to agriculture, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures (SPS), textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade (TBT), traderelated investment measures (TRIMS), anti-dumping, customs valuation, pre-shipment
inspection, rules of origin, import licensing procedures, subsidies and countervailing measures,
safeguards, trade in services, and trade-related aspects of intellectual property. WTO, A
SUMMARY OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
docs e/legal_e/ursum-wp.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
21

6MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note 176, at 44; GEORGE, supra note 214, at 52.

217CHOSSUDOVSKY, supra note 214, at 62-63; GEORGE, supra note 214, at 50-52; BELLO ET AL.,
THE FUTURE IN THE BALANCE, supra note 214, at 10-11. Currency devaluation is intended to
make exports more competitive, thereby increasing the export revenues available to developing
countries to service the foreign debt. Privatization of government enterprises and elimination of
price controls and subsidies are designed to increase efficiency by inducing greater reliance on
the market rather than on government. Reduction of government spending is calculated to
control inflation and reduce the demand for capital from abroad. Trade liberalization is supposed
to increase the efficiency of local industry by exposing it to foreign competition. BELLO ET AL.,
THE FUTURE IN THE BALANCE, supranote 214, at 11.
218 See Gonzalez, supra note 209, at 446-47.
219World Trade Talks Near Collapse over Farm Subsidies Row, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1.
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The stated objective of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture was to reform
agricultural trade by "correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions
in world agricultural markets" in order to "establish a fair and marketoriented agricultural trading system."220 The Agreement sought to accomplish
221
reducing export subsidies,222
this objective by expanding market access,
223
subsidies.
and curtailing trade-distorting domestic
Despite its free market aspirations, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
did not correct the inequities in world agricultural markets that
systematically favor industrialized country producers. 22 4 First, developed
countries evaded the market access requirement by taking advantage of
ambiguities in the Agreement's language to maintain protectionist barriers to
developing country products. 225 By contrast, most developing countries had

220 Agreement

on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, pmbl. 2, 3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs-ellegale/14-ag.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
221 The

Agreement sought to expand market access by requiring the conversion of all non-tariff
import restrictions (such as quotas) into tariffs that provide an equivalent level of protection (a
process known as tariffication). These tariffs were then capped and reduced below a 1986-1988
base level over a period of several years. See Dale McNiel, Agricultural Trade Symposium:
Furthering the Reforms of Agricultural Policies in the Millenium Round, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 41, 61 (2000); Kevin J. Brosch, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, in THE
GATT, THE WTO, AND THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 875-76 (H. Applebaum & L. Schlitt
eds., 1995). The tariff reduction commitments and other market access obligations of specific
countries are spelled out in individual country schedules rather than in the body of the
Agreement. See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 220, art. 4. In general, developed
countries are required to reduce tariffs by 36% over six years (1995-2000), while developing
countries are given ten years (1995-2004) to achieve tariff reductions of 24%. See McNiel, supra,
at 62; Ian Sturgess, The Liberalisation Process in International Agricultural Trade: Market
Access and Export Subsidies, in NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES:
AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE MILLENIUM WTO ROUND 135, 147 (Sanoussi Bilal & Pavlos
Pezaros eds., 2000).
222The Agreement required developed countries to reduce export subsidy expenditures by 36%
and the volume of subsidized exports by 21% over six years (1995-2000) based on the 1986-1990
base period. In accordance with the principle of special and differential treatment, the
comparable percentages for developing countries were 21% and 14% over a ten-year period
(1995-2004). See Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 220, art. 15:2; Brosch, supra note 221, at
868; Joseph McMahon, The Uruguay Round and Agriculture: Charting a New Direction?, 29
INT'L L. 411, 429 (1995).
223The Agreement classified domestic subsidies based on the degree to which they distorted
trade, and required the reduction over time of the most trade-distorting subsidies (known as
Amber Box measures). See WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 56
(1999).
224See Gonzalez, supra note 209, at 459-65.
225See id. at 460-63 (explaining the various devices used by developed countries evaded the
market access requirements). For example, many developed countries engaged in "dirty
tariffication," the setting of tariff equivalents for non-tariff barriers at levels far more importrestrictive than the non-tariff barriers they replaced. In many instances, the levels of protection
were actually higher than under the pre-Uruguay Round GATT. The highest tariffs were often
imposed on developing country agricultural exports that competed with domestically produced
agricultural products. Furthermore, tariffs on developing country exports tended to escalate as
the processing chain advanced, thereby relegating developing countries to the production of

HeinOnline -- 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 459 2004-2005

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 14:419

eliminated non-tariff barriers and had significantly reduced tariffs pursuant
to structural adjustment programs mandated by the World Bank and the
IMF.226 Second, the Agreement allowed developed countries to continue to
use export subsidies (subject to reduction over time) while flatly prohibiting
their use by countries that had not used them in the past (most developing
countries). 227 Compounding this double standard, developed countries
avoided the mandated subsidy reductions by shifting resources to forms of
support not expressly prohibited by the Agreement. 228 Third, the Agreement
enabled developed countries to continue to provide massive domestic
subsidies by conveniently exempting the very types of support used most
often by the United States and the EU. 229 By contrast, the Agreement
prohibits developing countries that did not utilize these trade-distorting
subsidies in the past from using them in the future unless they fall below
certain de minimis levels or are restricted to low-income or resource-poor
farmers. 230 The level of agricultural subsidies in Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries increased in the aftermath
of the Agreement, from approximately $308 billion per year in 1986-1988231
to $318 billion per year in 2002.232 Far from remedying the inequities in the
global trading system that place developing country farmers at an enormous
disadvantage, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture institutionalized these
inequities by requiring market openness in developing countries while
233
permitting protectionist policies in the industrialized world.

primary agricultural commodities by restricting access to developed country markets for
processed goods. Id.
226See id. at 479, 479 n.292.
227 See id. at 463-65.

228 See Gonzalez, supra note 209, at 464-65. For example, the United States curtailed spending
on programs that promoted the export of agricultural products by paying exporters the difference
between the U.S. domestic price and the lower world market price. Instead, the United States
provided direct aid to producers not contingent on export performance-a type of subsidy
permitted by the Agreement. It also promoted exports by providing government credit on highly
favorable terms to exporters. Id.
229 See id. at 465-68, 483.

23 See id. at 481-82.
231 ORG.

FOR ECON.

COOPERATION

&

DEV.

(OECD),

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES

IN OECD

COUNTRIES: MONITORING AND EVALUATION 2000, tbl. 111.1 (2000).
232 OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES, MONITORING AND EVALUATION 2003,

Highlights, at 5, available at http://www.oecdwash.org/PDFILES/agr-me2003hl.pdf (last visited
Sept. 29, 2004).
233 See Gonzalez, supra note 209, at 459-68, 478-84 (assessing the implementation of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, and concluding that it enabled developed countries to maintain tradedistorting subsidies and import restrictions while restricting the options available to developing
countries to promote food security).
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A second WTO agreement, the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), 234 threatens to
preclude developing countries from banning or restricting the importation of
genetically modified seeds. The SPS Agreement promotes liberalized trade in
agricultural products by requiring that trade-restrictive measures to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health be "based on scientific principles" and
that these measures not be maintained "without sufficient scientific
evidence." 235 The SPS Agreement's emphasis on scientific evidence appears
to conflict with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (the Biosafety Protocol). 236 The Biosafety Protocol
recognizes the precautionary principle and allows parties to restrict the
in
importation of living genetically modified organisms (such as seeds) even 237
the absence of strict scientific proof regarding the extent of potential harm.
In May 2003, the Unites States, Canada, and Argentina initiated
challenges to the EU's de facto moratorium on the approval and marketing of
genetically modified organisms on the ground that the ban has no scientific
basis and therefore violates a number of WTO Agreements, including the SPS
Agreement. 238 In view of the scientific uncertainty surrounding the risks of
genetically modified organisms and in light of the anti-regulatory bias of

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1A, available at http://www.wto.org/english/trntop-e/sps-e/spsagr-e.htm
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
234

235 Id. arts. 2.1-2.2. WTO members are encouraged to base their SPS measures on international
standards. Id. art. 3.1. If these measures exceed international standards, they must be supported
by a risk assessment that takes into account, inter alia, scientific evidence, relevant ecological
and environmental conditions, economic factors, and the minimization of negative trade effects.
Id. arts. 3.3, 5.1-5.4.
236Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000,
availableat http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004)
[hereinafter Cartagena Protocol].
237Id. pmbl., arts. 1, 10.6. The potential conflict between the Cartagena Protocol and the SPS
Agreement has spawned voluminous scholarship. See, e.g., Guruswamy, supra note 174, at 490500; Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus of Trade and the Environment: The
Relationship Between the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement of the World
Trade Organization, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1 (2003); Sabrina Safrin, Treaties in
Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade OrganizationAgreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 606 (2002); John S. Applegate, The Prometheus Principle:Using the PrecautionaryPrincipleto
Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
207, 237-40 (2001); Brett Grosko, Genetic Engineering and International Law: Conflict or
Harmony? An Analysis of the Biosafety Protocol, GATT, and the WTO Sanitary and
PhytosanitaryAgreement, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 295 (2001); Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis,
Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy for GMOs-The Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: of
Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317 (2000).
238 See John W. Boscariol & Orlando E. Silva, Genetically Modified Organisms at the Centre of
Major WTO Dispute, LAW. WKLY., Mar. 26, 2004. The complaining countries contended that the
EU's de facto moratorium on approving and marketing genetically modified products violates the
1994 GATT, the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the SPS Agreement, and the WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Id.
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WTO dispute resolution panels, 239 it is unclear whether the EU will prevail.
The outcome of the dispute will likely elucidate the relationship between the
SPS Agreement and the Biosafety Protocol, and will have enormous
consequences for developing countries that are currently resisting pressure
from the U.S. government and from U.S. agribusiness to permit the
240
importation of genetically modified seeds.
Finally, a third WTO Agreement, the WTO Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),241 may impair food security
in the developing world by restricting the traditional rights of farmers to
save, sell, and exchange seeds if the seeds are protected by patents or patentlike intellectual property legislation. 242 The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO
members to utilize either patents or sui generis legislation to protect the
intellectual property rights of the seed industry. 243 Most developing countries
244
have opted for sui generis systems that preserve farmers' traditional rights.
By contrast, the United States, Canada, and the EU have opted for patent
protection, thereby permitting biotechnology companies to bring patent
infringement actions against farmers who replant, sell, or breed patented
seeds-and even against farmers whose crops are accidentally contaminated
by another farmer's patented seeds. 245 Developing countries are under

239 Guruswamy, supranote 174, at 493-94; Applegate, supra note 237, at 238.
240 In a move reminiscent of Public Law 480's deployment of food aid to create markets for U.S.
agribusiness, the United States has been shipping genetically modified food aid to African
countries afflicted by drought. Five African countries (Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique,
Zimbabwe, and Zambia) refused the unmilled genetically modified grain out of concern that it
would contaminate domestic seed. All of the countries but Zambia later accepted the grain as
long as it was milled before delivery to prevent its use as seed. Zambia, citing health concerns,
rejected the grain in both milled and unmilled form. The United States claimed that African
countries rejected high-yielding genetically modified seeds for fear of being shut out of EU
markets. The European Union accused the United States of exploiting the humanitarian needs of
starving people to create markets for genetically modified food and pointed out that African
countries have legitimate concerns about the local impacts of biotechnology. The EU's position
has been echoed by numerous environmental and development groups in Africa and elsewhere in
the developing world. See WTO Agreement on Agriculture Silent on GMOs, AFR. NEWS, June 19,
2003; Katrin Dauenhauer, Africans Challenge Bush Claim that GM Food Good for Them, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, June 19, 2003; Robert Weissman, Biotech Food Fight: The Front,
MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June 1, 2003, at 6.

241 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex 1C, available at http://www.wto.org/englishitratop-e/trips-e/t-agm3_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
242 Ruchi Tripathi, Food Patenting-A Threat to Food Security 3-4 (July 12-13 2001), availableat
http://www.actionaid.org/resources/pdfslpatenting.doc (ast visited Dec. 5, 2004) (unpublished
paper presented at the Launch Meeting of the Regional Programme on Farmers' Rights to
Livelihood in Kathmandu).
243 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 241, art. 27.3(b).
244 Tripathi, supra note 242, at 4.
245 See id. at 4; Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 247, 286-304 (2003) (describing the leading U.S. and Canadian
cases regarding patent protection of seeds and other living organisms). One of the more
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intense pressure to adopt sui generis systems that restrict farmers'
traditional rights. 246 If developing countries accede to these demands,
biotechnology companies will be able to insist that farmers purchase new
seeds every year and will be able to penalize them for replanting, breeding, or
selling patented seed. 24 7 Many developing countries have resisted this
pressure out of concern that strong intellectual property protection will
facilitate the ongoing domination of agricultural production by transnational
corporations, will undermine the livelihoods of poor farmers in the developing
world, and will interfere with the crop breeding practices essential to
continuous agricultural innovation. 248 The TRIPS Agreement raises many
other significant issues, but these issues are beyond the limited scope of this
249
article.
As the foregoing narrative illustrates, the neoliberal model, properly
understood, is a system of double standards foisted upon poor countries by
wealthy countries in order to perpetuate and reinforce the economic
dominance of the latter. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, for example,
enables industrialized countries to continue to dominate world agricultural
markets by requiring market openness in the developing world while
disturbing implications of patent protection of seed technology is the possibility that an innocent
farmer whose crops are contaminated by genetically modified seeds from a neighbor's field may
be faced with a patent infringement lawsuit. This is precisely what happened to Percy
Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer whose neighbors adopted Monsanto's genetically modified canola.
When private investigators hired by Monsanto discovered genetically modified canola growing on
his farm, Monsanto brought a patent infringement action. The hapless Mr. Schmeiser was found
liable for patent infringement, and was ordered to pay Monsanto damages. Id. at 292-98. In May
2004, the Canadian Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld the validity of Monsanto's patent, and
affirmed the determination that Mr. Schmeiser had infringed the patent. However, the court
denied Monsanto's request for monetary damages on the ground that Mr. Schmeiser's profits
were no greater than they would have been if he had planted and harvested ordinary canola
rather than genetically modified canola. See Schmeiser v. Monsanto, [2004] S.C.R. 902, 2004
SCC 34, availableat 2004 S.C.R. LEXIS 30.
246 Tripathi, supra note 242, at 4-5.
247 Id. at 11.

248 Id. at 7-9, 11; Meetali Jain, Global Trade and the New Millenium: Defining the Scope of
Intellectual Property Protection of Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge in India,
22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 777, 789-94 (1999).
249 For example, another important issue raised by the TRIPS provision discussed above is
biopiracy-the appropriation of the traditional knowledge and genetic resources of local and
indigenous communities by transnational biotechnology companies without prior informed
consent and without compensation. This practice is inconsistent with the Convention on
Biological Diversity's (CBD) requirement of prior informed consent and benefit sharing.
Developing country governments and non-governmental organizations are demanding that the
TRIPS Agreement be made consistent with the CBD. See generally Tripathi, supra note 242, at
5-7, 9-11; CARLOS N. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 167-205 (2000); Charles R. McManis,

Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking
Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 547 (2003); Erin Donovan, Beans,
Beans, The Patented Fruit: The Growing International Conflict over the Ownership of Life, 25
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 117 (2002); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of
TraditionalKnowledge, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 233 (2001).
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permitting lavish subsidies and import-restrictive tariffs in the industrialized
world. The SPS Agreement creates lucrative business opportunities for U.S.based transnational corporations by prying open the markets of developed
and developing countries that would prefer to proceed cautiously with
genetically modified organisms. 25 1 The TRIPS Agreement threatens to
reinforce the dependence of developing countries on agricultural inputs
generated in the industrialized world by depriving farmers of their
traditional right to save, sell, and exchange seeds. Finally, the IMF and the
World Bank, which operate almost entirely in the developing world, do not
impose structural adjustment on the industrialized world. As one astute
commentator observed, the neoliberal model is quite simply "an economics of
25
empire." 1
Proponents of the neoliberal model might concede the previouslyreferenced inequities but nevertheless argue that the solution is to level the
playing field by requiring industrialized countries to eliminate agricultural
subsidies and reduce tariffs. There is no question that developing countries
would benefit enormously from trade liberalization in the industrialized
world. However, it is dangerous to conflate formal equality with substantive
equality. Trade liberalization in the industrialized world will not eliminate
the economic advantages conferred by decades of protectionism and centuries
of colonialism. Free trade among equals may be mutually advantageous.
However, free trade among vastly unequal parties is akin to a boxing match
between a featherweight wearing handcuffs and a heavyweight. Removing
the featherweight's handcuffs (like eliminating industrialized world subsidies
and tariff barriers) will certainly enhance the fairness of the competition.
Nevertheless, the underlying boxing match remains inherently unfair, and
the outcome is entirely predictable. This theme will be developed further in
25 2
Part V of this article.
If the United States prevails in its WTO challenge of the EU's de facto ban on genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), developing countries will be under increasing pressure to open their
markets to GMOs. However, based on recent history, there is a strong possibility that the EU
will refuse to comply with an unfavorable GMO ruling. In 1998, the WTO Appellate Body
concluded that the EU violated the SPS Agreement by prohibiting the importation of beef treated
with growth hormones without conducting the required risk assessment. The EU refused to lift
its ban. As a result, the United States subjected EU products to trade sanctions of $125 million
per year. Most developing countries do not have the financial resources to withstand U.S. trade
sanctions or even to contest a WTO complaint by the United States. In the end, the response of
developing countries will be influenced by their trading relationship with the United States and
the EU. Countries highly dependent on trade with the EU may be reluctant to accept GMO seeds
for fear of being shut out of EU markets if GMOs contaminate the country's agricultural exports.
See Report of the Appellate Body (WTO), EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS/48/AB/R, para. 124 (1998), available at 1998 WL 25520 (WTO); Jan Johanes,
Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-BasedApproach to the PrecautionaryPrinciple,40
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 336 (2002); Shelley Emling, U.S., European Union Toe-to-Toe Over
Trade Issues, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 2, 2003, at D1.
250

251

Finnegan, supra note 9, at 42.

The boxing match described in this paragraph is not precisely analogous to the situation of
developed and developing countries because the heavyweight's size and strength were not
252
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C. Impact of the NeoliberalReforms on Food Security
The neoliberal economic reforms of the last two decades exacerbated food
insecurity in the developing world by eliminating social safety nets,
increasing poverty and inequality, reducing domestic food production, and
253
depressing export earnings.
First, the slashing of social spending under structural adjustment
exacerbated food insecurity by producing massive reductions in the
entitlements of the poor. 25 4 As government price controls and subsidies were
removed, the cost of basic necessities exceeded the means of many people in
the developing world. 255 This sparked food riots (known as "IMF riots") in
numerous developing countries, including Morocco, Madagascar, the
256
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Zambia, and, most recently, Argentina.
Indeed, structural adjustment inflicted such intense suffering, stirred such
passionate opposition, and generated so much adverse publicity that the
acquired at the expense of the featherweight. By contrast, the economic dominance of the
industrialized world was acquired as a direct consequence of the colonial and post-colonial
integration of developing countries into the world economy on highly disadvantageous terms.
Leveling the playing field is a necessary first step, but it is by no means sufficient.
23 See generally, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY REVIEW INT'L NETWORK (SAPRIN),
THE POLICY ROOTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY: A MULTI-COUNTRY PARTICIPATORY
ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 111-27 (2002), available at http://www.saprin.org
SAPRl_ Findings.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter SAPRIN]; The SAPRIN report was
a multi-country study of structural adjustment sponsored by the World Bank and by a network
of civil society groups. Based on a four-year process of consultation and research in nine
countries located on four continents, the study analyzed the economic and social consequences of
structural adjustment in seven distinct areas: manufacturing, finance, employment, agriculture,
mining, state enterprise privatization, education, and health care. Id. at i-ii. The section of the
report focusing on agriculture was based on research performed in Bangladesh, Uganda,
Zimbabwe, Mexico, and the Philippines. Id. at 13. MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note
176, at 73-90; JOHN MADELEY, FORUM SYD, TRADE AND HUNGER: AN OVERVIEW OF CASE STUDIES
ON THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION ON FOOD SECURITY (2002), available at
(Oct. 2000) [hereinafter
http://www.environmentalobservatory.orgflibrary/cfm?ReflD=36097
MADELEY, TRADE AND HUNGER]. The Madeley publications summarize studies performed by
U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations on the consequences of trade liberalization
under structural adjustment and under multilateral trade agreements in a variety of developing
countries. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., FAO SYMPOSIUM ON AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND FOOD
SECURITY, PAPER NO. 3: EXPERIENCE WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCES (Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/meeting/x3065E.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter FAO,
Paper No. 3]. The FAO report assessed the impact of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in
sixteen developing countries: Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Egypt, Fiji, Guyana, India,
Jamaica, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Thailand.
254

YOUNG, supranote 21, at 44.

255 Id. at 44-45.

See YOUNG, supra note 21, at 44-45; GEORGE, supra note 214, at 78-80, 153-54; Roger
Burbach, "Throw Them All Out" Argentina's GrassrootsRebellion, 36 N.A.C.L.A. REPORT ON THE
AMERICAS 38-40 (July/Aug. 2002) (describing the protests in December 2001 known as
caserolazos, in which protesters banged on empty pots and pans to dramatize their inability to
purchase the basic necessities of life). See also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 18-20 (2002) (explaining that the free market prescriptions of the IMF increased
poverty and produced social and political unrest in the developing world).
256
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World Bank and the IMF have recently renamed the program "development
257
policy support lending."
Second, the lowering of tariff barriers and the elimination of non-tariff
barriers in developing countries increased rural poverty and depressed
domestic food production by exposing developing country farmers to ruinous
competition from industrialized country producers. 258 When the influx of
cheap, subsidized food from the United States and the EU depressed
domestic food prices, wealthy farmers shifted from food production to the
cultivation of more lucrative export crops. 259 However, poor farmers found
their livelihoods threatened as declining agricultural prices coincided with
the withdrawal of agricultural subsidies, the reduction of extension services,
and the elimination of subsidized credit. 260 Many farmers abandoned the
land, resulting in a concentration of land ownership in the hands of wealthier

See Finnegan, supra note 9, at 52. In its 1989 annual report, the United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF) blamed the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s for the death of
hundreds of thousands of children in the developing world. Putting aside the bland jargon of
U.N. relief agencies, UNICEF condemned structural adjustment in the following unequivocal
terms:
It is essential to strip away the niceties of economic parlance and say that
what has happened is simply an outrage against a large segment of
humanity. The developing world's debt, both in the manner in which it was
incurred and in the manner in which it is being 'adjusted to' is an economic
stain on the second half of the twentieth century. Allowing world economic
problems to be taken out on the growing minds and bodies of young children
is the antithesis of all civilized behavior. Nothing can justify it. And it
shames and diminishes us all.
UNICEF, STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN (1989).
258 See MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL, supra note 23, at 120; CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 14;
SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 114, 118-19; SUSAN STONICH, "I AM DESTROYING THE LAND!": THE
POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF POVERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION IN HONDURAS 73-77
(1992). Cheap food imports increase poverty and promote food insecurity because the vast
majority of the 1.2 billion poor people in the developing world are small farmers who depend on
agricultural revenues to purchase agricultural inputs, pay taxes, buy food in times of shortage,
and purchase items not produced on the farm. See MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note
176, at 76-80; Kevin Watkins & Joachim von Braun, Time to Stop Dumping on the World's Poor,
in INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST. (IFPRI), TRADE POLICIES AND FOOD SECURITY 2 (20022003), available at http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/bodes/ar2002/ ar2002-essay0l.htm (last visited
Sept. 29, 2004); INT'L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD), RURAL POVERTY REPORT 2001: THE
CHALLENGE OF ENDING RURAL POVERTY 15-17, 20 (2001), available at http://www.ifad.org/
poverty/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004); INST. FOR AGRIC. TRADE & POLICY (IATP),
CANCUN SERIES PAPER No. 1, UNITED STATES DUMPING ON WORLD AGRICULTURAL MARKETS 14
(2003), available at http:l/www.tradeobservatory.org/ library.cfm?ReflD=25825 (last visited Sept.
29, 2004) [hereinafter IATP, U.S. DUMPING]; COOTE, supra note 61, at 116.
257

269See CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 14; MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note 176, at
54, 58, 75-83; SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 14, 114, 118-19. In Chile, for example, the amount of
land under basic food crops dropped by nearly thirty percent between 1989 and 1993 as a
consequence of export-oriented agricultural production. Fruit, flowers, and other export crops
replaced wheat, beans, and other food staples. MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note 176, at
54.
260 See SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 116-18.
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farmers. 261 Domestic food production on both large and small farms declined,
262
and dependence on imported food increased.
Third, the emphasis on export production increased rural inequality by
reinforcing the privileged status of large farmers at the expense of
smallholders. 2 3 Large farmers generally had better access to capital and
credit with which to finance cash crop production and were provided with tax
breaks, subsidized credit, and other incentives to convert to export
production. 264 As cash crop production increased land values, landowners
raised rents, revoked peasant tenancy and sharecropping rights, or simply
evicted tenants in order to rent the land to more affluent farmers who could

See id. at 13, 118-20; RoSSET, supra note 133, at 15; LORI ANN THRUPP, BITTERSWEET
HARVESTS FOR GLOBAL SUPERMARKETS: CHALLENGES IN LATIN AMERICA'S AGRICULTURAL
EXPORT BOOM 84 (1995) [hereinafter THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS].
261

262

5ee MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note 176, at 58; SAPRIN, supranote 253, at 118-19;

15, 42, 49, 57, 77, and
82. In a recently published twenty-three country study on developing country implementation of
the Agreement on Agriculture, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization found that
expenditure on food imports increased significantly in the aftermath of the Agreement. For
example, the amount spent on food imports more than doubled from 1990-1994 (just before the
Agreement) to 1995-2000 Gust after the Agreement) in seven countries (Bangladesh, Costa Rica,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Philippines, and Uganda). Indeed the value of food imports in
Uganda increased more than three times. Dependence on food imports can be particularly
problematic if a country is likely to experience difficulty paying for them. An important indicator
of food import capacity is the ratio of food import expenditures over total exports of goods and
services. Because a proportion of export revenues in developing countries is usually set aside for
debt service and is therefore not available to import food, the ratio can also be expressed as food
imports over total exports of goods and services minus debt service payments. The FAO study
found that the ratio had increased for fourteen of the twenty-three countries over the past
decade. In other words, for these fourteen countries, the burden of paying for food imports had
increased in the 1995-2000 period relative to 1990-1994. FAO, WTO AGREEMENT ON
AGRICULTURE: THE IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE, DEVELOPING COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 36, 49
(2003) [hereinafter FAO, WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (2003)].
STONICH, supra note 258, at 73-77; FAO PAPER No. 3, supra note 253,

263See SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 13, 114. In Latin America, transnational corporations have

played an enormous role in shifting production away from staple foods to exports, including nontraditional agricultural exports such as vegetables, fruits, flowers, and animal feed. These
patterns of production have had a negative impact on staple food production and have sharpened
rural inequality. While some farmers have prospered and have evolved into "capitalist farmers,"
many smallholders have been displaced from the land or have become "proletarians in
disguise"-nominally smallholders, but completely dependent on agribusiness through contract
farming. See Cristobal Kay, Rural Development and Agrarian Issues in Contemporary Latin
America, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN 9, 12-13. (John Weeks ed., 1995).
264See CONROY ET AL., supra note 214 at 29, 37-41, 43, 54, 58; THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS,
supra note 261, at 67-70 (explaining that transnational corporations and large national and
foreign investors are the main beneficiaries of the shift to non-traditional agricultural exports in
Latin America); David Reed, Conclusions: Short-term Environmental Impacts of Structural
Adjustment Programs, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 310, 313 (David Reed ed., 1996) [hereinafter Reed, Conclusions] (discussing the
tendency of export production to benefit large farmers); Michael R. Carter et al., Agricultural
Export Booms and the Rural Poor in Chile, Guatemala, and Paraguay, 31 LATIN AM. RES. REV.
33, 57-60 (1996) (summarizing the factors that favor medium- and large-scale producers in the
agricultural export booms in Chile, Guatemala, and Paraguay).
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grow high-value crops. 265 These wealthy landowners also expanded their
holdings by purchasing the plots of smallholders who lacked the capital to
produce for the export market and who found it increasingly difficult to live
off traditional food crop production. 266 The net result was increasing economic
polarization in rural areas, with an ever-growing poor majority and an ever267
wealthier elite.
Finally, the neoliberal reforms exacerbated food insecurity by depressing
developing country export earnings. Structural adjustment shifted
investment to the export sector in order to generate the revenue with which
to service the foreign debt. 268 However, as competing developing country
exports simultaneously glutted the market, the benefits of export expansion
were almost completely nullified by declining prices. 269 In addition, the
neoliberal reforms harmed developing countries by requiring them to open
their markets while permitting developed countries to maintain tradedistorting subsidies and import-restrictive tariffs. 270 According to a study
released in 2003 by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI),
industrialized country subsidies and protectionism displaced about $40
billion in net agricultural exports per year from developing countries and cost
developing countries approximately $24 billion per year in foregone
agricultural and agro-industrial income.27 1 This foregone income reverberated

215 See CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 37-38 (explaining the changes in land tenure in
Central America as a consequence of high-value, export-oriented agricultural production);
THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra note 261, at 70 (discussing the growing concentration of
landholding in many Latin American countries as a consequence of export-oriented production);
STONICH, supra note 258, at 69-72, 81-82 (describing changes in land tenure in Honduras
between 1952 and 1974 resulting from the boom in cotton exports as well as similar changes
resulting from shrimp farming in the 1980s in the aftermath of structural adjustment).
266See CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 38; MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE, supra note 176, at
59. These displaced landowners became landless laborers or migrated to the cities. In some parts
of Central America, this displacement of small farmers has resulted in high unemployment
rates. CONROY ET AL., supra note 219, at 38.
267See CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 62; FAO PAPER No. 3, supra note 253, 18; SAPRIN,
supra note 253, at 120-22 (discussing the ways in which import liberalization and exportoriented production reinforced rural inequality). In its 2003 report on the implementation of the
Agreement on Agriculture in twenty-three developing countries, the FAO acknowledged that the
poor often suffer the most from trade liberalization. Small farmers are typically unable to
participate in export production, and many are marginalized as export production creates
competition for scarce resources. The FAO report expressed concern that export opportunities
might lead to the reallocation of land and other resources away from domestic food production,
thereby adversely affecting household food security. FAO, WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
(2003), supra note 262, at 50.
266 GEORGE, supra note 214, at 59-60, 78; MADELEY, FOOD FOR ALL, supra note 23, at 117.
269GEORGE, supra note 214, at 60-61; COOTE, supra note 61, at 34-35; MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR
TRADE, supra note 176, at 91-92.
276 See supra notes 223-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
271INT'L FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INST. (IFPRI), How MUCH DOES IT HURT? THE IMPACT OF
AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2-3 (2003), available at
http://www.ifpri.org/media/trade/trade.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Latin America and the
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throughout the economy, as lost agricultural revenues resulted in the
activities and in
depression of employment in farming and farming-related
272
sector.
agricultural
the
in
reduced investment
These observations are consistent with the results of twenty-seven case
studies examining the impact in thirty-nine developing countries of
agricultural trade liberalization resulting from IMF and World Bank
structural adjustment programs, regional trade agreements, and the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture. 273 The case studies concluded that cheap food
imports depressed agricultural prices, thereby reducing small farmer
revenues and placing domestic food production at risk.27 4 Because this drop
in prices was frequently accompanied by government cuts in agricultural
input subsidies, small farmers were forced to pay more for agricultural inputs
while receiving less for their output. 275 The case studies found that trade
liberalization resulted in a shift toward export production and a decrease in
land and resources devoted to domestic food production. 276 Large enterprises,
including transnational corporations and large-scale domestic farms,
benefited from trade liberalization. 277 Poor farmers and rural laborers saw
their livelihoods endangered by declining commodity prices and by the loss of
rural employment. 278 Many small farmers abandoned agricultural production
and migrated to the cities and towns, thereby placing additional strain on
limited urban amenities. 279 In general, trade liberalization had a negative
280
impact on food security.
D. Impact of the Neoliberal Reforms on the Environment
The shift from domestic food cultivation to export production degraded
the environment in the developing world by promoting the expansion of
monocultures 281 and the extensive use of agrochemicals. 28 2 This, in turn,
Caribbean experienced the largest losses (approximately $8.3 billion in annual income), while
Asia and Africa experienced less severe but nevertheless significant harm (annual losses of about
$6.6 billion in Asia and almost $2 billion in Africa) [hereinafter IFPRI]. Id.
272

Id. at 4.

27

3 MADELEY, TRADE AND HUNGER, supra note 253, at 7-13.

274

Id. at 2-3, 8, 17-18, 21, 25-26, 43, 45, 52, 62, 71, 77.

275 Id. at

8.

276

Id. at 3, 8-9, 26, 28-29, 34, 65.

277

Id. at 3-4, 8, 15, 34-35, 72.

278

MADELEY, TRADE AND HUNGER, supra note 253, at 9, 16, 27, 50, 58, 69, 72.

279 Id. at
280

5-6.

Id. at 5.

SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 124. In response to the glut of traditional agricultural export
products (coffee, bananas, cotton, beef, and sugar) on world markets, policymakers in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America promoted the cultivation of non-traditional agricultural exports, such
as fruits, vegetables, flowers, nuts, oils, and spices. While the cultivation of nontraditional
agricultural exports diversified export production, reduced reliance on one or two traditional
281
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eroded crop genetic diversity, 28 3 produced higher levels of pesticide-related
illness, 28 4 and resulted in the contamination of ground and surface waters by
pesticides and fertilizers. 28 5 The intensive irrigation schemes favored by
structural adjustment programs often caused excessive extraction of
groundwater, thereby diverting scarce water resources from local
communities to large-scale farming operations and threatening to deplete
local aquifers. 28 6 Finally, the decreasing ability to purchase agricultural
inputs (due to the elimination of input subsidies and credit) caused farmers
to attempt to maintain existing levels of production by expanding the land
under cultivation, thereby accelerating deforestation and overtaxing and
28 7
degrading marginal lands.
E. Summary and Conclusion: The NeoliberalModel and Industrial
Agriculture
In sum, the neoliberal reforms of the last two decades exacerbated
hunger and environmental degradation in the developing world by
reinforcing pre-existing inequities in agricultural trade and production that
have their genesis in colonialism. Specifically, the neoliberal policy
prescription of the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO reinforced
debilitating specialization in agro-export production, accelerated the adoption
export products, and offset market fluctuations in any single commodity, this diversification did
not necessarily result in crop diversity at the farm level. On the contrary, farms were usually
planted in monocultures and were therefore highly vulnerable to pests and disease. See David
Reed, An Instrument of Global Economic Policy, in STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, THE
ENVIRONMENT, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 17 (David Reed ed., 1996); CONROY ET AL.,
supra note 214, at 13-14, 18-19; THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra note 261, at 17-18, 9495.
282 SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 124. Indeed, pesticides constitute a significant percentage of total

operating costs in the export sector (especially in flower production), and their high cost
represents yet another barrier to the participation of small farmers in export production.
THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra note 261, at 96.
2

83 THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra note 261, at 112.

284 CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 138-39. The expansion of pesticide use resulted in

additional incidents of acute pesticide poisoning as well as chronic health problems. THRUPP,
BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra note 261, at 107-08. Structural adjustment programs often
impeded the ability of regulatory agencies in developing countries to monitor and regulate
pesticide use because these programs imposed sharp cuts in the budgets and staff of government
agencies charged with environmental protection. See PATRICIA LUNDY, DEBT AND ADJUSTMENT:
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES IN JAMAICA 61-62 (1999).
285 SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 124; STONICH, supra note 258, at 85. In addition, excessive

pesticide use destroyed beneficial insects that preyed upon other pests, thus promoting
secondary pest infestations. CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 124-25; THRUPP, BITTERSWEET
HARVESTS, supra note 261, at 102, 106. When farmers responded to these infestations by
increasing the dose and frequency of pesticide applications, many pests developed pesticide
resistance. Farmers were thus caught in a "pesticide treadmill," where increasing pesticide use
only exacerbated the pest problem and resulted in mounting crop losses. CONROY ET AL., supra
note 214, at 124-25; THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supranote 261, at 106.
286 SAPRIN, supra note 253, at 124-25; STONICH, supra note 258, at 85.
287 Reed, Conclusions, supra note 264, at 314.
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of ecologically harmful monocultures, and increased rural poverty and
inequality.
Structural adjustment exacerbated hunger in the developing world by
obligating developing countries to open their markets to foreign competition
without requiring corresponding reforms in the industrialized world. As
developing countries lowered import barriers and slashed subsidies,
developing country farmers were exposed to economically devastating
competition from highly subsidized U.S. and EU agribusiness. Structural
adjustment's emphasis on cash crop production (to generate the revenue with
which to service the foreign debt) aggravated rural inequality by favoring
affluent farmers (who could afford the necessary inputs) at the expense of
smallholders (who lacked the resources to shift to export production).
Furthermore, the cash crop specialization promoted by structural adjustment
glutted world markets and depressed commodity prices, thereby impairing
the ability of developing countries to generate the steady and reliable
revenue streams needed to finance food imports, service the foreign debt, and
undertake economic diversification. Finally, structural adjustment intensified
chemical-intensive monocultural farming techniques that eroded biodiversity,
contaminated water supplies, depleted aquifers, accelerated deforestation,
and degraded marginal lands.
Structural adjustment, in conjunction with the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, institutionalized a double standard that afflicts the agricultural
sector to this day: protectionism in wealthy countries and liberalized trade in
poor countries. This double standard aggravates food security at the
household level by allowing cheap, subsidized food imports from the United
States and the EU to undermine the livelihoods of millions of poor farmers in
the developing world. This double standard also intensifies food insecurity at
the national level in two distinct but complementary ways. First, the
agricultural subsidies maintained by the industrialized world create
disincentives to domestic food production in developing countries. Second, the
trade-distorting subsidies and protectionist import barriers depress the
export revenues necessary to finance food imports. Food security is
compromised at the national level as developing countries produce less food
and have less income with which to purchase food. The WTO SPS Agreement
and the WTO TRIPS Agreement threaten to exacerbate the plight of small
farmers and to reinforce chemical-intensive, monocultural production
techniques by making farmers increasingly dependent on agricultural inputs
(including patented seeds marketed with specific pesticides and herbicides)
produced by transnational corporations based in the industrialized world.
In short, the neoliberal economic model institutionalized the tendency of
colonialism, the post-war agrochemical production boom, and the Green
Revolution to favor large-scale, chemical-intensive agricultural production at
the expense of the poor and of the natural world. 28 8 The devastation wrought
288

In the words of physicist and environmental activist, Vandana Shiva:
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by this development model provides the necessary context for appreciating
the historic significance of Cuba's unique experiment in ecologically
sustainable agriculture.
IV. CUBA: AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL?

In an earlier article, I examined the evolution of Cuban agriculture from
the colonial period to the present through the framework of food security and
ecological sustainability. 2 9 I argued that Cuba, prior to the collapse of the
socialist trading bloc, was food insecure and ecologically compromised as a
consequence of the export-oriented capital-intensive agricultural production
model adopted by the Cuban government during the first three decades of the
socialist revolution. 290 Like the neoliberal economic model discussed in Part
III.B above, Cuba's post-revolutionary agricultural production strategy
reinforced patterns of economic specialization imposed during the colonial
period that created dependence on one agricultural commodity (sugar) to
generate the foreign exchange necessary to purchase manufactured goods
and imported food. 291 This strategy rendered Cuba acutely vulnerable to
fluctuations in world market prices for agricultural commodities and to
political and economic pressure from its primary trading partner. 292 When
the collapse of the socialist trading bloc in 1990 coincided with low world
market prices for sugar, the Cuban economy plunged into a state of crisis
known as the Special Period in Peacetime. 293 In response to the crisis, the
Cuban government implemented an unprecedented series of reforms that
decentralized and diversified agricultural production, emphasized production
for the domestic market, and promoted organic and semi-organic

It is true that cutting down forests or converting natural forests into
monocultures of pine and eucalyptus for industrial raw material generates
revenues and growth. But this growth is based on robbing the forest of its
biodiversity and its capacity to conserve soil and water. This growth is based
on robbing forest communities of their sources of food, fodder, fuel, fiber,
medicine, and security from
floods and drought.
While most
environmentalists can recognize that converting a natural forest into a
monoculture is an impoverishment, many do not extend this insight to
industrial agriculture. A corporate myth has been created, shared by most
mainstream environmentalists and development organizations, that
industrial agriculture is necessary to grow more food and reduce hunger.
Many also assume that intensive, industrial agriculture saves resources and,
therefore, saves species. But in agriculture as much as in forestry, the growth
illusion hides theft from nature and the poor, masking the creation of scarcity
as growth.
VANDANA SHIVA, STOLEN HARVEST: THE HIJACKING OF THE GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY 1 (2000).
289

See Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 685-732.

29

Id. at 703-09.

291

Id. at 689-96.

292

Id. at 703-05.

293

Id. at 686, 705.
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techniques. 294 These reforms enhanced food security and ecological
sustainability by diversifying Cuba's productive base and by utilizing natural
pest, nutrient, and soil management technologies in lieu of non-renewable,
295
environmentally damaging inputs.
Once the U.S. economic embargo is lifted, Cuba will face extraordinary
pressure from international trade and financial institutions to adopt
neoliberal policies that may jeopardize Cuba's agricultural transformation.
Cuba is, therefore, a superb vehicle for exploring the constraints imposed by
global trade and financial institutions on the development strategies of small,
trade-dependent developing countries. This section outlines the origins of
industrial agriculture in Cuba, discusses the transformation of Cuban
agriculture in the aftermath of the demise of the socialist trading bloc, and
examines the ways in which neoliberal economic policies may undermine
Cuba's post-1990 reforms.
A. Origins of IndustrialAgriculture in Cuba
In Cuba, as in much of the developing world, export-oriented agricultural
production was imposed during the colonial period and reinforced by postcolonial trade and investment practices. 296 Under the auspices of the Spanish
crown, the sugar monoculture became the defining feature of the Cuban
economy. 297 Sugar production displaced domestic food production and was
accompanied by increasing reliance on food imports to satisfy the nutritional
needs of the population. 298 As the sugar plantations expanded, land
ownership became increasingly concentrated. 299 By 1899, 70% of Cuba's
30 0
cultivated land was controlled by 16% of Cuba's farmers.
After political independence, sugar remained Cuba's economic
mainstay. 30 1 Sugar was cultivated on nearly half of Cuba's irrigated land and

294 Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 712-28 (describing and evaluating Cuba's agricultural reforms).
295 See id. at 721-28.
296 See FRANKLIN W. KNIGHT, SLAVE SOCIETY IN CUBA DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3-46

(1970) (describing the evolution of export-oriented sugar production in Cuba during Spanish
colonial rule); MARIFELI PEREZ-STABLE, THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: ORIGINS, COURSE AND LEGACY

15-24 (1999) (explaining how post-independence trade and investment practices reinforced
Cuba's economic dependence on sugar exports).
297 See KNIGHT, supranote 296, at 3-46.
298 See Max Zeuske, Notas retrospectives sobre la sociedadagrariacubana en los siglos XIXy XX,
in LA ULTIMA REFORMA AGRARIA DEL SIGLO: LA AGRICULTURA CUBANA ENTRE EL CAMBIO Y EL

ESTANCAMIENTO 23-26 (Hans-Jurgen Biirchardt ed., 2000) [hereinafter LA ULTIMA REFORMA
AGRARIA DEL SIGLO].
299 See id. at 23-25.
300 HUGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM 1562 (1998).

30' PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at 15. After the 1895-1898 war of independence, the sugar
industry in Cuba lay in ruins. Id. While Cuba achieved nominal independence from Spain in
1898, Cuba was under U.S. military occupation from 1899 to 1902 and did not achieve full

HeinOnline -- 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 473 2004-2005

TRANSNATIONAL LAW

&

CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 14:419

generated over 80% of export revenues. 30 2 The sugar monoculture fostered
economic dependence on the United States. 303 By the 1920s, U.S. investors
owned 60% of the Cuban sugar industry and controlled 95% of the Cuban
sugar harvest. 30 4 From 1903 to 1948, Cuban sugar was given preferential
access to the U.S. market in exchange for similar treatment of U.S. exports to
Cuba. 305 This trade reciprocity frustrated efforts to diversify the Cuban
economy 30 6 and encouraged continued reliance on the importation of food
products (such as oil, lard, rice, vegetables, and fruit) that could easily be
produced in Cuba. 30 7 Although U.S. investment in the sugar industry had
declined by the decade preceding the 1959 revolution, the United States
continued to dominate Cuba's foreign trade, supplying 75% of Cuba's imports
30 8
and receiving 66% of Cuba's exports.

political independence from U.S. administration until May 20, 1902. THOMAS, supra note 300, at
436, 460. HOWARD I. BLUTSTEIN ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR CUBA 23 (1971). Between 1900 and
1925, the Cuban sugar industry experienced a seventeenfold expansion due to substantial
investment and preferential tariff treatment from the United States. In the post-1925 period,
sugar would represent over eighty percent of Cuba's exports. PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at
15-16.

302THOMAS, supra note 300, at 1151-52.
3 See PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at 14-27. The sugar industry in post-colonial Cuba
operated as a foreign enclave highly dependent on foreign capital, machinery, and, to a lesser
extent, foreign workers. THOMAS, supra note 300, at 1150.
304See THOMAS, supra note 300, at 557.
305 See BLUTSTEIN ET AL., supra note 301, at 384. Cuba was also included in the U.S. sugar quota
system designed to stabilize sugar prices in the U.S. market. Under this system, Cuba was
allotted a substantial portion of the U.S. sugar market (approximately twenty-eight percent) and
was thereby guaranteed prices that substantially exceeded world market sugar prices. Id.
306See PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at 25-26. For example, the influx of cheap manufactured

goods from the United States at preferential tariff rates impeded the development of Cuba's
manufacturing industry. See JULES R. BENJAMIN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE

CUBAN REVOLUTION 69 (1990). Likewise, Cuba's preferential tariff arrangement with the United
States thwarted efforts to stimulate domestic rice production. When Cuban rice growers
increased rice production, U.S. rice growers protested declining rice imports and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture hinted that Cuba's sugar quota might be reduced. In order to protect
the sugar quota, the Cuban government agreed to import massive quantities of U.S. rice over the
vehement objections of Cuban producers. Between 1955 and 1959, Cuban rice imports from the
United States jumped by more than 40%, while domestic rice production grew a modest 10%. On
the eve of the revolution, the United States was exporting 75% of its rice output to Cuba, and
Cuban farmers produced less than half of the rice consumed in Cuba. The preferential
arrangement forced Cuba to rely on imports for the single most important item in the Cuban
diet. PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at 25-26.
307See THOMAS, supra note 300, at 1186-88.
308 Id. at 557, 1187-88. In the decades preceding the revolution, Cuba became increasingly

dependent on both U.S. investment and U.S. trade. By 1958, U.S. investment in Cuba amounted
to $1 billion, nearly one third of which was concentrated in public utilities. U.S. firms produced
over thirty percent of Cuba's sugar, and were substantially involved in Cuban mining and
manufacturing industries. Most cars, trucks, buses, trains, and aircraft were supplied by the
United States, and most of the machinery used in Cuba was designed according to U.S.
specifications. The U.S. influence was so powerful that most exports were shipped from tiny
ports designed for quick trips to the United States. These ports could not accommodate the large
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The sugar monoculture produced economic instability in Cuba and
contributed to rural poverty and inequality. 30 9 When world sugar prices were
high, the Cuban economy prospered; when they were low, all economic
sectors stagnated. 310 In the decades following political independence, land
ownership became increasingly skewed. By 1946, 70% of Cuba's cultivated
land was owned by 8% of Cuba's farmers, while the remaining land was
owned primarily by small-scale single-family subsistence farmers.3 11 The
sugar industry employed approximately 500,000 landless laborers (one-third
of the Cuban labor force) during the four-month sugar harvest, but these
workers remained unemployed or underemployed for the remainder of the
year. 312 Living conditions in rural Cuba were very poor. 313 The overwhelming
majority of rural Cubans lived in homes without electricity, running water,
indoor or outdoor toilets, or a refrigerator. 314 The sugar monoculture, the
concentration of landholding, and economic dependence on the United States
would remain key features of the Cuban economy through the 1959
revolution. 315
Ironically, the socialist revolution did not transform the patterns of trade
and production imposed during the colonial era that were so devastating to
the Cuban economy. The first three decades of the Cuban revolution (19591989) did not alter Cuba's economic dependence on sugar, its highly
centralized pattern of landholding, or its dangerous reliance on one primary
trading partner. 3 16 After an early attempt at agricultural diversification
created serious balance-of-payment difficulties, the Cuban government opted
317
to maintain the country's historic dependence on sugar for export earnings.
Cuba's decision was influenced by significant subsidies from the socialist
trading bloc, including long-term contracts with China, the Soviet Union, and
several Eastern European countries to purchase Cuban sugar at stable, above
vessels required for trade with Europe. Cuba's economic dependence on the United States made
the U.S. embargo (imposed in stages from 1960 to 1963) particularly devastating. Id. at 384-85.
309

See PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at 14; THOMAS, supra note 300, at 1152.

310

THOMAS, supra note 300, at 1152.

311Id. at 1562.
312

Id. at 1565-66; PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at 14.

313

PEREZ-STABLE, supra note 296, at 27-31.

314

Id. at 29.

316 Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 692, 694-95.
36 Id. at 696-705.

See BLUTSTEIN ET AL., supra note 301, at 321; CARMEN DIANA DEERE, SOCIALISM ON ONE
ISLAND? CUBA'S NATIONAL FOOD PROGRAM AND ITS PROSPECTS FOR FOOD SECURITY 8-9 (Inst. of
Soc. Studies, Working Paper No. 124, 1992). Between 1959 and 1976, sugar accounted for 81% of
Cuba's exports. After 1976, sugar's contribution to total exports ranged from a high of 86.7% in
1978 to a low of 73.2% in 1989. See Robert A. Packenham, Cuba and the Soviet Union: What
Kind of Dependency?, in CUBAN COMMUNISM 130, 134 (Irving Louis Horowitz & Jaime Suchlicki
eds., 9th ed. 1998); CARMELO MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST AND MIXED ECONOMIES 370-71
317

(2000).
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world market prices, and the Soviet Union's sale of petroleum and other
commodities to Cuba below world market prices. 318 Likewise, while Cuba's
initial land reform expropriated large farms and distributed land to more
than 100,000 farmers, the second land reform expropriated additional private
lands, but concentrated these in the hands of the state. 319 Henceforth, state
farms would be the preferred means of organizing agricultural production,
and private farmers would be pressured to incorporate their property into the
state farms. 320 By 1992, 80% of Cuba's arable land was in the hands of state
farms, while the remaining 20% was divided between private farmers and
agricultural production cooperatives. 3 2' Finally, revolutionary Cuba
exchanged its pre-revolutionary trade dependence on the United States for
trade dependence on the Soviet Union and the other members of the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).32 2 While the United States
accounted for 69% percent of Cuba's foreign trade between 1946 and 1958,
the comparable figure for the CMEA countries between 1977 and 1988 was
approximately 80%.323
Notwithstanding the continuities in the Cuban agricultural sector from
colonialism to 1990, the Cuban revolution did introduce one important
innovation: capital-intensive, chemical-dependent agricultural production
techniques strikingly similar to the industrial agriculture practiced in

318 See Andrew Zimbalist & Susan Eckstein, Patterns of Cuban Development: The First TwentyFive Years, in 15 WORLD DEV. 7 (1987); Hector Saez, Resource Degradation,Agricultural Policies,
and Conservation in Cuba, 27 CUBAN STUD. 40, 53 (1997); BLUTSTEIN ET AL., supra note 301, at
321; MESA-LAGO, supra note 317, at 257-58. It is important to recognize that the international
division of labor within the socialist bloc was highly beneficial to Cuba in the short term. In the
first three decades of the revolution, Cuba was highly ranked among developing countries in
terms of per capita GNP, life expectancy, nutrition, infant mortality, availability of doctors, and
secondary school enrollment. However, the long-term consequences of this division of labor were
disastrous and laid the groundwork for the crisis of the Special Period. See Peter M. Rosset,
Cuba: A Successful Case Study for Sustainable Agriculture, in HUNGRY FOR PROFIT, supra note
82, at 205-06.
319 See Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 696-701 (describing the first and second agrarian reforms of
the Cuban revolutionary government).
320 See id. at 699-701. There are various explanations for the Cuban government's decision to
adopt state farms as the favored means of organizing agricultural production. First,
expropriation of medium to large farms may have been a political offensive against private
farmers who opposed the new regime. Second, state farms may have been favored in order to
ensure government control of the food supply and avoid shortages or disruptions in production.
Third, the predominance of state farms may be explained by Cuban efforts to emulate the Soviet
model. Fourth, state farms may have been preferred in order to facilitate the introduction of
mechanization, agrochemicals and large-scale irrigation. Finally, state control of agricultural
production may have facilitated the diversion of arable land from food production to cash crop
production in order to address the government's urgent need for foreign exchange. Id. at 699-700.
321 Saez, supra note 318, at 49. State farms were generally operated by the Ministry of
Agriculture and the Ministry of Sugar and were known for their inefficiency and low
productivity. Id.

322See Packenham, supra note 317, at 135.
323Id. at 134; MESA-LAGO, supra note 317, at 374-75.
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capitalist countries. 324 While agriculture in pre-revolutionary Cuba relied on
traditional low-input, labor-intensive methods, 325 the revolutionary
government embarked on an ambitious plan to "modernize" Cuban
agriculture by developing large-scale, capital-intensive industrial farms
specializing in the production of sugar cane and livestock. 326 The government
constructed hundreds of dairy farms, significantly increased the amount of
land under sugar cultivation, invested in major irrigation projects, and
327
sponsored massive increases in agrochemical use and mechanization.
Between 1959 and 1989, pesticide use increased four-fold, tractor use ninefold, and fertilizer use ten-fold. 328 Cuba's adoption of industrial agriculture
produced serious environmental harm, including agrochemical contamination
of lakes, rivers, and drinking water supplies and significant erosion,
compaction, acidification, and salinization of soils.329
Despite the ecological harm produced by industrial agriculture, food
security proved to be the Achilles heel of the revolution. 330 While socialist

324 See

SERGIO

DIAZ-BRIQUETS

&

JORGE

PPREz-L6PEZ,

CONQUERING

NATURE:

THE

ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF SOCIALISM IN CUBA 6 (2000).
325Id. at 97; Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 696.
326See Saez, supra note 318, at 51.
327See id. at 50-51; DIAz-BRIQUETS & PtREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 324, at 105, 165-66.
328 See Saez, supra note 318, at 50-51; DIAz-BRIQUETS & PEREZ-L6PEZ, supranote 324, at 105.
329 See DIAZ-BRIQUETS & PEREZ-L6PEZ, supranote 324, at 95-97, 105-06, 132-33. Erosion affected
approximately 64% of Cuban farmland, whereas poor drainage affected 41%, soil compaction
21%, acidification 17%, and salinization 12%. Id. at 168. Soil compaction, a consequence of using
heavy tillage equipment, reduces the soil's ability to absorb water and nutrients, limits plant
growth, and increases vulnerability to erosion. Soil salinization is a function of irrigation in the
absence of proper drainage. Soil acidification, which depletes nutrients and impairs plant
growth, results from excessive reliance on agrochemicals. See id. at 105-06; 132-33; Saez, supra
note 318, at 45-48. The most serious environmental degradation occurred in the state farms as a
consequence of monocropping, heavy application of pesticides and fertilizers, significant
mechanization, poorly designed irrigation projects, intense pressure to fulfill production quotas,
lack of incentives to protect the environment, planting and harvesting deadlines imposed by high
level officials without regard to local ecological conditions, and limited ecological awareness of
workers, managers, and planners. Natural resource degradation on some state farms was so
severe that it resulted in declining agricultural productivity. By contrast, private farmers had
greater incentives to conserve the natural resource base necessary for long-term productivity
because they could transfer the land to their children by inheritance and could consume surplus
agricultural output in excess of state production quotas. In addition, the Cuban government's
neglect of private agriculture in favor of state farms limited private farmers' access to tractors
and agrochemical inputs, thereby fostering reliance on traditional farming techniques and
human and animal labor. Private farmers generally planted a wide variety of crops in order to
enhance biodiversity and maintain soil fertility, utilized natural pest control and fertilization
techniques, and implemented labor-intensive anti-erosion measures. Agricultural production
cooperatives tended to occupy an intermediate position between the state farms and the private
farms in their use of ecologically sustainable farming techniques. See generally Hector Saez,
Property Rights, Technology, and Land Degradation:A Case Study of Santo Domingo, Cuba, 7
CUBA IN TRANSITION 472 (1997), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/lacb/cuba/asce/cuba7/
saez.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
330 See THE GREENING OF THE REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 4.
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Cuba was able to produce or import the food necessary to satisfy domestic
nutritional requirements, its food security was nevertheless precarious
because it relied on a single commodity to generate the bulk of export
earnings, depended on a single group of countries for most of its foreign
trade, and required imported food and agricultural inputs to feed its
population and maintain agricultural production.3 31 When the socialist
trading bloc collapsed in 1990, Cuba experienced severe shortages of food,
fuel, agrochemicals, spare parts, and other inputs needed for agricultural
333
production. 332 Food imports and food production were sharply curtailed.
Average caloric, protein, and vitamin intake plummeted to levels thirty
percent below those achieved in the 1980s. 334 The economic crisis was
exacerbated by relatively low world market prices for sugar and by the
335
tightening of the U.S. economic embargo.
B. CubanAgriculture after the Collapse of the Socialist Trading Bloc
In response to the economic crisis occasioned by the demise of the
socialist trading bloc, the Cuban government introduced a series of reforms
that radically transformed Cuba's highly centralized, export-oriented,
chemical-intensive agricultural production strategy. 336 The first reform was
the conversion of the large, inefficient state farms into smaller, self-managed
agricultural production cooperatives (UPBCs) in order to enhance the
efficiency and productivity of Cuban agriculture.3 37 Agricultural production
was further decentralized by the distribution of idle state lands in usufruct to

See Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 706. On the eve of the Special Period, Cuba depended on
imported food to supply over 50% of the Cuban population's protein consumption, 55% of its
caloric consumption, and 90% of its consumption of oil and lard. Julio A. Diaz-Vazquez, Consumo
y distribucionnormada de alimentos y otros bienes en Cuba, in LA ULTIMA REFORMA AGRARIA
DEL SIGLO, supra note 298, at 47. Cuba imported 49% of its rice, 90% of its beans, and 100% of its
cereals. It also imported 82% of its pesticides, 98% of its herbicides, 48% of its fertilizers, and
331

97% of its animal feed. See THE GREENING OF THE REVOLUTION, supra note 18, at 18-19.
332 MESA-LAGO,

supra note 317, at 289-90.

333 Diaz-Vazquez, supra note 331, at 50.
334Id.
335 See MESA-LAGo, supranote 317, at 575 n.2; Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 712.
336 See Gonzalez, supranote 13, at 712-25.
337 See id. at 713. On September 20, 1993, the Cuban Council of State enacted Decree Law No.
142, which converted the state farms into agricultural production units known as Basic Units of
Cooperative Production (or UBPCs, their Spanish acronym). The UBPCs were organized as selfmanaging production cooperatives and were given state land in permanent usufruct free of
charge. Other assets (buildings, machinery, and tools) were sold to the UBPCs on favorable
terms and constituted private UBPC property. UBPCs were required to sell to the state
marketing agency 80% of their production target (plus 20% of any amount in excess of the
production goal) and, as a production incentive, could sell the remaining surplus at the newly
established farmer's markets. The track record of UBPCs has been mixed. On the one hand,
production of staple crops rebounded to just under 1988 peak levels by 1996. On the other hands,
over one third of UBPCs were operating at a loss by 1999-2000 and required state subsidies. Id.
at 714-15.
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private farmers, pensioners, and state workers for the cultivation of food
crops and cash crops, and by state support for the booming urban agriculture
movement. 338 The second reform was the opening of agricultural markets
throughout the country in order to improve food distribution, boost food
production, and combat the black market.3 39 Once they had satisfied their
state-mandated production quotas, state farms, UBPCs, and private farmers
were among those entitled to sell their surplus production in these markets
at prices determined by supply and demand. 340 The third reform was the
aggressive promotion by the state of low-input, ecologically sustainable
farming techniques, such as biopesticides, biofertilizers, and animal traction,

338 Id. at 716-18. In addition to authorizing the conversion of state farms to UBPCs, Decree Law
No. 142 and subsequent implementing resolutions authorized the distribution of thousands of
hectares of idle state lands in usufruct to private farmers, pensioners, and state workers for selfprovisioning or for the cultivation of specific crops. These reforms were enacted to regulate and
encourage the self-help measures taken by ordinary Cubans to cope with the food shortages of
the Special Period. For example, Cubans had begun to seize and cultivate private plots on state
farms as well as unused land along roads and highways in order to maximize food production. As
a consequence of the land distributions authorized by Decree Law No. 142, membership in
Cuba's National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) increased by 35,000, and now includes
college-educated urban dwellers who have abandoned cities and towns in order to earn a living
from the land. In urban areas, self-help took the form of growing food on balconies, rooftops,
patios, and on any available public or private land, including vacant lots and garbage dumps.
The Ministry of Agriculture responded to this initiative by creating an Urban Agriculture
Department to help secure land use rights for urban gardeners and to provide technical
assistance and information. Urban gardening relieved the pressure on rural areas to feed the
entire nation and reduced energy-intensive transportation and refrigeration costs. Moreover,
because the use of synthetic agrochemicals was prohibited within city limits, urban gardens
became models of organic agriculture, relying on low cost and locally available resources. Id.
339 Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 718-21. On September 19, 1994, the Council of Ministers enacted
Decree Law No. 191, which established agricultural markets where farmers could sell
agricultural output in excess of mandatory state production quotas at prices determined by
supply and demand. Among the individuals and entities authorized to sell their products at the
agricultural markets are state farms, non-sugar cane UBPCs, cooperative farms, private
farmers, individuals farming formerly idle state lands distributed pursuant to Decree Law No.
142, and tillers of private subsistence plots. While Cuban president Fidel Castro was adamantly
opposed to the establishment of free agricultural markets, the food shortages of the Special
Period forced his hand. In particular, the state food rationing system was in severe disarray as a
consequence of the diversion of agricultural production to the black market. Because black
market prices were high and transactions were conducted almost entirely in dollars, Cubans
without access to U.S. dollars were precluded from using the black market to supplement their
meager food rations. While Cubans responded favorably to the agricultural markets, prices
remained high, and many consumers opted to purchase food from a variety of other sources,
including urban gardeners and small farmers cultivating land on the periphery of urban areas.
In August 2000, the Cuban government attempted to regulate this informal commercial activity
and to increase food availability and affordability by authorizing the sale of food in other outlets,
including fixed maximum price agricultural markets, urban gardens, organoponics, and staterun food fairs. These outlets eventually came to handle about fifty percent of all fruit and
vegetable purchases in Cuba. However, the Cuban government maintained important social
safety nets designed to promote food security, including targeted food assistance to the
unemployed, low-income workers, children, pregnant women, and the elderly. Id.
340 Id. at 719.
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as substitutes for inputs (such as tractors, synthetic
34 1
pesticides) that were no longer available.

fertilizers, and

The conversion of state farms to cooperatives, the increase in the number
of small producers, the burgeoning of urban agriculture, and the availability
of agricultural free markets enhanced agricultural productivity and
diversified the agricultural sector. 342 Yields of staple crops such as plantains,
beans, corn, cereals, potatoes, and tomatoes increased relative to 1994 levels,
and in many cases surpassed pre-Special Period levels. 343 Export crops such
as tobacco, citrus, and coffee also rebounded. 344 In sharp contrast to the
prevalence of monocropping on state farms prior to the Special Period, Cuban
farmers currently practice intercropping of food and cash crops. 345 Cuban
farmers routinely intercrop soybean and sugarcane, coffee and taro, and corn
and cassava, thereby boosting food production, increasing soil fertility, and
minimizing pest infestations. 346 For the first time in Cuban history, another
industry, tourism, has eclipsed sugar as the prime generator of foreign
exchange. 34 7 In the terminology of entitlements, Cuba has promoted food
Id. at 721-25. The Cuban experiment with organic agriculture rested on three pillars: private
farmers, scientists, and the state. Private farmers played a critical role in enabling Cuba to
recover from the ravages of the Special Period. Unlike workers on state farms, private farmers
possessed incentives to protect the land they cultivated. These incentives included the right to
transfer land by inheritance to their children and the right to exchange surplus production for
other goods. Furthermore, because private farmers had been denied access to capital-intensive
inputs in order to encourage them to join the state sector, these farmers had preserved
traditional low-input agricultural production techniques and were not dependent on imported
petroleum, animal feed, or fertilizers. When the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the
consequent decline in food imports and in state sector food production created enormous food
demand, the productivity of many private farms remained steady or increased. The second pillar
of organic agriculture was the cadre of scientists developed by the Cuban government in the
aftermath of the revolution. Many of these scientists had been critical of industrial agriculture
even before the Special Period and had directed their research toward ecologically sustainable
alternatives. During the Special Period, the Cuban government quickly mobilized its highly
developed scientific infrastructure to develop substitutes for unavailable agricultural inputs. By
1993, Cuba had 222 mini-centers for the production of biopesticides and biofertilizers and was
experimenting with other nonchemical fertilization techniques, such as crop residues, composted
municipal waste, and sugar cane wastes. The third pillar of organic agriculture was the state.
The shift to organic agriculture was spearheaded by the Ministry of Agriculture, which launched
a national program to convert the agricultural sector to low-input self-reliant farming practices.
Id.
342 See Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 725-27.
341

343 SINCLAIR & THOMPSON, supranote 19, at 33.
34

Id. at 35-36.

345 Id. at 27.
346

Id.

According to the report prepared for President Bush by the Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba (chaired by Secretary of State Colin Powell), "tourism is Cuba's largest single source
of revenue, generating some $1.8-2.2 billion in annual gross revenues. Of this amount, it is
estimated that the regime nets 20 percent, although its take may be greater given the Cuban
regime's routine failure to pay creditors or honor contracts with foreign investors." COMMISSION
FOR ASSISTANCE TO A FREE CUBA, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 29 (2004), available at
37

HeinOnline -- 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 480 2004-2005

Fall 2004]

NEOLIBERAL THREAT TO SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT

481

security by enhancing its production-based entitlements and diversifying its
trade-based entitlements.
Cuba's economic reforms have resulted in better nutrition and increased
caloric intake. Between 1989 and 1994, per capita daily caloric intake in
Cuba dropped from 2908 to 1863 calories, resulting in weight loss of twenty
pounds for the average Cuban.3 48 By 2000-2002, per capita daily caloric
intake had rebounded to 3000. 349 Likewise, the proportion of undernourished
5
Cubans had dropped from 18% in 1995-1997 to 3% in 1999-2001.3 0
The reforms undertaken during the Special Period enhanced ecological
sustainability by replacing capital-intensive, chemical-dependent production
techniques with low-input organic and semi-organic methods. The emphasis
on organic soil management techniques (such as organic fertilization, crop
rotation, and intercropping) promises to restore the fertility of agricultural
lands degraded by chemical-intensive practices. 35 1 Intercropping of food and
cash crops boosted food production while improving soil condition and
enhancing the control of harmful pests and diseases. 35 2 According to one
estimate, nearly 50% of Cuba's fresh vegetable production and 65% of its rice
production are currently organic. 353 Cuba has also experimented with the
organic production of sugar, coffee, cocoa, and citrus, and with organic fruit
production for the tourism sector and for export. 354 However, Cuba continues
to utilize chemical-intensive methods in the cultivation of export crops such
as sugar and tobacco, and it is unclear whether the majority of Cuban
Sept.
29,
2004).
(last visited
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/32834.pdf
Approximately 2 million tourists visit Cuba each year (including 160,000 to 200,000 legal and
illegal visitors from the United States), and the Cuban government hopes to receive 7.5 million
tourists by 2010 and 10 million by 2025. The majority of tourists are from Spain, Italy, Germany,
and Canada. Id. at 28-29. By contrast, gross revenues from sugar exports have declined from
$4.3 billion in 1989-90 to $441 million in 2001-2002, as a consequence of falling world prices and
lower Cuban productivity. Indeed, these factors caused Cuba to downsize its sugar industry in
2002, closing nearly half of its sugar mills and causing some 200,000 workers to lose their jobs.
Tracey Eaton, In Cuba, Sugar Mills' Closing is Sweet Sorrow, Nearly Half of FacilitiesShifting;
Workers See Jobs "Gone Forever," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 5, 2002, at IA.
348 SINCLAIR & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 10, 49.
349 FAO, STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY 2004, supra note 1, at 37.
350Id. at 34.

351 Eolia Treto et al., Advances in Organic Soil Management, in SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND
RESISTANCE, supranote 12, at 184-85.
352SINCLAIR

& THOMPSON,

supra note 19, at 27-28.

353 See NICHOLAS PARROTT & TERRY MARSDEN, THE REAL GREEN REVOLUTION: ORGANIC AND
AGROECOLOGICAL FARMING IN THE SOUTH 12 (2002), available at http:l/archive.greenpeace.org/

geneng/reports/hunger/realgreenrevwhole.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
354 See Fernando Funes, The Organic FarmingMovement in Cuba, in SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
AND RESISTANCE, supra note 12, at 19-20. Indeed, Cuba is on the verge of exploiting a highly
lucrative market niche for organic products. Cuba has obtained organic certification for coffee,
cocoa, honey, and citrus and has begun to export these products to Europe and Japan. See Raisa
Pages, Cuba Enters the Market for Organic Products, HAVANA J., 2003, available at
(last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
http://HavanaJournal.com/businesscomments/A465_0_4_0_nm
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agronomists and technicians view organic and semi-organic production as
355
anything but a temporary accommodation to current economic exigencies.
Finally, Cuba has diversified its trading partners and is no longer
dangerously dependent on a single trading partner. In the year 2000, Cuba's
primary trading partners were Venezuela (13.9% of trade), Spain (13.4%),
Canada (9%), the Netherlands (8.3%), China (7.6%), Russia (6.7%), Mexico
(5.1%), France (5.1%), and Italy (4.8%).356
In sum, the post-1990 reforms increased food security, enhanced
ecological sustainability, and reduced Cuba's dangerous reliance on a single
trading partner. The reforms also diversified Cuba's economic base and
reduced Cuba's historic dependence on a single agricultural commodity
(sugar) to generate the bulk of export revenues. Finally, the decentralization
of agricultural production (through the distribution of land in usufruct to
UBPCs and to private farmers) enhanced agricultural productivity and
represented a significant shift from the patterns established in the colonial
period and maintained after political independence and during the first three
decades of the revolution.
C. Cuban Agriculture in a Neoliberal World
The greatest challenge to Cuba's unique agricultural experiment is the
eventual renewal of trade relations with the United States and the reintegration of Cuba into the global trading system. At the behest of the
United States, Cuba was excluded from major trade and financial
institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and regional trade
organizations. 357 Paradoxically, while Cuba's economic isolation produced
enormous hardship, it also gave Cuba free rein to respond to the crisis of the
Special Period in ways that diverged radically from the prevailing neoliberal
model.
One of the most significant decisions that Cuba will face after the
lifting of the U.S. economic embargo is whether to join the World Bank, the

355 DiAZ-BRIQUETS & PtREZ-L6PEZ, supra note 324, at 272-74.
356 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001: Evaluation of Performance and
Debate on the Future, 11 CUBA IN TRANSITION 1, 5 (2001), available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/
project/asce/pdfs/volumel i/mesa-lago.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).

Due to U.S. pressure, Cuba has been excluded from membership in the IMF, the World Bank,
and the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuba has also failed to reach full membership in
any regional trade association and has been excluded from the ongoing FTAA negotiations. See
SINCLAIR & THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 45; Mesa-Lago, supra note 356, at 5. However, Cuba
has been a member of the WTO since April 20, 1995, and it was one of the earliest members of
the 1947 GATT. See WTO, MEMBER INFORMATION: CUBA AND THE WTO, available at
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto__e/countries_e/cubae.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). WTO,
For the 128 countries that had signed GATT by 1994, see http://www.wto.org/englishthewto-e/
gattmem-e.htm (last visited Sept, 29, 2004).
357
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IMF, and the Inter-American Development Bank. 58 With an external debt of
approximately $12 billion as well as an additional $15 billion to $20 billion
debt to Russia, 59 Cuba might be tempted to avail itself of concessional loans
and debt restructuring assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in order
to normalize relations with external creditors and to obtain badly needed
infusions of capital.
Debt relief, however, will come at a very high price. Cuba, like other
developing countries, will be compelled to implement neoliberal reforms
pursuant to structural adjustment programs overseen by the World Bank and
the IMF. These programs will require Cuba to maximize the revenues
available for debt service by slashing social spending and vigorously
promoting exports. In light of Cuba's "comparative advantage" in agricultural
production, it is likely that structural adjustment will result in renewed
emphasis on sugar production or on the cultivation of non-traditional
agricultural exports (such as flowers, fruits, and vegetables). Cuba will be
required to prioritize agricultural exports over domestic food production, to
drastically reduce subsidies and social safety nets (including agricultural
subsidies and food aid), to privatize state lands and government-owned
enterprises, and to open its markets to foreign competition. These reforms
would be enacted in conjunction with pre-existing commitments under the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture to eliminate non-tariff barriers and reduce
tariffs, to phase out domestic subsidies, and to eliminate export subsidies.
Cuba would also be obligated under the SPS Agreement to permit the
cultivation of genetically modified crops unless Cuba could present strict
scientific proof that such cultivation will harm human health or the
environment. Since such proof is unlikely given scientific uncertainty
regarding the effects of genetically modified organisms, it is likely that Cuba,
like Argentina, would become a major cultivator of genetically modified crops.
Based on the track record of the neoliberal model in the developing world,
it appears that Cuba's adoption of the standard package of neoliberal reforms
would jeopardize food security at the national level. First, the neoliberal
reforms would undercut domestic food production by diverting prime
agricultural land to export production and by requiring Cuba to open its
markets to cheap, subsidized food from the United States. This would reduce
Cuba's food self-sufficiency and would reinstate Cuba's dangerous
dependence on food imports to satisfy basic nutritional needs. Second,
renewed emphasis on agricultural exports to generate foreign exchange
would make Cuba's trade-based entitlements highly vulnerable to
fluctuations in world market agricultural prices and to the declining terms of
358 Under Section 1O4(a) of the Helms-Burton Act, the United States is obligated to oppose Cuba's
membership in the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank until it
finds that a democratically elected government is in power in Cuba. See Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Helms-Burton) Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996).
3

19U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK: CUBA (2003), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/cu.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
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trade for agricultural products. In the terminology of entitlements, Cuba's
production-based entitlements would be eroded in favor of highly precarious
trade-based entitlements.3 60 In addition, a significant percentage of Cuba's
export earnings would be earmarked for debt service and thus unavailable for
investment or for the importation of food and other vital items. Finally, the
cultivation of genetically modified crops would reinstate Cuba's trade
dependence on the United States (and subordinate Cuba's food security to
U.S. political and economic interests) by shutting Cuba out of lucrative EU
markets.
The neoliberal model would also jeopardize food security at the household
level by fueling rural poverty and inequality. The promotion of export
production is likely to provoke a land grab by elite Cubans and transnational
corporations at the expense of Cuban smallholders. Export production tends
to favor wealthy farmers with ready access to capital who can benefit from
economies of scale in both production and marketing and can withstand the
dramatic price fluctuations that plague many export commodities. 3 61
Furthermore, the opening of Cuba's markets to cheap food imports from the
United States, in conjunction with the slashing of agricultural subsidies and
social safety nets, will threaten the livelihoods of the majority of Cuban
farmers and produce economic polarization in rural areas. Finally, the
cultivation of genetically modified crops is likely to accelerate the
dispossession of small farmers by disrupting the traditional practice of
saving, sharing, and breeding seeds. As farmers become increasingly
dependent on seeds and other inputs produced by transnational corporations,
they may suffer severe economic dislocation if input prices increase or if farm
revenues drop. Dispossessed farmers are likely to migrate en masse to towns
and cities, thereby straining limited urban amenities. In the terminology of

360It is unclear whether Cuba's burgeoning tourism industry, if subjected to requirements of the

global trade regime, would generate sufficient foreign exchange earnings to mitigate Cuba's
renewed dependence on agricultural export production. According to the WTO, as much as 50%
of tourism revenues 'leak" out of the developing world in the form of profits earned by foreignowned businesses, advertising, and payments for imported goods and labor. Leakage is
particularly severe in the Caribbean, where 50% to 70% of tourism revenues are earmarked for
the acquisition of foreign inputs. Cuba's adherence to the WTO General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS)
would make it easier for foreign businesses to establish franchises and repatriate profits and
harder for Cuba to require foreign companies to use local inputs in order to build linkages to the
local economy. See Lisa Mastny, Redirecting InternationalTourism, in THE WORLDWATCH INST.,
STATE OF THE WORLD 2002 101, 106-07 (2002). Likewise, the Cuban biotechnology industry may
fail to provide the necessary economic diversification if it is absorbed by transnational
pharmaceutical companies after the lifting of the U.S. embargo. See AMINA AITSISELMI, DESPITE
U.S. EMBARGO,

CUBAN

BIOTECH BooMs,

35(5) NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS,

38-39

(Mar./Apr. 2002) (describing the development of the Cuban biotechnology industry).
CONROY ET AL., supra note 214, at 29, 37-59 (discussing why export agriculture benefits
wealthy farmers at the expense of poor farmers); THRUPP, BITTERSWEET HARVESTS, supra note
261, at 67-77 (explaining why transnational corporations and large national and foreign
investors have been the main beneficiaries of the shift to non-traditional agricultural exports in
Latin America); Reed, Conclusions, supra note 264, at 310, 313 (discussing the tendency of
export production to favor large farmers).
361 See
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entitlements, Cuban smallholders are likely to be deprived of productionbased entitlements (land with which to grow food), trade-based entitlements
(the ability to buy food on the market with the income generated by
agricultural production), labor-based entitlements (due to the loss of jobs to
mechanization on the large farms), and transfer-based entitlements (state
subsidies and food aid).
Neoliberal economic reforms may also jeopardize Cuba's experiment in
sustainable agriculture. Export production tends to reinforce ecologically
unsustainable monocultures that require extensive application of
agrochemicals. These monocultures displace traditional food crops that
contribute to soil fertility, pest control, and fodder production. The cultivation
of genetically modified crops may exacerbate the problems associated with
industrial agriculture by reinforcing monocultural production, eroding
biodiversity, and increasing the use of herbicides and insecticides (by
accelerating resistance to these products). Even if Cuba is able to capture an
export niche in the lucrative market for certified organic products, the
introduction of genetically modified organisms may undermine Cuba's efforts
by producing genetic contamination. Moreover, the cultivation of Bt crops
may injure organic farmers by accelerating resistance to one of the most
widely used natural pesticides. Finally, if the cultivation of genetically
modified crops results in increased use of herbicides and insecticides, this
may harm organic agriculture by killing non-target organisms (including the
natural enemies of the target pest and other beneficial insects) and by
producing ecosystem-wide disturbances.
In short, Cuba's adoption of neoliberal economic reforms threatens to
recreate colonial and post-colonial patterns of land tenure and production,
whereby the ruling elite and transnational corporations grow export crops on
large industrial farms while small-scale producers are relegated to marginal
subsistence plots or forced to abandon agriculture altogether. Furthermore,
the cultivation of genetically modified crops may re-introduce trade
dependency on the United States by foreclosing access to the lucrative
European market. The prospects for food security and ecological
sustainability under neoliberalism are grim.
D. Summary and Conclusion: The Symbolic Significance of Cuba
The saga of Cuban agriculture illustrates the ways in which developing
countries are structurally disadvantaged in the global trading system by the
colonial and post-colonial division of labor that relegates them to the
production of primary agricultural commodities. Cuba's integration into the
world economy as an exporter of sugar and an importer of manufactured
goods and food products so deeply constrained its development options that
not even a socialist revolution could alter these pre-existing trade and
production patterns. It was not until the collapse of the socialist trading bloc
and the tightening of the U.S. economic embargo that Cuba was forced by
external circumstances to diversify its exports, diversify its trading partners,
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decentralize agricultural production, prioritize domestic food production, and
promote organic and semi-organic farming techniques.
Cuba is symbolically important because it demonstrates that there is an
alternative to the dominant export-oriented industrial agricultural model and
that this alternative can boost agricultural productivity, enhance food
security, and protect the environment. 362 However, the transformation of
Cuban agriculture was a response to the crisis of the Special Period and was
made possible by Cuba's relative economic isolation. Once the U.S. embargo
is lifted and Cuba is reintegrated into the global trading system, Cuba, like
every other developing country, will face intense pressure to restructure its
economy along neoliberal lines. The results could be devastating. It is
therefore important to recognize the neoliberal threat, to consider whether
neoliberalism can ever be made compatible with food security and ecological
sustainability, and to explore alternative strategies for sustainable rural
development.
V. CONFRONTING THE NEOLIBERAL THREAT

The neoliberal economic model reinforces the economic dominance of the
industrialized world through double standards that systematically benefit
transnational agribusiness at the expense of poor farmers and the
environment in the developing world. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
for example, permits industrialized countries to continue to practice
protectionism while requiring market openness in developing countries. The
SPS Agreement bolsters the economic might of agribusiness by overriding
health and safety measures that limit access to developed and developing
country markets. 363 The TRIPS Agreement promotes dependence on
362 While Cuba is the only developing country to promote sustainable agriculture on a nationwide scale, many successful small-scale experiments throughout the developing world have
demonstrated that food production and household food security can be increased through the use
of low-cost, locally available, environmentally friendly technologies. See MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR
TRADE, supra note 176, at 143-52; Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty, supra note 50; Pretty & Hine,
supra note 208, at 107-2 1; Pretty, Can SustainableAgriculture Feed Africa?, supranote 208.
As explained in Part III of this article, the United States' WTO challenge of the EU's de facto
ban on genetically modified organisms will have a major impact on the EU and on other
countries that currently prohibit or restrict the importation of GMOs. Developed countries are
the prime beneficiaries of the SPS Agreement despite its ostensible benefit to developing
countries. The SPS Agreement is designed to ensure that health and safety measures (SPS
measures) are supported by sound scientific evidence and do not function as disguised
protectionist barriers. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 237, at 25. Because SPS measures
frequently result in the exclusion of developing country agricultural products from industrialized
country markets, the SPS Agreement should, in theory, benefit developing countries by enabling
them to challenge SPS measures maintained without adequate scientific justification.
Regrettably, this benefit may be illusory without fundamental changes in the WTO dispute
resolution process. Although they comprise eighty percent of the WTO membership, developing
countries have historically initiated only one third of the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.
Moreover, a dozen developing countries in Asia and Latin America, led by India and Brazil,
account for almost all of these cases. The obstacles are two-fold. First, developing countries
frequently lack the technical, scientific, and legal resources needed to mount or defend a case.
Second, even if a developing country brings a case and prevails, its remedy is to apply trade
363
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agricultural inputs produced in the industrialized world by protecting the
intellectual property rights of the seed industry at the expense of farmers'
traditional rights to save, sell, and exchange seeds, Finally, structural
adjustment programs mandated by the IMF and the World Bank impose
socially and economically devastating austerity measures on developing
countries without any corresponding obligation on the part of industrialized
countries to implement free market reforms.
Proponents of neoliberalism might argue that further liberalization in the
industrialized world will redress most of the inequities in the global trading
system by establishing a level playing field that imposes identical obligations
on developed and developing countries. For example, reduction of
industrialized country import barriers and subsidies is widely regarded as a
critical step in promoting food security in the developing world and has been
3 64
forcefully demanded by developing countries in the WTO negotiations.
Furthermore, non- governmental organizations have criticized the nonreciprocal nature of trade liberalization under structural adjustment and
have urged that industrialized countries match the liberalization previously
undertaken by developing countries.365
This section considers whether extension of the neoliberal model to the
industrialized world would enhance food security and ecologically sustainable
farming practices in developing countries. Part A examines the benefits to
developing countries of agricultural trade liberalization in the industrialized
world. Part B argues that the neoliberal model, even if applied in an evenhanded manner, is inherently incompatible with sustainable rural
development.
sanctions (equivalent to the foregone revenue from the illegal SPS measure) if the non-prevailing
developed country refuses to change its trade practices. This remedy would inflict enormous
harm on the prevailing developing country by raising the cost of essential imports from the nonprevailing developed country. Moreover, the remedy would be entirely ineffective against
wealthy countries such as the United States and the members of the EU. Consequently, the
prime beneficiaries of the SPS Agreement are the transnational corporations whose governments
can afford to bring a WTO claim and can apply trade sanctions against a non-complying losing
party. One obvious solution is to amend the dispute resolution process to require the noncomplying losing party to pay monetary damages. See Frances Williams, WTO Minnows Cry Foul
on Mediation: Poor Countries Claim the System to Challenge Unfair Practices by Richer Nations
is Stacked Against Them, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 24, 2002, at 8; Prema-chandra Athukorala &
Sisira Jayasuriya, Food Safety Issues, Trade and WTO Rules: A Developing Country's
Perspective, 26 WORLD ECON. 1935 (2003).
-6 See Carlson, supra note 209, at 1209-20; Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks
Over World Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at Al. [hereinafter Becker, Poorer Countries Pull
Out]; Gretchen Peters, in Cancun, a Blrw to World Trade, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept.
16, 2003, at 6; TEO BALLv9, GLOBALIZING RESISTANCE IN CANCUN, 37 NACLA REPORT ON THE
AMERICAS 16-19 (Nov/Dec. 2003), available at http://www.nacla.org/art-display.php?art=2285
(last visited Nov. 9, 2004) (noting that developing countries' focus at WTO's Fifth Ministerial
Meeting was on "domestic support and export subsidies by rich countries").
365See OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE FIGHT
AGAINST POVERTY 5-6, 147-48 (2002) (calling on the IMF and the World Bank to consider the
consequences of short-term poverty and long-term development when establishing loan
conditions) [hereinafter OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS].
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A. Taking Neoliberalism Seriously: Leveling the PlayingField
Phasing out agricultural subsidies in the United States and the EU may
improve food security in the developing world by putting an end to the
dumping of agricultural commodities on world markets at below the cost of
production. 366 The elimination of export dumping is likely to raise food prices,
thereby increasing the incomes of developing country farmers and creating
economic incentives for domestic food production. 367 In the language of
entitlements, agricultural trade liberalization in the industrialized world is
likely to boost the production-based entitlements of developing countries by
368
encouraging greater food self-sufficiency.
Likewise, improving market access in the industrialized world would
enhance the trade-based entitlements of developing countries by increasing
export revenues. 369 The elimination of U.S. and EU tariff barriers and the
slashing of subsidies would increase the market share of developing country
exporters. 370 Moreover, because industrialized country tariffs often escalate
as commodities are processed, the phasing out of tariffs would foster the
growth of labor-intensive, low-cost food processing industries, thereby
providing the economic diversification necessary to cushion developing
371
countries against commodity price fluctuations.
Enhanced export opportunities, however, can be a two-edged sword. If not
complemented by domestic strategies to strengthen small-scale agriculture
and promote sustainable farming practices, export-oriented production may
hinder sustainable rural development by increasing rural poverty and by
degrading the environment. In the absence of major redistributive measures

366 See IATP, U.S. DUMPING, supra note 258, at 17; OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE
STANDARDS, supra note 365, at 114-15, (presenting OXFAM's findings on dumping of major
commodities in world markets using its Export Dumping Estimate indicator).
367 See Carlson, supra note 209, at 1216-20.

368 In order to ensure that agricultural trade liberalization in the industrialized world promotes
food security at the household level, developing countries would have to strengthen small-scale
agriculture and related industries. This would entail, inter alia, providing subsidized credit and
crop insurance, promoting more equitable land tenure, and investing in roads, electrification,
water supply, irrigation, and other economic infrastructure in rural areas. See generally,
MICHAEL BAILEY, OxFAM GB, AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND THE LIVELIHOODS OF SMALL FARMERS
(Mar. 2000), available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we-do/issues
/trade/downloads/
agricultural trade.rtf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Furthermore, as discussed in Part B of this
section, even if industrialized country subsidies are removed, transnational corporations may
nevertheless use their market power and global reach to flood the developing countries with
cheap food produced in other regions of the world. Local smallholders may be unable to compete.
See MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 82, at 39-40.
369 See IFPRI, supra note 271,

at 3 (quantifying the benefits to developing countries of
agricultural trade liberalization in industrialized countries).
370 See OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 365, at 112-13 (critiquing
developed countries' agricultural tariffs and subsidies and discussing the impact of these
measures on international trade in agricultural products).
371See id. at 102-03; Carlson, supra note 209, at 1216-17, 1220.
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to increase the market participation of small farmers (such as land reform
and the provision of subsidized inputs and credit), the prime beneficiaries of
enhanced export opportunities are likely to be large commercial farmers and
transnational corporations.3 7 2 Indeed, export-oriented production, with its
demand for more capital and less labor, is likely to increase rural poverty and
inequality by creating incentives for the expansion of large commercial farms
at the expense of small farmers and landless laborers.373 Furthermore, it is
important to keep in mind that transnational corporations rather than
farmers engage in international trade. 374 Farmers generally sell their output
to grain dealers and processors or contract with transnational corporations to
produce specific crops. 375 Hence, the benefits of greater market access will
accrue disproportionately to middlemen and foreign companies rather than
developing country farmers.37 6 Finally, renewed emphasis on export
production is likely to reinforce large-scale industrial farming, thereby
degrading the natural resource base necessary for sustainable agricultural
377
production.
B. Formal Equality in an Unequal World: The Limits of Neoliberalism
Notwithstanding the benefits to developing countries of greater
liberalization in the industrialized world, the neoliberal economic model is
inherently biased in favor of transnational agribusiness and fundamentally
incompatible with food security and ecological sustainability. Leveling the
playing field by applying the same rules to both developed and developing
countries will not redress the power imbalances caused by decades of
protectionism and centuries of colonialism. On the contrary, neoliberalism,
even if applied in an even-handed manner, institutionalizes the economic
dominance of transnational agribusiness and limits the ability of developing

372See COOTE, supra note 61, at 195.
313 See SOPHIA MURPHY, FOOD SECURITY AND THE WTO (2001), available at http://www.cidse.org/

pubs/tq1posfoodsecwto2001.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2002). According to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), local exporting companies, trading
companies, and distributors in the developing world have virtually vanished in recent years.
They have been replaced by subsidiaries and agents of multinational trading enterprises. United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development on World Commodity Trends and Prospects,
UNCTAD, 57th Sess. at 8, U.N. doc. A/571381, 8 (Sept. 5, 2002) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
374 See MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 82, at 8-9, (emphasizing that

transnational companies' exercise of unregulated market power is detrimental to the average
farmers' marketing opportunities). In the agricultural sector, direct foreign investment by
transnational corporations has been largely superseded by production contracts and other
mechanisms as the preferred means of controlling the marketing chain and coordinating input
suppliers, farmers, processors, and traders. UNCTAD, supra note 373, at 8.
375 See MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 82, at 8-9.
376

Id.

377 See MURPHY, FOOD SECURITY AND THE WTO, supra note 373, at Issues for Developing

Countries.
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countries to utilize state intervention to safeguard the interests of the poor,
protect the environment, and diversify and industrialize the economy.
1. Institutionalizing the Dominance of Transnational Agribusiness
The neoliberal model attributes distortions in world agricultural markets
to government intervention and ignores the market power of transnational
agribusiness. 37 8 This omission is unfortunate in light of the significant
consolidation over the last twenty years among agrochemical companies
(suppliers of fuel, fertilizer, seeds, and pesticides) and companies that
purchase, process, and market agricultural commodities. 379 For example, five
380
agrochemical companies control 65% of the international pesticide market. 381
Five grain trading enterprises control over 75% of the global cereal market.
Many of these companies are vertically integrated conglomerates with highly
diversified operations. 38 2 The global reach of these corporations gives them
access to valuable market information unattainable to potential competitors,
and their wealth and power make them politically and economically
38 3
influential in both industrialized and developing countries.
As a consequence of the consolidation of transnational agribusiness,
farmers in developed and developing countries are increasingly dependent on
a handful of transnational corporations for their agricultural inputs and for
the marketing and distribution of their output. 384 Indeed, agricultural
inputs, transportation, processing, and marketing services now account for
90% of every food dollar, while farming itself accounts for only 10%.385 As
biologist R.C. Lewontin points out, farmers are becoming increasingly
proletarianized, as they are transformed from independent commodity
producers to mere operatives in a production chain controlled on both ends
(input and output) by transnational corporations. 38 6 The WTO TRIPS
Agreement takes this process one step further by protecting corporate
38 7
ownership of the one resource historically controlled by farmers-seeds.

378
379

See MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 82, at 19.
See id. at 21-22.

380 See Halweil, supranote 11, at 68 (tbl. 3-2).
381

See id.

See MURPHY, MANAGING THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 82, at 28-29. Cargill, for example, is
the largest grain exporter in the United States. It operates in over 160 countries, and its multibillion dollar operations encompass the salt, cotton, seed, fertilizer, steel, beef, and poultry
business as well as worldwide transportation services. Id. at 23, 29.
382

383

See id. at 23-24.

See id. at 37.
385 R.C. Lewontin, The Maturing of Capitalist Agriculture: Farmer as Proletarian,in HUNGRY
FOR PROFIT, supranote 82, at 95.
386 Id. at 97.
n4

387

Id. at 100.
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This domination of agricultural production by a handful of vertically
integrated corporations places developing country farmers at an enormous
competitive disadvantage and enables transnational agribusiness to drive
down prices by purchasing from the lowest cost producer while concentrating
value-added processing in the industrialized world. 388 For example, nine
transnational corporations control over seventy percent of the world cocoa
market. 38 9 These companies purchase their cocoa beans from millions of
suppliers in the developing world (small farmers or local traders and
exporters) who are driven into the market by their need for cash and who
often lack market information and alternative livelihood options. 390 The
power imbalance between a small group of corporate buyers and millions of
fragmented suppliers is enormous. 391 Furthermore, because most
commodities are exported in unprocessed form, transnational corporations
profit handsomely from each stage of processing. 392 As commodity markets
suffer the biggest slump in fifty years and wreak havoc on small farmers in
the developing world, the price paid by consumers for the final product (such
393
as coffee or chocolate) continues to rise.
388 See OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 365, at 161-63; Philip
McMichael, Global Food Politics, in HUNGRY FOR PROFIT, supra note 82, at 136; IRFAN UL
HUQUE, COMMODITIES UNDER NEOLIBERALISM: THE CASE OF COCOA 24 (UNCTAD G-24
Discussion Paper Series, No. 25, Jan. 2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
gdsmdpbg2420041_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 9 2004). Market prices are also depressed by the
entrance of new, low-cost producers (such as Indonesia, which expanded cocoa production by
twenty percent per year beginning in the 1970s and is now the world's third largest cocoa
producer) and by the availability of substitutes in the industrialized world for developing country
exports (for example, the substitution of vegetable fats for cocoa butter in chocolate).
Furthermore, biotechnology may accelerate the development of substitutes for developing
country exports, potentially jeopardizing the livelihoods of millions of farmers. See OXFAM,
RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 365, at 159-60.
389 See

OxFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS supra note 365, at 162.

390Id. at 162-63.
391Id.

For example, developing countries supply 90% of the world's cocoa beans, but they constitute
less than half of cocoa bean production, one-third of cocoa powder, and only 4% of chocolate.
Cocoa bean exports from developing countries generate annual revenues of $2 billion, whereas
chocolate sales produce in excess of $60 billion. Id. at 161.
392

393Id.

The monopolistic practices of transnational agribusiness have kept consumer prices high
in many sectors despite plummeting commodity prices. For example, between 1975 and 1993,
world coffee prices fell by 18% while consumer prices in the United States rose by 240%.
Declining commodity prices increased the profit margins of transnational agribusiness rather
thnn heing passed on to consumers. See Jean Ziegler, The Right to Food, U.N. ESCOR, HUM.
RTS. COMM.,
21, at 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/10 (2004), available at http://www.unhchr.chl
Huridoca/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/34441bf9efe3a9e3c1256e6300510e2
4/$FILE/G0410777.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2004). Moreover, the concentration of coffee
processing in the industrialized world had the effect of transferring resources from coffee
producing countries to coffee consuming countries. Between 1989-1990 and 1994-1995, producers
retained only thirteen percent of the total income generated in the coffee production chain.
Stefano Ponte, The "Latte Revolution?" Winners and Losers in the Restructuring of the Global
Coffee Marketing Chain, 14, 14-15 (June 2001), available at http://www.cdr.dk/
working.papers/wp-01-3.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
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By focusing exclusively on market distortions caused by governmental
interference, the neoliberal economic model fails to address the
monopolization of agricultural production by transnational corporations that
undermines the livelihoods of small farmers in the developing world. Farmers
are essentially price-takers, caught in the vise of input prices set by a handful
of agrochemical companies and output prices determined by a handful of
transnational trading and marketing enterprises. Even if agricultural
subsidies and import barriers are lifted, developing-country farmers cannot
compete effectively with the monopoly power exercised by transnational
agribusiness. Furthermore, the neoliberal model precludes developing
countries from utilizing the protectionist measures used for decades by the
industrialized world to build its corporate behemoths. Structural adjustment
and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, for example, severely constrain
developing countries' use of subsidies to support agro-export or food
processing industries as well as the use of import barriers to protect domestic
farmers from foreign competition. By ignoring the market distortions caused
by the monopolization of agricultural trade and by depriving developing
countries of important tools to mitigate this problem, the neoliberal model
institutionalizes the economic dominance of transnational agribusiness at the
expense of the poor in the developing world.
2. Institutionalizing Economic Specialization
The neoliberal economic model prevents developing countries from
remedying the structural inequities in the global trading system that produce
food insecurity. One of the major structural inequities is the dependence of
many developing countries on agricultural export revenues to finance the
importation of food and manufactured products. This economic specialization
diverts prime crop land from food production and subjects developing country
export revenues to market instability and to the deteriorating terms of trade
for agricultural commodities relative to manufactured goods. The most
vulnerable countries are those that rely on a handful of primary agricultural
commodities to supply the bulk of export earnings. Diversification and
industrialization are critical to the promotion of food security.
The neoliberal economic model perpetuates food insecurity in the
developing world by depriving developing countries of the very instruments
used by developed countries to diversify and industrialize their economies.
Contrary to the free market prescriptions of the IMF, the World Bank, and
the WTO, virtually all industrialized countries (including the United States,
France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom) actively relied on tariffs,
subsidies, and other interventionist measures to industrialize. 394 Many of

394 HA-JOON

CHANG,

KICKING AWAY

THE LADDER:

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE 19-51, 59-66 (2002); Chang, The Market, the State and Institutions in Economic

Development, supra note 68, at 43. Other interventionist measures include the use of capital and
currency controls during the post-World War II reconstruction of Western Europe. Most Western
European countries did not achieve currency convertibility until late 1958. Many did not fully
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these countries directly financed and subsidized large-scale and/or risky
ventures such as railroads and steel manufacturing. 39 5 Many also sponsored
96
Most
the acquisition of intellectual property through industrial espionage.
recently, the so-called NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries)-South Korea,
Taiwan, and Singapore-successfully industrialized their economies through
a combination of tariffs, subsidies, and regulation of foreign investment,
including the imposition of technology transfer requirements and local
397
content requirements.
Having benefited from subsidies, import barriers, and technological theft,
industrialized countries now invoke "free trade" to preclude developing
countries from utilizing interventionist tools to develop, diversify, and
industrialize their economies. Structural adjustment, for example, has
thwarted economic diversification and industrialization in many developing
countries by reinforcing their "comparative advantage" in raw material and
primary product exports. 398 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture hamstrings
the ability of developing countries to use tariffs and subsidies to nurture
infant agro-export industries. The WTO TRIPS Agreement limits the ability
of developing countries to build their technological capacity through imitation
and adaptation. 399 It also subjects developing countries to monopoly pricing
(in seeds and pharmaceuticals, for example) and potentially onerous royalty
payments. 400 The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS) and the 1994 GATT limit the ability of developing countries to
impose local content requirements on foreign investors in order to foster
dynamic linkages with other sectors of the domestic economy. 40 1 While a full
eliminate capital controls until the 1990s. These measures enabled Western European countries
to achieve a high level of economic development without facing potentially ruinous capital flight
or speculative runs on their currency. Nevertheless, at the behest of the very countries that
benefited from the use of capital controls, the IMF currently imposes free capital mobility on
developing countries as a condition for badly needed financial assistance. See Timothy A.
Canova, Banking and FinancialReform at the Crossroadsof the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1571, 1612-14, 1639 (1999). Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has described capital
market liberalization as the "single most important factor" leading to the global financial crisis
that began in East Asia in 1997. See STIGLITZ, supra note 256, at 98-104.
15 See Chang, The Market, the State and Institutions in Economic Development, supranote 68, at

43.
396 HA-JOON CHANG, GLOBALIZATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

276-77 (2003) [hereinafter CHANG, GLOBALIZATION].
397

Id. at 258-59; Chang, The East Asian Development Experience, supra note 68, at 111-12, 115.

39s See Stein, supra note 68, at 156 (criticizing the policy prescriptions of the IMF and the World

Bank that have limited industrialization in Africa by emphasizing raw material and primary
product exports).
399

See CHANG, GLOBALIZATION, supra note 396, at 298.

400 See id. at 297.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, art. 2.2 & Illustrative Annex, available at http://www.wto.org/englishl
docs7e/legal e/18-trims-e.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004) (prohibiting investment measures that
require the purchase or use of domestic products known as local content requirements)
401
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discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, these examples
highlight the ways in which the neoliberal economic model, even if applied
prospectively in an even-handed manner, prevents developing countries from
replicating the strategies used by industrialized countries to diversify and
industrialize their economies. In so doing, the neoliberal economic model
institutionalizes the economic specialization that produces poverty and food
402
insecurity in the developing world.
3. Institutionalizing Industrial Agriculture
Neoliberalism threatens to reinforce industrial agriculture in the
developing world and to erode the biological diversity necessary for ecosystem
health. Trade liberalization in the United States and the EU is expected to
result in increased crop specialization in developing countries in accordance
with the dictates of agricultural markets. 403 Crop specialization will erode
crop diversity and result in the loss of a wide range of indigenous plants and
animals traditionally used for food. 404 The cultivation of export monocultures
will result in increased use of pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation water and
will accelerate deforestation and loss of valuable forest species. 405 Increased
emphasis on export production will exacerbate food insecurity by
undermining local food production and encouraging reliance on imported

[hereinafter TRIMS]. The TRIMS Agreement provision is somewhat redundant since it appears
to codify GATT jurisprudence concluding that local content requirements violate GATT art. III, §
4. See Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem?,
24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 77, 135-39 (2003); see also Paul Civello, The TRIMS Agreement: A
FailedAttempt at Investment Liberalization,8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 97, 113-14 (1999).
402

As economist Eric Reinert succinctly observes:

The current fashion is to blame the poverty caused by globalization on the
lack of openness on the part of industrialized countries towards agricultural
imports from the Third World; in other words, the problems are seen as being
created by a lack of openness to free trade. In our opinion, the historical
record proves these assertions to be wrong. No nation has ever taken the step
from being poor to being wealthy by exporting raw material in the absence of
a domestic manufacturing sector.
Eric S. Reinert, IncreasingPoverty in a Globalized World: MarshallPlans and Morgenthau Plans
as Mechanisms of Polarization of World Incomes, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS,
supra note 68, at 470.
See ANDREW K. DRAGUN, Trade Liberalisation, Agriculture and Sustainability, in
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT: GLOBALISATION AND THE IMPACT OF TRADE
LIBERALISATION 17 (Andrew K. Dragun & Clem Tisdell eds., 1999).

403

40 4

Id. at 17-18.

405 See

Kym Anderson, Effects on the Environment and Welfare of Liberalizing World Trade: The
Cases of Coal and Food, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES 152-54 (Kym Anderson &
Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992). For example, the explosion of export agriculture in Brazil over
the past decade has been accompanied by a surge in the importation of pesticides and fertilizers
and by the acceleration of Amazon deforestation due to the expansion of farm lands and grazing
lands. Larry Rohter, South America Seeks to Fill the World's Table, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at
Al, A22.
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food. 40 6 Finally, export production is likely to benefit large commercial
farmers at the expense of smallholders, thereby increasing poverty and
producing economic dislocation and conflict in many parts of the developing
407
world.
Neoliberalism's subordination of environmental protection to the
imperatives of commerce is likely to override any effort by developing
countries to ban or restrict the importation of genetically modified organisms.
The commercial cultivation of genetically modified crops will exacerbate the
socioeconomic and environmental ills of industrial agriculture (such as
monocultures, overuse of pesticides and fertilizers, and increasing economic
polarization in rural areas) while introducing new risks (such as genetic
contamination).
In short, neoliberalism will undermine ecological sustainability in the
developing world by eroding agrobiodiversity and encouraging dependence on
non-renewable inputs that harm human health and degrade the
environment. Neoliberalism will also promote food insecurity by exacerbating
poverty and inequality and by depressing domestic food production.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the colonial and post-colonial division of
labor between "core" and "periphery" introduced patterns of economic
specialization in the developing world that promote food insecurity, degrade
the environment, and produce rural poverty and inequality. Economic
specialization in the cultivation of cash crops diverts land from food
production, subjects developing country export earnings to the fluctuating
and declining terms of trade for agricultural commodities, and deprives
developing countries of the steady and reliable export earnings necessary to
finance industrialization and to import the food not produced domestically.
Economic specialization in the cultivation of monocultures is also contrary to
the biological diversity necessary to promote ecosystem health. In the
aftermath of World War II, various development assistance programs
(including Public Law No. 480 and the Green Revolution) exacerbated hunger
and environmental degradation in the developing world by increasing rural
poverty and promoting ecologically harmful monocultural farming
techniques. As a consequence of these programs, biodiverse agroecosystems
and self-reliant farming practices were replaced with industrial monocultures
dependent on uniform seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, synthetic
pesticides, and expensive machinery manufactured by transnational
corporations headquartered in the industrialized world.
The neoliberal economic reforms of the last two decades reinforced cash
crop production at the expense of food production, frustrated economic

406

See EINARSSON, supra note 47, at 23.

407

See DRAGUN, supra note 403, at 17-18.
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diversification and industrialization, exacerbated rural poverty, and
institutionalized the double standard that permits protectionism in the
industrialized world while requiring market openness in the developing word.
As explained in Part V, leveling the playing field by eliminating the tradedistorting subsidies and protectionist import barriers of the United States
and the EU is necessary but not sufficient to address the problem of hunger
and environmental degradation in the developing world. First, trade
liberalization in the industrialized world will not address the distortions and
inequities caused by the monopolization of agricultural markets by a small
number of transnational corporations. Second, trade liberalization, even if
applied in an even-handed manner, will reinforce the specialization of many
developing countries in agricultural export production by precluding these
countries from using the protectionist tools utilized by the United States,
Western Europe, Japan, and the NICs of East Asia to industrialize and
diversify their economies. Third, the elimination of U.S. and EU subsidies is
anticipated to increase crop specialization in the developing world, thereby
undermining the biological diversity necessary for healthy agroecosystems.
Cuba is the only country in the western hemisphere that has rejected the
neoliberal model and has embarked on a nation-wide experiment in
sustainable agriculture. Cuba was able to adopt an autonomous development
path only after the collapse of the socialist trading bloc and the tightening of
the U.S. embargo. Indeed, Cuba's unique experiment is a product of economic
and political isolation. Once the U.S. economic embargo is lifted, Cuba will be
under intense pressure to abandon its autonomous development path and
adopt neoliberal reforms. The consequences are likely to be devastating.
There is very little that one country can do to resist the imposition of
neoliberal economic reforms. The most promising solution is for Cuba to work
collectively with other developing countries in the Doha round of WTO
negotiations to transform the rules of the global trade regime. Rather than
proposing a detailed blueprint for these negotiations, the remainder of this
article highlights several key reforms designed to promote sustainable rural
development.
First, trade concerns must be subordinated to food security and ecological
sustainability. The right to food is enshrined as a basic human right in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 408 and in the Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.40 9 The Convention on Biological Diversity
recognizes the intrinsic value of biological diversity, its critical role in
maintaining the life-sustaining systems of the biosphere, and its "importance
for meeting food, health, and other needs" of human beings. 410 The global
trade rules must be reformed in order to serve as means to these ends rather
408

Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, § HI, art. 25 (1948).

409 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 11, 993

U.N.T.S. 3.
410

Convention of Biological Diversity, pmbl., reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
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than functioning as ends in themselves. In particular, the TRIPS Agreement
must be reconciled with the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the SPS
Agreement must be harmonized with the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to
the Convention on Biological Diversity. More fundamentally, the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture cannot be reconciled with food security or
ecological sustainability as long as its single-minded objective is the
elimination of trade barriers in order to promote agro-export production.
Second, it is important to recognize that the United States, Western
Europe, Japan, and the NICs of East Asia industrialized their economies
through tariffs, subsidies, unauthorized appropriation of intellectual
property, and regulation of foreign investment. Developing countries must be
permitted to diversify and industrialize their economies by utilizing a variety
of protectionist policy tools that are currently prohibited by trade agreements
and by the conditions attached to assistance from the IMF and the World
Bank.
Third, a major step in reforming the international trade regime is to
eliminate the double standards that systematically benefit transnational
agribusiness at the expense of smallholders in the developing world. The
WTO rules must phase out the subsidies and import barriers of the
industrialized world. However, formal equality must not be conflated with
substantive equality. The historic subordination of developing countries
through trade and investment requires compensatory measures to permit
developing countries to promote food security, protect the environment, and
diversify and industrialize their economies. Developing countries must be
given the flexibility to utilize a wide array of protectionist instruments
(including tariffs and subsidies) to nurture infant industries, to promote food
security, to protect the environment, and to preserve the livelihoods of small
farmers. Developing countries must also be permitted to adopt intellectual
property rules suitable to their technological needs and capacities. Finally,
developing countries must be given wide latitude to regulate foreign
investment through local content rules and other requirements in order to
forge dynamic links between foreign investment and the local economy.
Fourth, the global trade regime needs to address the distortions in global
agricultural markets produced by transnational corporations. International
trade is conducted by corporations, not by farmers or countries. In order to
ensure that the global trade regime benefits farmers, consumers, and
developing countries, it is imperative to reform the corporate practices that
lead to monopolistic abuse.
Transforming the rules that govern global trade will require sustained
cooperation and coordination among highly heterogeneous developing
countries with conflicting interests and priorities in the face of intense
opposition from the United States and the EU. The immense practical
difficulty of holding together such a coalition cannot be underestimated.
Nevertheless, developing countries asserted their collective power for the first
time in September 2003 by walking out of the Fifth Ministerial meeting of
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the WTO in Cancun, Mexico, to protest the intransigence of the United States
and the EU on agricultural subsidies. 41' The WTO negotiations did not
resume until the United States and the EU broke the deadlock by agreeing to
modest agricultural subsidy reductions. 412 Developing countries have also
been pressing for an exception to the WTO rules for protectionist measures
designed to promote food security. 413 Such an exception would provide
developing countries with much needed policy flexibility in the area of food
security. However, it is important to recognize that a carve-out for food
security is a far cry from a re-conceptualization of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture's single-minded promotion of export production.
Finally, modifying the WTO rules to provide developing countries with
greater flexibility to promote food security, protect the environment, and
diversify their economies does not guarantee that national elites will in fact
adopt measures that serve the common good rather than their own narrow
self-interest. It is therefore imperative to vindicate the right to food and the
emerging right to a healthy environment in both domestic and international
tribunals. Human rights law remains an indispensable tool to protect the
basic right of all human beings to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food and to
advance the procedural and substantive rights essential to the achievement
of ecological sustainability.

Poorer CountriesPull Out, supra note 364, at Al. Opposition to the WTO negotiations
had been building in developing countries since the 2001 WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha,
Qatar, where developing countries were pressured into adopting a Ministerial Declaration that
they had no role in drafting. Only two weeks before the Ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico,
developed countries hastily sidestepped one of the most contentious WTO issues by agreeing to
ease access to cheap generic drugs to poor nations in order to address public health emergencies.
With the drug issue off the table, the conflict over agricultural subsidies took center stage.
Tensions escalated when the United States and the EU made reductions in agricultural
subsidies contingent on developing country concessions in the areas of investment, government
procurement, competition policy, and trade facilitation. The Ministerial meeting collapsed as
outraged developing countries refused to negotiate these new issues without first resolving the
impasse over agricultural subsidies. See BALLVt, supranote 364, at 16-19.
411 Becker,

The United States agreed to reduce agricultural subsidies by twenty percent. The EU
announced that it would eliminate export subsidies. In exchange for these concessions,
developing countries were asked to reduce tariffs on manufactured goods. While some observers
hailed the deal as "the beginning of the end of subsidies," others speculated that the United
States and the EU might avail themselves of ambiguities in the agreement to evade their
subsidy reduction obligations. See Elizabeth Becker, Trade Group to Cut Farm Subsidies for Rich
Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at 8; Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Will Cut Farm Subsidies in
Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at BI.
412

food security and rural development exceptions to the WTO rules have been referred to
collectively as the "Development Box" proposal. See SOPHIA MURPHY, IISD, INTRODUCTION TO
THE DEVELOPMENT BOX: FINDING SPACE FOR DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS IN THE WTO's
AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS 1, 19 (2003), available at http://www.iisd.org/publications/
publication.asp?pno=533 (last visited Jan. 12, 2005) (describing the origins and elements of the
Development Box).

413 These
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